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Over the past three decades the level of corporate executive salaries has risen 
dramatically, prompting community concern.  This thesis is an investigation of corporate 
executive salaries, considered against the principles of distributive justice and economic 
efficiency. This will then enable the determination of whether the concerns are valid. 
 
I commence by examining empirical evidence for relationships between corporate 
performance and executive salary levels in Australia and the United States.  I find that 
there is a weak correlation between executive salary and corporate performance in 
Australia, and no reliable relationship evidenced in the United States.  There is some 
evidence that high executive salary may be associated with greater risk of corporate 
collapse in the United States.  Looking wider, there is no evidence that higher executive 
levels result in greater economic efficiency or returns to shareholders, in the OECD 
countries for which evidence is available. 
 
Given the lack of an empirical justification for current executive salary levels, I next review 
the philosophical and economic theories that have been used to analyse them, to see 
whether it is possible to define what executive salaries should be.  Philosophically the 
preferable approach is David Miller’s market rate theory, which justifies salary levels based 
on the fairness of the markets that set them.  The executive salary market fails to meet 
Miller’s conditions for non-exploitive markets. 
 
In economics, executive salaries have been recognised as an example of the principle-
agent problem since the 1970s. The recent debate over executive salary levels has been 
dominated by two rival theories.  Management power theory, as defined by Bebchuk and 
Freid, argues that executive salary levels are the result of the exploitation of positional 
power by executives.  Alignment theory, as defined by Jensen and Murphy, argues that 
the principle-agent problem can be solved by incentive based contracts, and therefore 
executive salary levels are defensible as their free market outcome. 
 
I conclude that management power is strongly preferable to alignment theory as an 
explanation of current executive salary practices and levels.  Alignment theory suffers from 
circular reasoning and inadequate evidentiary support, despite being developed on an 
empirical basis. The increase in executive salary levels since the 1970s is due to 
increased management power.  This increase can be explained by the more indirect 
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nature of share ownership that has evolved in parallel with institutional share funds.  This 
has added additional layers of agency costs to share ownership, and created the potential 
for collusive games between share fund managers, corporate directors, and executives. 
 
Having established that executive salary levels in Australia and the United States are not 
economically efficient, not ethically justifiable, and caused by systemic weaknesses in 
corporate governance structures, I consider the case for government regulation.  I 
conclude that this is both necessary and appropriate, as the cost of regulation is likely to 
be very much less than the current losses from excessive executive salaries.  Reforms 
need to include both direct salary caps and bonus limits on executive salaries in publicly 
listed corporations, as well as major overhauls to voting rules for the election of corporate 
directors and binding votes on remuneration.  A further equally important reform is the 
extension of current corporate governance regimes to share funds. 
 
I conclude on a somewhat pessimistic note, pointing out that corporate executives wield 
enormous political influence, making reform difficult.  This is due to their ability to use 
corporate financial resources to influence politicians to advance their private interests.  
This “executive influence” theory is consistent with public choice theory first identified in 
the 1960s.  There is now an imbalance in political power between corporate executives 
and all other citizens.  Without reform, the misuse of corporate power by executives is 
likely to be a continuing problem for capitalist democracies into the future. 
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1 Scope of Thesis and Definitions 
 
1.1 The Good, the Bad and the Average 
 
In recent years, instances of large salary payments to corporate executives under 
questionable circumstances have attracted widespread criticism.  Consider the case of 
Phillip Green, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Director of Australian investment firm 
Babcock & Brown (B&B). He received a salary of  $14.3 million in 2006, making him the 
second highest paid CEO in Australia.  Over the four years from B&B’s listing on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in 2004 to its demise in 2008, Green was paid $30 
million.  In addition he received performance bonuses of B&B shares, although these were 
not vested before the corporation collapsed.  Green’s combined personal ownership of 
B&B shares was valued at $400 million when the stock price peaked in mid-20071.   
 
The outcome for other B&B shareholders was less pleasing.  B&B had enjoyed rapid 
growth during this period, with the listed value of its shares exceeding $9 billion at its peak 
of $33 per share in 2007.  As credit markets tightened in 2007, the B&B share price fell.  
By the end of 2008 it had fallen to 14 cents per share.  It was placed into voluntary 
administration in March 2009.  Over 99% of the $4 billion in funds that had been invested 
into B&B was lost.  In 2009 the administrator recommended Green and other executives 
should be investigated by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
for possible conflicts of interest in loan deals2.  
 
Far worse examples of excessive pay proliferated on Wall Street in the first decade of the 
21st Century.  In 2007 Richard Fuld, CEO of investment bank Lehman Brothers, received 
salary and bonuses of US$51.65 million, with a total income over the five years 2002 to 
2007 of US$311.88 million3.  Less than a year later in September 2008 Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy, with more than 90% of its US$600 billion assets lost.  It was the 
largest financial collapse in US history and precipitated what became known as the global 
financial crisis (GFC) of 2008/09. 
                                                
1 Michael West, “Babcock’s Loot.” The Age, 14 February 2009. 
2 Danny John, “Former B&B Chief Faces Probe over Tricom.” Sydney Morning Herald, August 15, 
2009.  
3 Scott De Carlo, “Special Report: CEO Compensation.” Forbes Magazine, 30 April 2008. 
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In the years prior to bankruptcy Lehman Brothers, like the other four major Wall Street 
investment banks, had annually paid out 40% to 50% of gross revenue as compensation 
to its market traders and executives4.   Two of its last corporate actions were to transfer 
over US$8 billion in cash from its European offices back to New York, and then set aside 
US$2.5 billion to pay out bonuses to New York staff.  These actions were taken after it was 
known the bank faced bankruptcy5.  By contrast Lehman’s UK staff were not guaranteed to 
have their leave entitlements paid, even though the UK part of the business had still been 
profitable. 
 
The link between Fuld’s extraordinary pay and Lehman’s disastrous collapse was more 
than coincidental.  Corporate governance researcher Nell Minnow said in testimony to the 
US Congress Committee inquiring into Lehman’s collapse:  
“As I have mentioned in previous testimony before this committee, there is no more 
reliable indicator of litigation, liability, and investment risk than pay that is not linked to 
performance. I think it is fair to say by any standard of measurement that this [Fuld’s] pay 
plan is as uncorrelated to performance as it is possible to be.”6 
 
Excesses such as those listed have generated considerable hostility over the issue of 
rewards for corporate executives.  In the wake of the Enron and “dot-com” scandals of the 
late 1990s Carol Loomis, Fortune Magazine reporter on CEO pay wrote simply “This Stuff 
is Wrong”7 in 2001.  Almost ten years later sentiment has become even more outraged 
following the onset of the global financial crisis.  This was particularly the case in the 
United States after the GFC.  It emerged that some large corporations receiving taxpayer 
assistance to avoid bankruptcy, such as American Insurance Group (AIG), had used 
taxpayer funds to continue paying executives their (very large) performance bonuses, 
despite being effectively insolvent.  
 
Yet there are also examples of executives who have created genuine benefits for their 
corporations without cheating their employees, the taxpayer, or their shareholders.  When 
                                                
4Christine Harper, “Bonus Pay for Wall Street Big Five Surges to Record $36 Billion.” Bloomberg, 
6 November 2006. 
5 David Prosser, “Fury at $2.5 Bn bonus for Lehman’s New York staff.” The Independent, 22 
September 2008. 
6 Nell Minnow, “Testimony to US Congress Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
Hearing on the Bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.” Washington D.C., October 6, 2008. 
7 Carol Loomis, “This Stuff is Wrong.” Fortune Magazine, 25 June 2001. 
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Charles “Chip” Goodyear became Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of BHP in 1999, 
Australia’s largest mining company was debt-ridden.  It then merged to become BHP 
Billiton in 2001 and Goodyear took over as CEO in 2003.  By 2007, when Goodyear 
retired, BHP Billiton was the largest mining company in the world, very profitable, and had 
eliminated most of its debts.  Under Goodyear BHP Billiton’s share value had increased 
from $12 billion to $200 billion in nine years.  It was also Australia’s largest taxpayer, 
contributing greatly to a parallel boom in the Australian economy.  Goodyear’s salary, 
bonuses and departure benefits in his final year totalled A$8 million, compared to BHP 
Billiton’s annual profit of over A$15 billion8.  
 
An even more clear-cut example of effective executive management providing good 
returns to shareholders is the success of American businessman Warren Buffett.  In 1967 
Buffett acquired control of Berkshire Hathaway, a textiles company, and reorganised it as 
an insurance and investment holding company.  Over the next forty-four years Berkshire 
Hathaway averaged returns of 20.3% to its investors, and its shares grew in price from $19 
each to over $70,000 each, becoming the 18th largest corporation in the world9.   This 
success was not a result of luck or any discovery or invention.  Buffett had studied an 
investment philosophy known as “value investing” at college and applied it in his own 
management decisions over the following forty years. 
 
During this period Buffett’s personal wealth grew to over US $40 billion, making him the 
third richest person on earth in 2010.  However this wealth accrued from his personal 
stake in investments and starting ownership share of the company.  He lived frugally and 
in 2007, at the height of the corporate salary boom on Wall Street, paid himself a base 
salary of $100,000 per annum as CEO of Berkshire.  He consciously favoured investments 
that provided employment in his home town of Omaha, Nebraska.  In 2006 he announced 
his intention to give most of his wealth to charity, via the William and Melinda Gates 
Foundation10.  By any measure, Buffett’s skill as an executive has benefited his 
corporation, its shareholders and his community11. 
 
                                                
8 Barry Fitzgerald, “Chip heads off with $60m in shares.” The Age, 27 September 2007. 
9 Warren Buffett, “Letter to Shareholders.” Berkshire Hathaway Inc., February 2008. 
10 Carol J. Loomis, "Warren Buffett gives away his fortune." Fortune Magazine, 25 June, 2006.  
11 I do not claim that Buffett is a paragon of virtue.  Some of his highly profitable investments were 
made in tobacco companies after the harm caused by smoking was already well known. 
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Such extreme examples of good and ill in executive behaviour and performance illustrate 
the dangers of rushing to judgement as an emotional reaction to examples of wrong doing.  
They also demonstrate that we cannot reach sound general conclusions from individual 
stories and anecdotal evidence.  They may not be reliable indicators of the overall picture.  
Every profession has instances of individuals who perform exceptionally well, while others 
may behave unethically to the extent that they harm the reputation of the group as a 
whole.  There is a danger that, in the emotional context of a strong societal reaction 
against apparent corporate greed and excess, we will rush to judgement and overreact.  
As the cases of Goodyear and Buffett show, talented individual executives may greatly 
benefit a corporation, and presumably the society in which it operates. Judgements about 
executive salaries should be based on a broad examination of the executive labour market 
and its wider consequences, and not an emotional reaction to an instance of bad practice. 
 
1.2 A Multi-Disciplinary Approach 
To date the quantitative analysis of executive salary has primarily been carried out within 
the field of financial accounting.  This field is concerned with the analysis of business 
operations and costs.  It aims to provide investors with enough information about the 
performance of businesses to make rational investment decisions.  Hence consideration of 
the level of executive salary within this field is appropriate.  As we shall see, the pioneering 
work on the study of executive salary was by financial accounting academics Michael C. 
Jensen and William H. Mecklin in the 1970s, and by Jensen with Kevin F. Murphy since 
then.   
 
In this literature these authors argued that the efficient level of executive salary to be paid 
within a corporation depended on what gave the best financial return to shareholders.  If 
this condition could be satisfied then under financial accounting theories it would be 
rational for shareholders to pay the salary.  This thesis will review this literature in order to 
understand whether the levels of executive salary being paid do in fact represent rational 
business decisions for shareholders. 
 
For the broader society, the consideration of executive salary in financial accounting 
literature will be insufficient to resolve public concerns.  Members of a society will be 
interested in the broader question of whether or not the society as a whole is better off with 
a particular level of executive salary, not the individual corporation that pays it.  Financial 
 16 
accounting is only concerned with the performance of individual corporations and cannot 
answer this broader question. 
 
The social science of economics is concerned with understanding the operations of entire 
industries, national and even international economies, to guide the efficient allocation of 
resources within each to satisfy the needs of the society.  To reach rational conclusions on 
whether a particular level of executive salary is efficient, economic analysis may be used 
to determine whether the society as a whole is (materially) better off.  This requires 
consideration of its macro-effects on social welfare, not only monetarised effects within the 
corporation.  
 
The question of what level of salary within an occupation provides the best resource 
allocation outcomes within the society is normally considered within the sub-field of labour 
market economics. This thesis will examine relevant literature from that field in assessing 
whether the level of executive salary is rational for the society.  There is a remarkable lack 
of economic analysis of the effects of executive salary levels, compared to the economic 
analysis of other occupations, such as whether a society needs more doctors, or whether 
teachers should be paid more.  In this absence I will consider the application of standard 
theories in labour market economics to the executive salary market.  I will also examine 
executive salary levels within a macro-economic framework to gain a better understanding 
of their overall societal impacts. 
 
Yet while this analysis of the evidence on executive salary already spans two disciplines, it 
is still not sufficient to answer the broader question about the legitimacy of executive salary 
levels. Financial accounting theory will tell us whether executive salary levels are rational 
for corporations.  Labour-market economics will tell us whether executive salary levels are 
rational for the whole economy.  Macro-economics will tell us whether the society is better 
off in economics terms. None of these will tell us about the non-economic impacts, 
whether they are justifiable, or give us guidance as to whether the society should permit 
them.  They cannot respond to Carol Loomis’ concern and indicate whether executive 
salaries are wrong.   
 
While the rightness or wrongness of executive salaries may not be a question for 
accounting or economics to answer, it remains a significant question.  When I say that the 
emotional reaction against current executive salary levels may be an overreaction or may 
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not be reliable, this is not to dismiss the reaction.  Human beings react emotionally against 
behaviour which conflicts with their own values and ethical principles.  Societies create 
laws or establish norms of behaviour in recognition of such commonly held values and 
principles.  Without them, it might be argued that there is little in common to bind the 
society together. 
 
Determining whether or not executive salary levels are right or wrong is a normative 
question. It presupposes that there are rules, or at least some common understanding 
within a society, for what level of reward is reasonable for undertaking an occupation.  We 
need to understand what norms or principles are applied to such cases, and apply them to 
executive salaries.  This is the province of applied ethics, which is concerned with the 
rightness or wrongness of actions. Distributive justice is the sub-discipline that is 
concerned with the judgements about the appropriateness of forms and levels of rewards.  
Therefore, a significant proportion of this thesis will be devoted to the analysis of executive 
salary levels using principles of distributive justice. 
 
It should be noted that the topic of inquiry straddles three very large fields of study, 
accounting, economics and distributive justice with only marginal overlap between them.  
Each has separate professional as well as academic literature, particularly in the business 
and financial accounting field.  It is impossible to consider all of the relevant material in one 
thesis.  Therefore this thesis will focus on what I consider to be seminal articles that 
examine the theoretical issues in each case.  Examination of empirical evidence will be 
confined to Australia and the United States up to the end of 2009. 
 
1.3 The Relevance of Normative Analysis 
Before proceeding to outline the thesis in detail, I will address further the question of the 
applicability of normative analysis to business decisions such as executive salary.  It may 
be argued that the level of executive salary is purely a financial decision and should be left 
to business to decide.  Normative questions of right and wrong are separate to business 
management questions under this view. 
 
This claim is false. Ethical theories are developed to enable an analysis of the rightness or 
wrongness of actions in all social contexts.  Business is neither specifically targeted nor 
excluded.  It is included simply by being part of the range of activity undertaken by persons 
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within a society.  It is no more justifiable to exclude business behaviour from ethical 
scrutiny than it is to exclude the military or executive branches of government from ethical 
scrutiny.  We may debate what are the appropriate normative standards to apply to 
business, but it is not defensible to say that none apply to business by definition.  The 
existence of rules for probity in business, that define acceptable behaviour in negotiations, 
demonstrate that accepted norms of behaviour already exist within business.  Whether or 
not those norms are ethically justifiable is a separate question. 
 
Moreover, the assumption that executive salary levels are purely a question of business 
efficiency is itself a normative view.  It implies that such questions are solely a matter of 
consideration of financial outcomes.  That is, value should be given to financial outcomes 
in such matters, and not to any other social impacts.  Such a decision to give a weighting 
or value to financial measures and zero value to any other measures is itself a value or 
normative judgement.  It would therefore be both arbitrary and logically inconsistent to 
exclude other normative judgements without sound reason.  No such reason exists. 
  
There has been little consideration of the underlying philosophical issues involved in the 
distribution of rewards within corporations, either for employees in general or to 
executives.  This is consistent with the “classic” view of corporations as espoused by 
Milton Friedman.  Friedman argued that the purpose of a firm is to make a profit, with all 
other considerations, including ethics, being secondary12. Friedman used executives’ 
fiduciary duty to shareholders as a justification for executives making ethical 
considerations secondary.  Under their fiduciary duty, executives were obliged to act in the 
shareholder’s interests, that was primarily assumed to be making a profit.  Hence the 
executives could not substitute other considerations, including their personal ethical views, 
while making decisions about the corporation. 
 
John Boatright has already demonstrated the internal contradiction in Friedman’s view13.  
He pointed out that fiduciary duties held by corporate executives are themselves a form of 
moral obligation.  Hence it was logically inconsistent to say that a particular class of moral 
obligation (fiduciary duty) trumped consideration of all other moral obligations an executive 
might feel compelled to act upon.  There was no inherent attribute of fiduciary duties that 
                                                
12 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits.” The New York 
Times Magazine, September 13, 1970.  
13 John R. Boatright, “Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder – Management Relation: Or, What’s so 
Special About Shareholders?” Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 4, Issue 4 (1994). 
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gave them priority over other moral obligations.  Deciding which moral obligation was most 
important in each case was an example of the sort of reasoning normally required in 
making moral judgements. Despite this logical flaw in Friedman’s argument, it clearly 
remains popular in business thinking14. 
 
I contend that the Friedman view of business ethics is not only logically flawed, but it is far 
too narrow a view, and is sharply inconsistent with community values.  Questions of justice 
and fairness do matter to the majority of people, and it is legitimate to examine executive 
salary from this viewpoint.  This has been true throughout history, with Aristotle first 
defining it in the fourth century BC: 
“True justice means that those who have contributed to the end of the [state] should have 
privileges in proportion to their contribution to that end.”15 
 
In summary then, reaching a view on what social policy should be towards executive 
salary levels requires a consideration of each relevant discipline: financial accounting, 
economics and distributive justice.  Material from each will be considered in this thesis.  A 
final answer on whether executive salary levels are wrong and what social policy towards 
them may be appropriate will be principally considered from the viewpoint of philosophy 
and distributive justice, since these are primarily normative questions for a society.  
However impacts of policy proposals on business and the economy will still be considered, 
since these form part of the society.  The point of using a philosophical framework is to 
ensure that non-financial issues will not be excluded from consideration. 
 
1.4 The Relevance of Distributive Justice 
Having established that normative principles are relevant to business issues such as 
executive salary levels, the next question is the applicability of distributive justice 
principles.  That is, we have shown that the rightness or wrongness of executive salary 
levels is a normative question, that normative questions are appropriate to apply to 
business, and that the community is concerned about normative aspects of executive 
salary.  The question remains: are ethical and distributive justice principles an appropriate 
means to use in making this inquiry?  It might be argued that the philosophical conception 
                                                
14 As of 2010 Friedman’s article had been cited in over 3500 publications, most in the fields of 
financial accounting and business management. 
15 Aristotle, “The Politics”, translation by Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995). 
Book 3, Chapter 9. 
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of distributive justice is simply an idealistic notion with no basis in people’s lived 
experience.  We need to demonstrate that the principles of distributive justice are both 
ethically sound, and representative of community values.  I will deal with the first question 
in later chapters, but here I will demonstrate the link between distributive justice principles 
and community values. 
 
David Miller16 in Principles of Social Justice (1999) surveyed evidence on social attitudes 
and behaviour on justice issues including income distribution.  He found that, while 
attitudes vary slightly from culture to culture within the western world, most people did 
have an understanding and acceptance of concepts of social justice. Thus Miller 
concludes we can reject the Hayekian17 claim that “the whole notion of social justice is 
fundamentally misguided”.  Miller found that:  
“people seem to be perfectly at home with the notion of social justice itself; they are 
prepared to apply criteria of distributive justice to existing social arrangements, and to say 
in broad terms what a just society would look like (even if they are sceptical about the 
chances of achieving one)”18. 
I agree with David Miller on this point.  Whether or not we may agree with any particular 
conception of social justice, we cannot, as Hayek does, dismiss it as a “mirage” imagined 
only by philosophers.  As David Miller’s survey demonstrates, views on what social justice 
is exist within each society.  Thus, consistently held or not, the idea of social justice exists. 
 
Further, there were some consistently held beliefs about distributive justice across and 
within cultures.  These could be demonstrated through empirical evidence, both in terms of 
individual’s behaviour, and the justifications or principles that individuals referred to in 
survey responses.  These beliefs also went beyond holding principles that might be in an 
individual’s rational self-interest to hold.  They represent underlying beliefs about the 
nature of a just distribution of rewards.   
 
These beliefs did not equate to a preference for income equality.  Results of surveys of 
preferences for income distribution varied between countries and size of groups: 
“most of the groups studied favoured top to bottom income ratios of between 9 to 1 [in 
Australia] and 12 to 1 [in the United States].  This still represented a considerable 
                                                
16 David Miller, “Principles of Social Justice.” (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press 1999). 
17 F.A. Hayek, “The Mirage of Social Justice.” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1976). 
18 David Miller (1999), Page 90. 
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narrowing of existing differentials as perceived by the respondents but clearly the overall 
pattern is substantially more inegalitarian than that presented by vignette studies, where 
the top-to-bottom ratio is less than 3 to 1.” 19 
 
The highest incomes were expected by respondents to go to occupations such as lawyers 
or business executives.  These results demonstrate that most individuals accept the notion 
that some individuals deserve higher income than others, based on some criteria about 
their work.  They also show that most individuals have a view of what quantum for such 
differences is reasonable. 
 
Miller (1999) concluded that community ideas of social justice were pluralistic, based on 
multiple criteria20.  These criteria are contextual in that their application singly, or in 
combination, depends on the circumstances, and also on the nature of the group in which 
they are being applied.  Different societies may have different views on social justice, but 
there will still be an underlying notion held by the members of each society of what it is, 
and when criteria are relevant. Individuals have a practical understanding of these 
concepts, and an awareness of when it is appropriate to apply them21. 
 
Concepts of desert, need and equality are widely recognised as the key criteria in deciding 
questions of the just distribution of rewards and obligations within society.  Of these, the 
desert criteria are the most unambiguous, and most clearly distinct from other arguments 
for preferences.  Desert criteria are backward-looking, based on people’s past contribution 
or efforts made towards an outcome22. It may be difficult to distinguish rewards for desert 
from those given as incentives for future efforts.  The preference for desert criteria over 
equality tended to be stronger in larger groups, or where the degree of internal group 
cohesiveness was lower23. 
 
Need is also an important criteria to most people, as long as genuine need is distinguished 
from wants or desires.  That is, need is determined by the circumstances an individual 
finds themselves in, not their expressed claims of need.  This is true both in small groups, 
                                                
19 David Miller (1999) Page 69. 
20 David Miller (1999), Pages 78-79.  
21 David Miller (1999), Pages 87. 
22 David Miller (1999), Page 90. 
23 David Miller (1999), Pages 64-65. 
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and across societies as a whole.  At the societal level, there is a strong preference for 
need to be reflected in minimum levels of income or support for all individuals24. 
 
Equality is also important to the majority of persons, but it needs to be carefully defined.  
Most people want equality of treatment and opportunity for all.  This does not equate to a 
preference for identical rewards for all.  A purely egalitarian approach to distribution of 
rewards is the preference of some but not the majority.  Most people consider that 
differences in factors such as effort, difficulty, qualifications and risk between occupations 
should be taken into account in their relative rewards.  They do not seriously expect all 
jobs to have equal incomes, although Miller did find that most would expect income 
differences to be smaller than at present, and not the present differences or larger, if all 
labour markets were fair25. 
 
Given the prevailing attitudes Miller reported, we can consider how they relate to corporate 
executives.  For executives, consideration of reward practices against measures of 
equality is almost a “straw-man” criticism.  Current levels of executive reward are so much 
greater than average incomes that they could not be justified under any conception of 
egalitarianism.  Likewise questions of need maybe disregarded in the case of corporate 
executives, since their rewards are already higher than the norm, and much higher than 
any definition of poverty or the minimum income levels needed for survival in any society.   
 
This leaves the question of whether executive rewards are deserved.  This is squarely 
within the field of study of distributive justice theories of desert.  Therefore this thesis 
examines executive rewards from the viewpoint of desert theories.  That is, we will 
consider whether it can be shown that executives deserve the level of rewards they 
receive.  If it is possible to construct a distributive justice theory that might justify executive 
rewards, desert theories seem to offer the best chance.  Whether this is possible or not, 
desert theories are reflective of broader social attitudes and thus represent the sort of 
justification that needs to be met for executive rewards to be socially acceptable. 
 
                                                
24 David Miller (1999), Page 91. 
25 David Miller (1999), Page 71. 
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Jarred Harris26 has considered the question of executive rewards from the viewpoint of 
three other theories of distributive justice, namely Rawl’s difference principle and 
conception of justice as fairness, Sen and Nussbaum’s capability theory, and Nozick’s 
libertarian theory. Harris makes clear that executive rewards practice did not satisfy these 
theories either. Rawl’s difference principle is that increased rewards should only be 
allocated in such a way that the least well off are (also) made better off.  We will see in 
reviewing empirical evidence in Chapter Two that this is not the case for higher executive 
rewards.  With regard to the principles of justice as fairness, Harris considers equality of 
opportunity and the process for determining rewards for executives.  In both cases current 
practice in selecting executives and their rewards is shown to fail to meet relevant criteria.  
 
Sen and Nussbaum’s capability theory focuses on whether the freedoms and capabilities 
of individuals relevant to an action are enhanced by it.  For executive rewards, Harris 
considers that this equates to deciding whether the freedoms and capabilities of the 
stakeholders in a corporation are increased by rewarding the executive more.  He 
concludes that this requirement is difficult to quantify and prove, and likely not to be met.   
 
This application of Sen and Nussbaum is debateable, since it depends on the definition of 
the group affected by the executive reward.  If the group affected was extended to the 
whole community, and it could be shown that the reward did lead to an increase in social 
welfare, then it might be possible to satisfy Sen and Nussbaum’s conception of distributive 
justice.  With a wider definition of stakeholders the theory would more closely resemble 
contribution-based desert theory, although an increase in income would be insufficient to 
satisfy it, unless there was also a genuine increase in human freedom and capability. 
 
Nozick’s libertarian theory very narrowly defines distributive justice to property ownership 
and the justice of  its acquisition and transfer.  He states no view on the justice of any 
particular pattern of allocation of rewards, other than the means by which they were 
obtained.  In Harris’s view this means that executive compensation must satisfy a “value 
proposition” that it results in a gain in value for the other parties of the transaction i.e. the 
shareholders.  Again, Nozick does not allow an overall conclusion to be reached for 
                                                
26 Jared D. Harris, “How Much is Too Much? A Theoretical Analysis of Executive Compensation 
from the Standpoint of Distributive Justice”, The Ethics of Executive Compensation, Robert W. 
Kolb, ed., Chapter 4, pp. 67-86, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006). 
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executive rewards.  This would depend on examining the process and level of executive 
rewards in each individual case. 
 
I broadly agree with Harris’ conclusions, however in my view they do not answer the 
central questions of this thesis.  None of these theories closely match the commonly held 
attitudes to justice described by David Miller.  Nor do they match the economic theory and 
rhetoric commonly used to analyse and justify executive rewards.  In my view this is the 
most urgent task facing a review of executive rewards from the point of view of distributive 
justice and economics.  There is a need to engage with the views held by the community, 
and the theories in use within the professional groups that set executive rewards.   I do not 
propose to examine these other philosophical theories further in this thesis.  I consider that 
desert theories as defined by David Miller represent the best analytical tool with which to 
consider the fairness of executive rewards. 
 
1.5 Does it Matter? 
Finally, before launching into an examination of such a complex topic, I need to address 
the question of whether it matters.  That is, can we establish that executive salaries are a 
sufficiently important question of distributive justice to warrant examining it closely?  
Arguments about the reasonableness of executive salaries have been raised since well 
before their growth trend started in the early 1980s.  After over 25 years of debate for 
seemingly no change in trend, cynics might say that nothing has changed, or will change, 
and there is no point in further debating the topic.  Critics of distributive justice and/or 
defenders of high executive rewards could also argue that such behaviour is simply an 
inevitable aspect of the corporate executive labour market.  Further, arguments about 
equity are irrelevant and some degree of self-serving behaviour occurs in every field, while 
most executives take their responsibilities seriously and only seek their earned reward. 
 
This view is false.  Although the trend of real increases in executive rewards has been 
ongoing for over 25 years, this does not mean that the situation is static.  In real terms the 
Australian or US CEO of the early 21st Century is rewarded five to ten times more than 
their counterpart CEO was in the late 1970s.  Executive rewards have continued climbing 
higher every year, at a rate outstripping growth in both corporate profits and economic 
growth in general.  They now represent a considerable cost to shareholders.   
 
 25 
This trend will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, but I will briefly outline the 
situation here.  In Australia in 2007/08, the CEOs of Australia’s top 300 corporations had 
an average total income of $2.9 million per annum, with a median income of $1.7 million 
per annum.  The average total incomes for non-CEO executives were $1.1 million and the 
median total income was $600,000 per annum27.  This represented an income 45 times 
the national average income for top 300 CEOs and ten times the national average for 
other executives.  Comparing to other highly paid professions, the average executive 
received 3.3 times the income of the Prime Minister, 2.75 times the income of a High Court 
Judge28, and 2.3 times the income of a University Vice-Chancellor29. 
 
In the United States the contrast is even more dramatic.  In 2007/08, the CEOs of 
America’s top 500 corporations were paid an average of $12.8 million US, or 457 times the 
national average income.  Perhaps more remarkably, this average income was 32 times 
the US President’s salary, and 74 times the salary of the average doctor30.  While a few 
individuals such as musicians or sporting stars might earn more than the average CEO, 
the average income for musicians and professional sportspeople as a group is much less.  
There is no other occupational group with an average income comparable to executives. 
 
Prior to the 1980s executive compensation represented a cost to shareholders of perhaps 
1% to 2% of corporate profits.  Paying executives slightly more to motivate better 
corporate performance might be understandable in that context.  In the thirty years since 
then the scale of executive rewards has grown to the point where they now represents a 
loss to shareholders of over 10% of corporate profits annually31.  Shareholders would wish 
to be sure of a corresponding increase in profits for such a cost to be worth incurring.  
 
If current executive pay practices and levels remain in place in the long term, they will 
have a significant effect on retirement savings in Australia and the United States.  Under 
                                                
27 Australian Productivity Commission, “Executive Remuneration in Australia.” Inquiry report, 
Appendix D, December 2009.   
28 The Prime Minister’s salary was $330,000 in 2007.  The High Court Chief Justice salary 
$398,930 in 2007. Source: Australian Government Remuneration Tribunal 
29 Australian University Vice Chancellors average salary was $474,000 in 2004.  See Clements, 
Kenneth W. and Izan, H. Y., “The Stairway to the Top: The Remuneration of Academic 
Executives.” University of Western Australia Business School, 2007. Accessed online at 
http://www.ecosoc.org.au/files/File/TAS/ACE07/presentations%20(pdf)/Clements.pdf  
30 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Occupational Employment and Wages – May 2009.” US 
Department of Labor, 2009. 
31 Lucien Bebchuck and Jesse Fried, “Pay without Performance, the Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation.” (Harvard University Press, Cambridge: Massachusets, 2004). 
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current executive salary levels individuals with retirement funds invested in shares are 
likely to have their retirement benefits reduced by 15% to 20% over 35 years of full time 
work, compared to returns if the cost of executive rewards had remained equal to 1% of 
corporate profits as in the 1970s.  This has the potential to undermine the retirement 
income policies of most western nations.  The threat of too high executive pay to 
superannuation (retirement) fund performance in Australia was identified by Pauline 
Vamos, Chief Executive of the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, in 
200932.  The potential loss in retirement benefit from executive pay for a worker saving 
$5000 per year over 35 years is shown in Figure 1.133.  
 
Figure 1.1 Potential Losses in Retirement Savings from Executive Pay 
 
Further, executive pay practices may be creating additional indirect losses to 
shareholders, by encouraging excessive risk taking.  While this is not a case of 
deliberately transferring wealth from shareholders to executives, the losses to 
shareholders may be even greater than from excessive pay.  Nobel Economics Laureates 
                                                
32Ruth Williams, “Super Funds in Executive Pay Warning.” The Age, 20 March, 2009. Stephen 
Long has shown that average returns on superannuation in Australia over the 14 years up to 2010 
were barely more than inflation.  Stephen Long, “A Super Scandal.” ABC Drum, 5 August 2010. 
33 The chart assumes a worker on average wages, receiving legally required superannuation, an 




Joseph Stiglitz34 and Paul Krugman35 have both suggested that the form of executive 
salaries was one motivating factor behind the high-risk investment strategies that led to the 
global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008/09.   The GFC reduced the value of stockmarkets by 
more than a third throughout the western world and was estimated to have cost over two 
trillion dollars36.   
 
The growth trend in executive incomes extending over three decades is not normal for 
labour markets.  We would expect any labour market to begin some form of correction (i.e. 
return to a long run equilibrium price level) before such a long period of time had elapsed.  
For example, the demand for accountants boomed in the 1980s following financial market 
deregulation, while the demand for computer professionals grew dramatically in the 1990s 
during the “dot com boom”.  Yet in both cases those labour markets adjusted later, as the 
supply of graduates trained in accountancy and computer science increased to match 
demand.  Labour markets are notoriously “downwards sticky” in that individuals are usually 
reluctant to accept a cut in personal income37.  Nevertheless, those labour markets 
reached equilibrium again at a lower labour price within less than a decade. 
 
The executive labour market has shown little sign of reaching an equilibrium level or of 
undergoing any form of price correction.  This is despite an increase in the supply of 
business graduates in the Australian and United States labour markets to the point where 
they might now be regarded as over-supplied38.  In a competitive labour market this should 
have resulted in a correction to the cost of executive labour.  This is contrary to all relevant 
economic theory for labour markets and markets in general.  A deeper examination of the 
mechanisms at work does seem necessary to understand what is occurring.  Moreover the 
trend in executive rewards has created tangible costs, both economic and social. 
 
Clearly, there is a need to examine the broader economic impacts of executive salaries, 
and not simply their effect on the profitability of an individual corporation.  Recently, 
                                                
34 Sean O’Grady, “Economist Stiglitz blames crunch on ‘flawed’ city bonus schemes.” The 
Independent, 24 March 2008. 
35 Paul Krugman, “The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008.” (New York: 
Norton 2008). 
36 The cost was estimated at US$2.3 Trillion by the International Monetary Fund in its October 
2009 Global Financial Stability Report. 
37 Robert E. Hall, “Employment Efficiency and Sticky Wages: Evidence from Flows in the Labor 
Market.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, August 2005, Vol. 87, No. 3, Pages 397-407. 
38 Jerold L. Zimmerman, “Can American Business Schools Survive?” Simon School of Business 
Working Paper No. FR 01-16. (September 5, 2001). 
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studies of Australia superannuation fund returns suggest that these concerns are already 
being realised.  For the period records were available, from 1997 to 2010, Australian super 
fund returns averaged less than 4% per annum, barely exceeding inflation39.  Whilst it is 
not suggested that executive salary levels are the sole cause of this poor performance, it 
highlights that any issue that affects the long-term performance of shares and 
superannuation funds is of national economic significance. 
 
1.6 Terminology and Definitions 
Modern corporate culture has spawned a bewildering array of terms for corporate 
structures, positions, roles, and forms of payments.  In some cases a multiplicity of terms 
relate to essentially the same concept, while in others the concepts themselves appear 
deliberately confusing.  Payments to executives are often defined in opaque terms that a 
reasonable person might be forgiven for suspecting are invented primarily to conceal the 
true extent of payment from easy calculation.  In this thesis I will assume certain key terms 
to have the meanings defined here. 
 
The term “corporation” is taken to apply to any privately owned business structure in a 
capitalist economy that has the purpose of providing goods or services for profit.  For this 
purpose it applies equally to individual firms or large groups consisting of many subsidiary 
companies both nationally and internationally.  The key structural characteristics are that 
corporations are owned by a group of individuals able to sell their share of ownership if 
they desire, and that they have a defined power structure controlled by high-ranking 
employees.  They are typically controlled by a corporate board elected by shareholders 
and including the most senior (executive) members of the employees reporting to it. 
 
The term “shareholder” is taken to represent individuals holding (owning) shares in the 
ownership of a corporation.  Note that there is a legal debate over whether shareholders 
are the legal owners of a corporation.  Some argue that instead they own a share of the 
stock, or a security over a corporation40.  Also there are many different classes of share 
ownership in some corporations, with varying combinations of ownership, voting rights and 
rights to profits.  However its details are beyond the scope of this thesis and does not alter 
the status of shareholders from the point of view of rewards.  In ethical terms, 
                                                
39 Stephen Long, “A Super Scandal.” ABC The Drum, 5 August 2010, published online at 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/08/05/2974671.htm 
40 Stephen Bainbridge, “Corporation Law and Economics.” (New York: Foundation Press, 2006). 
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shareholders are the providers of the capital required to create the corporation, and are 
reasonably entitled to a return on their investment.  Hence for purposes of this thesis, 
shareholders will be regarded as sharing the ownership of a corporation and entitled to 
share in the profits. 
 
The term “executive” is meant to refer to an occupier of any high level position within a 
corporation who has, or shares, some form of decision-making authority over the 
corporation.  Common titles for these positions at present are Chief Executive Office 
(CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Operating Officer (COO), Chief Technical 
Officer (CTO), Chief Information Officer (CIO), and Chief Communications Officer (CCO).  
Other examples include titles substituting terms such as “Vice President”, “Director” or 
“Executive” in place of the word “chief”.  Examples of executives by this definition also 
include Managing Directors or members of Corporate Boards with executive powers 
(Executive Directors).  
 
The term “rewards” will be taken to include all forms of contractually entitled payments or 
benefits received by executives for the performance of their corporate role.  This includes 
salary, bonuses, severance and retirement benefits, and other accumulated benefits such 
as options to purchase shares at a concessional price. In this context I am not concerned 
with whether the payments are received by cash, or share options or in the present or 
future.  The question is the total amount and present value of rewards received, and 
whether it is justified. 
 
In many cases I will primarily consider evidence on payments made to CEOs when 
discussing executive rewards more generally.   There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the 
lack of consistency in titles and structures in firms below this level makes lower level 
comparisons difficult.  Secondly, the large amount of data available for CEO pay makes 
them convenient to use as a proxy for executive wage trends generally.  While CEO 
rewards will generally be higher than those of other executives, data shows they act as a 
reasonable proxy for the trend in executive rewards generally.  Wherever possible 
empirical evidence has been drawn from government or official sources such as the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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1.7 Structure of Thesis 
I will commence in Chapter Two by examining an overview of the empirical evidence for 
trends in executive rewards in Australia and the United States. The Australian and US 
markets have been selected because the relevant data is published and most easily 
accessible to the author.  Australian and US executive labour market trends are also 
considered to be representative of other English speaking countries such as Canada, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom.  Data from other nation’s executive labour markets will 
be compared where relevant and available. 
 
The examination will commence with a review of the cited evidence for relationships 
between executive rewards and corporate performance at the micro (individual firm) level, 
as practiced in financial accounting literature.  I will show that, while these relationships 
are commonly quoted to defend the effectiveness of accounting models of executive 
salary, they do not meet normal standards of statistical reliability applied in other fields of 
science.  Next I will proceed to review the macro (national) level economic evidence of 
relationships between executive rewards and economic performance.  This should be a 
key factor in justifying high executive salary from a societal and public policy perspective.  I 
will show that such evidence as exists is either inconclusive or recommends lower 
executive salary levels.  I will conclude with evidence on two aspects not usually quantified 
by financial papers on rewards, the relationship between executive rewards and corporate 
risk, and a comparison with norms for variation in salary levels in other group practices. 
 
In Chapter Three I will examine philosophical theories of distributive justice.  The general 
question of reward for individuals in groups has received little attention in the philosophical 
literature.  I will sketch a philosophical framework by which we may judge claims about the 
fairness of executive rewards and economic theories used to justify them. 
 
Chapters Four, and Five contain a review of the primary economic theories used to explain 
and in some cases justify executive rewards, namely management power and alignment 
theories.  Although both of these theories are defined in terms of agency costs, they 
represent explanations of executive rewards that depend on non-market and market 
causes respectively.  In this respect, executive reward theories are at the intersection of 
the economic debate over efficient markets hypothesis, and the question of whether self-
regulating markets are possible.  I argue that the available evidence from executive labour 
markets in Australia and the United States leads to a clear preference between these two 
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economic theories.  Further developments in the causal explanations of both theories are 
recommended.  Other economic theories such as the economics of superstars are briefly 
discussed in Chapter Six.  These are peripheral to the arguments in this thesis but help to 
clarify some aspects of executive rewards. 
 
Having developed a philosophical framework and completed a review of the economic 
theories, we are left with the question of policy recommendations.  Chapter Seven looks at 
the weaknesses identified in economic explanations of executive rewards and asks 
whether, in ideal circumstances, one of the economic theories could be implemented in a 
more effective fashion than has occurred to date.  This leads to conclusions on the nature 
of structural and regulatory changes required to reform the executive labour markets in 
Australia and the United States. 
 
Chapter Eight continues with some specific policy recommendations on the types of 
changes required to have a better functioning executive labour market.  This will not detail 
specific legal or accounting rules, but focuses on areas where practice may be improved, 
and some means by which this may be achieved.  This is discussed broadly, including 
changes to executive labour market practice, changes to corporate governance, and 
structural changes to corporations themselves.  Changes are recommended to both 
corporate practices, and practices of associated bodies that are found to causally impact 
on executive rewards.  
 
I conclude with some reflections on the significance of the executive rewards problem as it 
stands now.  I argue that current practice is a symptom of broader weaknesses in the 
political - economic relationship between corporations and democratic governments.  
These have far reaching implications for the functioning of democracy.  As I intend to 
demonstrate, I consider that executive rewards are problematic, and they are symptomatic 
of deeper problems in the conception of corporations and their stakeholders in most 
English-speaking countries, including but not limited to Australia and the United States. 
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2 Empirical Evidence on Executive Reward Trends 
 
Empirical evidence on the level of rewards for corporate executives and their relationship 
to the performance of corporations and the economy is relevant to arguments on both 
financial (business) and economic (societal) efficiency.  Later it will also be relevant to 
consideration of the distributive justice or fairness of such rewards, when we are 
considering the desert bases of these executives. 
 
In this chapter I will briefly describe some of the trends in executive rewards in the past 
two decades for Australia and the United States.  I will then review literature on 
comparisons between executive rewards and the performance of corporations, to see 
whether higher rewards for executives generate a higher return on investment for 
shareholders in individual corporations.  I will also report my own comparison of data on 
executive rewards and investment risk, which has rarely been addressed in financial 
literature.  This will enable us to form a view on whether current executive salary trends 
are rational as investment decisions for shareholders.  Next I will report a comparison of 
executive rewards with national economic performance. This will enable us to form a view 
on whether current trends are economically rational for each society. 
 
2.1 Evidence and Proof 
Statistical analysis plays a significant role in the arguments for and against associations 
between executive salary and corporate performance.  I will therefore give a brief 
introduction to the methods of proof and statistics most commonly used in economic and 
financial analysis here before looking at the evidence itself.   
 
In any form of scientific inquiry, seeking confirming evidence is not a sound means to 
prove an argument.  Following Karl Popper’s philosophy of falsifiablity41, it is more usual to 
define a hypothesis, then test to see if there is any disproving evidence against the 
hypothesis, before adopting it.  That is, we only accept a hypothesis as “proven” if we 
cannot find sufficient evidence to disprove it.  Even then, the hypothesis is not proven 
absolutely, but we assume it is likely to be correct. 
 
                                                
41 Karl Popper, “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”, (Mohr Siebeck: Heidelberg 1934 as Logik der 
Forschung, English translation 1959). 
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In this context, statisticians often include multiple variables in an analysis, including other 
plausible causes of a phenomena besides the hypothesis being tested.  Thus we are able 
to ensure that the hypothesised variable provides the best explanation of the phenomena 
being studied, amongst the range of possible causal variables.  This approach is known in 
economics as “positive economics”, being introduced by Paul Samuelson and first defined 
by Milton Friedman42: 
 
 
Relationships between data may be analysed and measured in the form of correlation 
coefficients (R2), which measure the degree of similarity between variables as a number 
ranging from +1 to -1.  A correlation coefficient or R2 value of +1 represents perfect 
agreement between two datasets, an R2 value of 0 indicates there is no relationship, and 
an R2 value of -1 represents that the datasets are exactly the inverse of each other.  As 
well as checking the strength of R2 values, statisticians also perform various tests on the 
reliability of relationships, based on the sample size tested.  A relationship which passes a 
statistical test for reliability is said to be “statistically significant”.    
 
Correlation between data does not prove causation.  An R2 coefficient of +0.9 or better 
would normally be taken as strong evidence, but not proof, of a significant relationship 
between two variables.  Smaller R2 values may indicate that both are related to some 
other factor, or that the degree of influence of one variable over the other is small.  They 
are then said to have limited “explanatory power”.  While a high R2 value does not prove 
causation, a low R2 value indicates that any causal relationship between the variables is 
either unlikely or inconsequential.   
 
Irrespective of the strength of any correlation between data, the context also needs to be 
considered.  There are many different types of statistical models than can be fitted to data.  
It is important to check that an appropriate model is used.  Typically, statisticians produce 
“scatter plots” of data to check if there is any visually obvious pattern in the data.  It is also 
important not to include too many variables in an analysis, as this may result in spurious 
relationships being “detected.  The larger the number of variables that are included in a 
statistical model, the easier it becomes to match to data to some variable, regardless of 
whether or not an actual relationship exists between them. 
                                                
42 Milton Friedman. "The Methodology of Positive Economics". In Essays In Positive Economics. 
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 3-16, 30-43 
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As Milton Friedman indicated, the ultimate test of the quality of any statistical model of the 
relationship between data is its predictive accuracy.  That is, if we say some variable X is 
related to Y, then if our model is accurate, given a new value Y2, we should be able to 
predict the corresponding value X2 with reasonable reliability. 
 
2.2 Methodological Difficulties 
There are two categories of methodological difficulty with empirical analysis of executive 
rewards and performance.  The first is practical – there needs to be suitable data collected 
over a long enough time for trends to be detected. Despite recent laws on reporting 
executive salary, obtaining comparable data remains difficult.  Accounting standards vary 
and reporting methods are often inconsistent in treatment of current income, bonuses for 
past performance, and the valuation of future shares options.  Complex payment methods 
and obscure terminology have been used by corporations to camouflage the full extent of 
executive’s rewards from shareholders.  Non-reporting of share bonuses that are to be 
vested at a future date is a notorious example43.  A typical structure for executive salary 
packages in Australia is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
                                                
43 Lucien Bebchuck and Jesse Fried, “Pay without Performance, the Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation”, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge: Massachusets, 2004), Page 67. 
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Figure 2.1 Structure of Executive Rewards44 
 
Reporting laws themselves have changed over time, generally becoming tighter, such as 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) in the United States and the CLERP 9 (2004) reforms to 
corporate law in Australia.  This increases the amount of data but makes time comparisons 
more difficult. 
 
Significant amounts of data on executive rewards are held by private organisations, 
typically business consulting firms that provide advice on executive remuneration.  These 
include several of the world’s largest accounting firms, such as Deloitte’s, and specialist 
remuneration consultants such as Mercer and Towers Watson.  These databases are not 
freely available for external review.  Remuneration advisors are not subject to the same 
disclosure rules as auditors45. 
 
Despite this limitation private sources often hold the most comprehensive datasets 
available.  For example, the 2008-09 Australian Productivity Commission inquiry into 
executive remuneration utilised data from Egan Associates.  Data on executive rewards for 
public listed Australian and United States corporations is published by the financial press 
such as Australian Financial Review, Fortune Magazine, and Forbes Magazine.  These 
are based on information supplied for stock exchange reporting requirements for public 
corporations.  This leaves large gaps in data for executives below board level and for 
unlisted private corporations. 
 
The second practical difficulty is in the nature of the data, especially its granularity.  
Executives comprise a small fraction of the workforce of a corporation, and so the number 
of sample points in an industry will be small, especially in Australia.  The samples would 
be larger if we could consider the trends for rewards of all executive positions, but in the 
past the research focus was often on CEO pay, and time series data is often limited to 
them.  If a comparison is to be made of executive rewards or corporate performance within 
a single industry, there may be less than a dozen comparators.  This makes reaching 
statistically reliable conclusions difficult in the United States and impossible in Australia. 
 
                                                
44 44“Productivity Commission Inquiry into Executive Remuneration”, Australian Productivity 
Commission, Canberra, Australia, 4 January 2010.  Figure 7, Page 26. 
45 “Remuneration Experts Driving Big-Gun Pay”, Australian Financial Review, 15 November 2006. 
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Overall then, despite large and growing volumes of data on executive rewards, there is a 
dearth of accessible databases reported through peer-reviewed processes.  Compared to 
other areas of social science research there is no central agency with agreed standards 
and definitions for executive reward data.  Accounting conventions and corporate reporting 
requirements vary between jurisdictions and over time.  This has been highlighted by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) in the United States, and the Australian Productivity 
Commission in Australia46.  There is enormous scope for disagreement in empirical 
studies.  The answer to questions such as “are executive rewards rising faster than 
corporate profits?” can vary depending on the database used.   
 
For these reasons only publicly available data sources have been used for my own 
analysis.  Wherever possible, data published by government bodies such as the Australian 
Productivity Commission, US Federal Reserve and OECD have been used.  Where private 
sources of data have been required, peer-reviewed publications have been used to source 
it, and preference has been given to databases maintained over longer periods of time.  I 
will identify where data constrains our ability to reach strong conclusions. 
 
2.3 Trends in Executive Rewards 
2.3.1 Australia 
An extensive review of trends in executive rewards was recently published by the 
Australian Productivity Commission (APC) in its Inquiry into Executive Remuneration in 
Australia47.  This examined trends in total executive rewards, including pay and other 
bonuses, in the past two decades, from 1993 to 2009.  It also reviewed previous 
publications reporting on executive reward trends back to the early 1980s.  Although 
consistent data sets are lacking for the reasons discussed previously, there is an 
unmistakeable rising trend in total rewards to executives.  These rose up to 300% during 
this period, reaching a peak in 2007, then falling in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008-
09.  This trend is shown for Australian CEO pay from a range of databases at Australia’s 
largest 50 to 100 firms in Figure 2.2. 
                                                
46 Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”, 
Journal of Political Economy, April 1990. 
47Australian Productivity Commission, “Productivity Commission Inquiry into Executive 
Remuneration”, Canberra, Australia, 4 January 2010.  See Chapter 3 and Appendix D for data on 
executive reward trends. 
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Figure 2.2 CEO Pay Trend in Large Australian Companies48 
 
Within this overall trend of rapid growth, a number of related trends are apparent.  The 
ratio of CEO rewards to other executive rewards remained constant, indicating that trends 
in CEO rewards are representative of overall trends in executive rewards.   The growth 
trend in executive rewards was much faster than inflation and growth in other worker’s 
wages.  It closely matched the growth trend in stock market valuations during this period, 
which was dramatic.   
 
There was a shift during this period from executive reward packages that mainly consisted 
of salary, to rewards packages that comprised a large component of performance 
bonuses, usually linked to share prices.  This made executives during this period 
beneficiaries of an enormous personal financial windfall.  Their own incomes increased 
correspondingly as share prices rose.  A comparison of Australian CEO rewards and ASX 
200 share market capitalisation over this period is shown in Figure 2.3. 
                                                
48 APC Inquiry (2010), Figure 1, Page 16. 
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Figure 2.3 Australian CEO Rewards Compared to ASX 200 Index49 
 
The distribution of executive rewards was highly skewed.  Growth in rewards was much 
higher at large corporations than for executives and CEOs of smaller companies.  
Executive rewards had grown into the millions at Australia’s 100 largest corporations by 
2008, whereas the average for executives at Australia’s 2000 public companies was 
several hundred thousand dollars per annum.  This corresponded to executives earning 
110 times average income at the largest 20 companies, compared with four times the 
average income for the smaller half of the sample.  Executive rewards tend to be 
proportional to the value of the corporation, not its profit or return to shareholders.  This 
suggests that the executives at large companies had much greater ability to extract large 
performance bonuses than at small firms.   
 
Executive rewards in Australia were comparable with those of executives at similar sized 
corporations in other western countries.  Generally, executive rewards in the United States 
and United Kingdom were significantly larger than for similar sized corporations in other 
countries.  Executive rewards in Australian corporations were more comparable to those at 
similar sized corporations in European countries.  A comparison of international CEO 
rewards in 2008 is shown in Figure 2.4. 
                                                
49 APC Inquiry (2010), Figure 6, Page 23. 
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Figure 2.4 International CEO Total Rewards in 2008 ($M AUS)50 
 
These findings confirmed earlier work by Shields51 and others.  In general, over the past 
two decades executive rewards have risen rapidly in Australia, though not as rapidly as in 
the United States or the United Kingdom.  Executive rewards rose faster than average 
wages, inflation, corporate earnings and returns to shareholders.  They more closely 
matched increases in share prices.  These share price increases were across the board, 
and related to increased retirement savings via share markets.  Hence Australian 
executives were in the fortunate position that their incomes became closely linked to share 
prices, precisely at the time when the latter increased dramatically. 
2.3.2 United States  
The situation in the United States is more complex.  More data is available over a longer 
time period than in Australia. Conversely there has been no independent inquiry into 
executive rewards to consistently evaluate all the data.  The government data source is 
US Bureau of Labor income surveys.  For chief executives this data is for 300,000 persons 
self-reporting as chief executives, whether they own their own business, or are the CEO of 
a major corporation.  The income data does not include bonuses.  The average income 
listed for CEOs was $167,000 US as of 200952.  This is far less than CEO incomes 
reported to stock exchanges. 
 
                                                
50 APC Inquiry (2010), Figure 4 
51 John Shields, “Setting the double standard: Chief executive pay the BCA Way”, Journal of 
Australian Political Economy, vol. 56, pp. 299–324 (2005). 
52 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Occupational Employment and Wages 2009”, US Department of 
Labor, May 14, 2010. 
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Piketty and Saez53 have undertaken an extensive study of incomes in the United States as 
part of their research into income inequality.  Their data includes executive incomes, 
based on annual compensation surveys by Forbes Magazine for CEOs of the top 500 
corporations.  Some critics have argued against their use of IRS data including capital 
gains.  I do not consider that criticism significant and in any case, as their analysis has 
used consistent datasets, I consider it adequate for this purpose to establish trends in 
executive rewards. 
 
Real growth in US executive rewards has been occurring since the 1970s according to 
Piketty and Saez.  Like the Australian data, it has shown a more rapid rise in executive 
rewards from the 1990s onwards.  A graph of average CEO rewards for top 500 firms, 
together with average wages, is shown in Figure 2.5 (all incomes are converted to 1999 
dollars). 
 
Figure 2.5 US CEO Pay Versus Average Wages 1970 – 200354 
 
The quantum of growth in US executive rewards is much greater than in Australia, 
reaching tens of millions of dollars per annum for CEOs by the middle of the decade. Total 
compensation for CEOs at major US corporations equalled 275 times average wages by 
                                                
53 Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States 1913-1998”, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol CXVIII (February 2003). 
54 Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. CXVIII, February 2003.  Figure 15, Page 33. 
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200755.  The growth in rewards for other executives was not as high as for CEOs, but was 
comparable in pattern.  The resulting ratio of US executive rewards to average wages is 
much higher than in Australia, exceeding 167 times average wages by 2003.  US 
executives are now paid six times more than their peers of the early 1980s in real terms.  
In this respect the executive labour market has grown more rapidly in the United States 
than in Australia56. 
 
The primary reason for the dramatic rise in US executive rewards during this period was 
the increase in performance-based bonus payments to executives.  From the 1980s 
onwards, performance based share options had tended to be paid in addition to base 
salaries.  Performance bonuses now represent up to ten times the base salary for US 
executives.  As share values grew in the 1990s this greatly increased executive rewards.  
This effect is illustrated in Figure 2.6, which compares average pay for US production 
workers to average CEO pay from 1970 to 1996.  Executive pay is shown with 
performance bonuses (red line) and without (blue line).  The difference demonstrates the 
increase in bonuses during the 1990s. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Ratio of CEO Pay to Worker Pay 1970-199657 
 
                                                
55 Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and Heidi Shierholz, “The State of Working America, 
2008/09”, Economic Policy Institute, Washington D.C, published on-line at www.epi.org. 
56 Lucien Bebchuck, and Yaniv Grinstein, “The Growth of Executive Pay”, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, vol.21, No.2, Pages 283-303 (2005). 
57 Kevin J. Murphy, “Executive Compensation”, Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, editors O. 
Ashenfelter, R. Layard and D. Card, (Elsevier: North Holland 1999). Figure 15, Page 91. 
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In 2002 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced in the United States to force more 
complete disclosure of all forms of executive rewards.  It was hoped that this would 
increase transparency and reduce the rate of increase in executive rewards.  However the 
latter objective has not been realised, with executive rewards continuing to rise in the 
following decade.  They reached a peak in 2007 before falling 3.4% in 2008 and 0.9% in 
200958 to an average of $7 million US.  Declines in US executive rewards during the 
financial crisis were less than in Australia, despite the fact that the crisis has been far more 
severe in the United States than in Australia.  This decline proved only temporary.  In 2010 
CEO salaries of Fortune 500 corporations rose 12% in the United States, and exceeded 
their 2007 levels in the finance industry59. 
 
2.4 Executive Rewards and Performance – Corporate Level 
We have seen that executive rewards have been increasing and the degree of inequality 
with other incomes has been increasing in Australia and especially the United States.   I 
will now consider the return on executive rewards for shareholders, by comparing 
executive rewards to corporate performance.  This will partly answer the financial question 
of whether it has been a rational investment of shareholder funds to pay increased levels 
of salary to corporate executives.  Following this I will consider executive rewards and risk 
for shareholders, which will complete the financial assessment of executive rewards and 
performance. 
 
2.4.1 Australian Evidence  
The APC Inquiry (2010) considered the relationship between executive rewards and 
corporate performance in Australia.  Defining corporate performance is a complex 
question.  There may be many non-financial measures of performance not reported in 
markets, but which are important to measuring the effectiveness of an individual executive.  
Examples include staff turnover, safety, and regulatory compliance.  The APC Inquiry used 
the ASX200 Accumulation Index to measure financial performance.  This includes share 
dividends and capital (share price) growth for the top 200 companies, giving total financial 
returns to shareholders.  Statistical comparisons were then made between executive 
salary and corporate performance. 
 
                                                
58 Joann S. Lublin, “CEOs See Pay Fall Again.” Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2010. 
59 Scott DeCarlo, “Show Me The Money.” Forbes Magazine, April 13, 2011. 
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From the APC inquiry data, overall growth in Australian executive rewards in the period 
1993 – 2008 was found to closely match growth in the ASX200 accumulation index.  The 
correlation between the ASX200 accumulation index and average CEO rewards was 
reported by the APC to be very close, with a correlation coefficient of 0.88 for the top 50 
corporations, and 0.83 for the top 200 corporations60.  No test correlations with other 
variables were reported.  No measures of statistical significance were reported, although 
as this result is for the complete ASX200 dataset, it is presumed to be significant.  This 
suggests that executive rewards are closely related to financial performance at the 
aggregate level in Australia, assuming the ASX200 accumulation index is a reliable 
indicator of performance.  However, in the absence of any testing against independent 
variables, this does not constitute proof of a causal relationship. 
  
The situation changes for the worse when the analysis is undertaken at the individual 
corporation level.  Analysis at this level is difficult, as executives may leave a firm during 
the analysis period, and there is uncertainty over how to treat bonuses that may be 
received (vested) years after they are earned.  Conclusions of different researchers have 
varied.  Doucouliagos, Haman and Askary (2007)61, Merhebi et al (2006)62 and O’Neill and 
Iob (1999)63 all concluded that there is a positive correlation between Australian corporate 
performance and executive rewards.  Conversely Izan, Sidhu and Taylor (1998)64, Shields 
(2005) and Capezio (2008)65 all concluded that there was not a statistically significant 
relationship, with Shields concluding that any relationship that was present was negative.   
 
The APC inquiry compared CEO rewards with three measures of corporate performance – 
total shareholder return (dividends paid to shareholders plus growth in share capital 
value), profit growth and return on equity (share dividends as a percentage of share 
value). Total shareholder returns would have been influenced by the rising overall share 
market in this time period, due to their including share prices in the measure.   
                                                
60 APC Inquiry (2010), Page 73. 
61 H. Doucouliagos, J. Haman and S. Askary, “Directors’ remuneration and performance in 
Australian banking”, Corporate Governance, vol. 15, no. 6 (2007) pages 1363–83. 
62 R. Merhebi, K. Pattenden, P.L. Swan, and X. Zhou, “Australian chief executive officer 
remuneration: pay and performance”, Accounting and Finance, no. 46 (2006), pages 481–97. 
63 G.L. O’Neill and M. Iob, “Determinants of executive remuneration in Australian Organisations: An 
exploratory study”, Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, vol. 37, no. 1 (1999), pages 65–75. 
64 H.Y. Izan, B. Sidhu and S. Taylor, “Does CEO pay reflect performance? Some Australian 
evidence”, Corporate Governance, vol. 6, no. 1 (1998), pages 39–47. 
65 A. Capezio, 2008, “Does Performance Pay? An Economic and Structural Analysis of CEO Cash 




Findings were mixed with positive correlations between executive rewards and profit 
growth and return on equity, but negative correlations between executive rewards and total 
shareholder returns.  Correlation coefficients were low (R2 = 0.1 to 0.46), suggesting that 
at best these variables explained less than half of the variation in executive rewards66. 
Again no tests against independent variables were reported.  Also correlations varied 
depending on whether the relationship was measured in the short term or the long term, 
with short term results highly variable depending on share-price volatility.  Overall then, the 
Australian executive labour market appears to be reasonably correlated with corporate 
performance at the macro level, but not at the micro level (individual firms). 
 
2.4.2 United States Evidence  
It is possible to reach more definite conclusions on the relationship between executive 
rewards and corporate performance in the United States.  This is due to the availability of 
much longer time-series databases, and the larger number of corporations enabling more 
robust sample sizes to be used.  Interestingly, the answer has varied considerably over 
time.  There have been many studies into this issue, but I will confine discussions to those 
most commonly cited. 
 
Studies into the relationship between executive rewards and corporate performance in the 
United States up to the 1980s had found that there was no relationship between them67. 
The data for these early studies was drawn from the late 1970s and early 1980s, when in 
real terms US executive rewards were ten times less than for the decade post 2000.  Even 
so, researchers then found that the highest rewards for executives were correlated with 
corporation size, not corporate performance as measured by profitability and return to 
shareholders. 
 
This view was challenged by Jensen68 and Murphy69 in the 1980s.  They sought to 
measure corporate performance by total return to shareholders, including change in share 
                                                
66 APC Inquiry (2010) Page 78. 
67 David H. Ciscel, and Thomas M. Carrol, “The Determinants of Executive Salaries: an 
Econometric Survey”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press (1980). 
68 Michael Jensen, and Jerrold L. Zimmerman, “Management Compensation and the Management 
Labor Market”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 7 No. 1-3 (1985), pp. 3-9. 
69 Kevin J. Murphy, “Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical 
Analysis.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 no. 1-3: (1985). 
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price and dividends to shareholders, rather than corporate profits.  This shift implicitly 
assumes Fama’s efficient market hypothesis70, whereby share markets would accurately 
price shares based on a corporation’s performance.  I will discuss these assumptions 
further later.  Using this approach and tracking individual executives across firms, Murphy 
found a positive but weak correlation between executive rewards and performance.  The 
correlation coefficient quoted (R2 = 0.312 for “cross sectional” data)71 was low.  A higher 
correlation was achieved in the long term (R2 = 0.880) by comparing executive salary 
against the share index.  This relationship was also reported to be statistically significant. 
Comparative tests of correlations against other executive position incomes were reported 
as dummy variables.  No test of the predictive accuracy of the model was made or scatter 
plots reported. 
 
Aside from the very low degree of explanatory power demonstrated in Murphy’s analysis, I 
consider the methodological approach very problematic.  Comparing executive salary 
against share price assumes both that the executives were responsible for the 
corporation’s performance and the share price accurately reflected that performance.  It 
also means that results were influenced by the overall rising trend in share prices. The 
much stronger correlation in the long term may have been due to that effect.   
 
No attempt was made to test correlations against alternative causes. The process of 
testing a range of measures of corporate performance against a range of measures of 
executive income (salary, bonuses, share options and total income) hints at searching for 
confirming evidence, rather than testing whether the hypothesis was falsifiable. Finally, I 
consider that the statistical significance Murphy reported was likely to be an artefact of the 
large number of data points analysed (data on 461 executives for 17 years) combined with 
the inclusion of share prices, rather than any inherent reliability in the relationship.  To 
clarify the point, nothing in Murphy’s analysis disproves an alternative hypothesis that 
executive salary was a function of corporation size as measured by share price, which was 
the finding of previous analysis by Ciscel and Carrol (1980) and others. 
 
                                                
70 Fama, Eugene, “"Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work". The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 25, No. 2: 383–417. (May 1970). 
71 Kevin J. Murphy (1985), page 30. 
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A later study by Jensen and Murphy (1990)72 found that the correlation was more 
significant if measured between relative changes in CEO wealth and shareholder wealth 
(share price) rather than absolute performance as measured by the total of share price 
and dividends.  This established the so-called “Jensen-Murphy Statistic” that CEO wealth 
increased by $3.25 for every $1000 increase in shareholder wealth.  This enabled a 
numerical value of performance incentives for executives to be quantified.  The 
relationship between observed executive rewards and corporate performance was 
reported as statistically significant but the correlation coefficient (R2=0.0144)73 was very 
low.  In my view this correlation is so small as to disprove that a relationship existed, and it 
should have been grounds for Jensen and Murphy to abandon their hypothesis at this 
point. 
 
Murphy (1999)74 did further analysis of the corresponding data for the subsequent decade.  
The “sensitivity” of CEO pay to shareholder wealth had increased, meaning that CEO 
wealth now increased by $4.36 to $7.69 (average $6.03) for every $1000 increase in 
shareholder wealth, which Murphy regarded as evidence of increasing alignment of 
interests.  The correlation coefficients measuring the strength of the relationship between 
US executive rewards and corporate performance defined in this manner were declining, 
even relative to the low levels observed in the 1980s.  Depending on the industry 
measured, correlation coefficient (R2) values varied from a low of 0.0034 to a high of 
0.0078, about half the R2 values measured in the 1980s.  Again, in my view claiming that 
such tiny correlations represented any form of statistical proof was false.  Further, the 
continued change in the reported value of the pay-performance sensitivity statistic Jensen 
and Murphy had established meant that it had not demonstrated any predictive reliability.  
Linking executive salary and corporate performance together was therefore not statistically 
sound. 
  
Further US research has been done by others since 2000.  Daines, Nair and Kornhauser 
(2005)75 hypothesised that a continuation of good performance of a firm relative to its rivals 
or change in poor performance was due to CEO “skill”.  They showed that there were 
                                                
72 Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives”, 
Journal of Political Economy, (April 1990).  
73 Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy (1990), page 40. 
74 Kevin J. Murphy, “Executive Compensation” in “Handbook of Labor Economics”, Vol. 3, 
Editors O. Ashenfelter, R. Layard and D. Card, (Elsevier: North Holland 1999).  See Table 7. 
75 Robert Daines, Vinay B. Nair, and Lewis A. Kornhauser, “The Good, the Bad and the Lucky: 
CEO Pay and Skill”, NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 04-035 (August 2005). 
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instances when CEOs paid higher than average did display high “skill” (i.e. good relative 
performance) and other instances where CEOs paid higher than average did not display 
such skill. I consider that defining “high skill” for the CEO in this way made it a proxy for 
CEO performance, and this research still makes the assumption that correlation between 
CEO performance and corporate performance implies causation.  Nevertheless in defining 
CEO skill by change in a corporation’s performance relative to its peers, this approach is 
more sophisticated than Jensen and Murphy’s.  Daines, Nair and Kornhauser also tested 
for other possible causal variables, including aspects of corporate governance. 
 
Overall Daines, Nair and Kornhauser found a low correlation (R2 = 0.32) between CEO 
pay and skill (firm’s relative performance).  They found that highly paid CEOs displayed 
high skill in small firms, when the pay was performance based, and when there was a 
single large shareholder.  Where any one of these factors was absent high pay did not 
guarantee a highly skilled CEO.  This suggests that it is possible that high CEO pay may 
be rational for shareholders in these cases of exceptional performance.  Conversely, it 
shows that high CEO pay does not in itself guarantee high performance, and other 
governance factors are more likely causes. 
 
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005)76 analysed CEO and top five executive pay for all S&P1500 
(largest 1500) firms in the United States from 1993 to 2003.  They compared CEO and 
executive pay to a range of measures of corporate performance, including size and sales, 
profit, dividends, ROA (return on assets or ratio of income to asset value) and stock 
(share) price.  Statistically significant correlations were obtained between executive pay 
and all the variables except ROA.  However overall, changes in firm performance and size 
could only explain 66% of the 166% increase in executive pay that occurred in this period.  
That is, an overall rising trend in executive pay was occurring in which only a minority of 
the rise could be linked to measures of corporate performance.  The correlation 
coefficients for Bebchuk and Grinstein’s model was 0.56 for CEOs and 0.74 for top five 
executives, much higher than Jensen and Murphy had achieved with most of their 
analyses.   
 
In my view Bebchuk and Grinstein’s analysis gives further weight to the conclusion that 
executive rewards in the United States are not closely correlated to corporate 
                                                
76 Lucian Bebchuk, and Yaniv Grinstein, “The Growth of Executive Pay”, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, Vol. 21, No. 2, (2005). 
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performance.  Any relationship that does exist is small and, while it may be statistically 
significant over a large sample, this is merely evidence that executive rewards and 
corporate performance are both auto-correlated with other factors, such as firm size and 
the overall rising trend in share market prices. 
 
Overall, the empirical studies indicate that, assuming differences in comparative 
performance between firms are due to the executive, the salaries paid to executives in the 
United States are less closely linked to corporate performance than in Australia.  That is, 
higher rewards for US executives are not primarily linked to corporate performance, but to 
other factors, such as (weaknesses in) corporate governance.  Highly paid executives 
have achieved comparatively better corporate performance in some cases, but these are 
not the majority, and those outcomes do not occur unless corporate governance 
arrangements are also sound. 
 
This lack of a strong link between executive salary and corporate performance has now 
been the case in the United States for more than three decades.  The problem appears to 
have worsened as corporate rewards grew rapidly in the 1990s.  The United States 
executive labour market is both more expensive than the Australian executive labour 
market, and less linked to corporate performance, at both the macro level and at the level 
of individual corporations.  High executive salaries appear to represent a poor investment 
of shareholder’s funds in this context.  Popular criticism of the level of executive rewards in 
the United States is therefore justified from a financial perspective77. 
 
2.4.3 Evidence on Executive Influence – Corporate Performance Studies 
A major criticism of empirical analysis into the relationship between executive rewards and 
corporate performance is that it assumes cause and effect.  That is, since the studies only 
consider the relationships between executive rewards and corporate performance, and not 
relationships between corporate performance and other possible causes, they effectively 
assume that executives are the cause of corporate performance.  This is assuming 
precisely the point which is trying to be proven.  This leaves the question of to what degree 
executives do influence corporate performance unanswered. 
 
                                                
77 Even some business leaders have voiced concern, notably US Federal Reserve Bank President 
William McDonough in a speech on September 11, 2002, who described United States CEOs as 
"terribly overpaid". 
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In reality a CEO’s ability to influence corporate performance will vary depending on their 
degree of control over the organization.  Adams, Almeida and Ferriera (2005)78 have 
shown that firms with structures giving greater power to the CEO have more variable 
performance than other firms, both for better or worse.  This suggests that the CEO role is 
influential.  However if we wish to use performance measures to define executive rewards, 
it would be logical to quantify the degree to which it is the determining factor. 
 
Wasserman, Anand and Nohria (2001)79 analysed differential corporate performance in 
each US industry group.  They found that, assuming CEOs were responsible for the 
differential performance change between firms in the same industry that occurred during 
their period of control, their influence was at best 21% of performance improvements (in 
the Communications Equipment industry) and at worst 2% of performance improvements 
(in the meat products industry).  In this way Wasserman concluded that on average 14% of 
the gains in performance made by US corporations could be linked to decisions made by 
their executives.  In my view this claim is still vulnerable to the criticism that it assumes 
causation between CEO performance and corporate performance, only over a narrower 
range of criteria.  The conclusions on the degree of influence of CEOs over corporate 
performance are therefore a best case, assuming this causation is true. 
 
Assuming for purposes of this analysis that this is the case, then rational shareholders who 
paid executives solely on the basis of performance would not wish the quantum of 
executive rewards to rise above this proportion of corporate profits.  That is, rational 
shareholders would not wish the quantum of executive rewards to rise above 2% to 21% of 
profits, depending on industry.  Bebchuk and Grinstein showed that by 2003, average 
rewards for the CEO and top five executives (not counting other lower level executives) 
were already averaging 10% of corporate net income (of which profits would be a 
proportion)80.  If Wasserman, Anand and Nohria are correct, some of these shareholders 
would appear to be paying executives more than any additional return they are likely to 
generate for their corporation. 
 
                                                
78 Renee B. Adams, Heitor Almeida, and Daniel Ferreira, “Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on 
Corporate Performance”, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 18, Issue 4, ( 2005). pages 1403-
1432. 
79 Noam Wasserman, Anand Bharat and Nitin Nohria. "When Does Leadership Matter? The 
Contingent Opportunities View of CEO Leadership." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 
01-063 (2001). 
80 Lucian Bebchuk, and Yaniv Grinstein, (2005), Page 297. 
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Other likely causes of changes in share prices can be identified during the period that was 
analysed. In The Roaring Nineties (2003)81 Joseph Stiglitz identified several external 
causes for the boom in share market prices that occurred during the 1990s. These 
included increased globalisation of trade, market deregulation, greatly increased 
investment of retirement savings into share markets, and even accounting fraud.  This 
trend of increased share market prices greatly increased the wealth of existing 
shareholders.  In parallel, this period saw the wide use of performance bonuses paid to 
executives in the form of share options.  This meant that the value of executive wealth 
would inevitably rise as the value of their share options rose with the market. 
 
2.5 Corporate Risk and Executive Reward 
A major criticism of the previous empirical analyses of executive rewards and corporate 
performance is that most only looked at narrow definitions of corporate performance.  
There was no reported consideration of whether effects on other measures of corporate 
performance were associated with the level or type of executive rewards.  One economic 
factor not considered is the impact of performance bonuses on corporate risk taking.  One 
of the potential consequences of large performance components in executive rewards is 
that they may encourage executives to adopt high-risk corporate strategies, in order to 
achieve their bonuses.  If so, this may be to the long-term harm of shareholders.  This 
would represent a form of moral hazard as defined by Arrow82, where the moral hazard 
occurs because the executive takes the risk but the potential loss accrues to the 
shareholder. 
 
In the long term risks should be apparent in the financial outcome for a corporation. In the 
short term it may be difficult to determine whether a corporation’s results have been 
achieved through effective performance or taking on excessive risks.  The occurrence of 
catastrophic risks that may cause the corporation to become insolvent should be evident in 
statistics for corporate collapse.  Corporate bankruptcies are usually infrequent for large 
corporations and so it is difficult to obtain a statistically significant sample.  However the 
global financial crisis of 2008 – 2009 provides a unique opportunity to study this 
relationship, due to the large number of corporate collapses that occurred in this period. 
 
                                                
81 Joseph Stiglitz, “The Roaring Nineties”, (Penguin: London, 2003). 
82 Kenneth Arrow, “Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing”, (Markham: Chicago 1971). 
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To test whether there is any relationship between high executive pay and risk to 
corporations a comparison has been made between executive rewards immediately prior 
to the financial crisis and subsequent corporate performance in Australia and the United 
States.   Executive rewards have been measured by CEO total rewards in 2006 and two 
tests have been made:  
(1) test if there is a higher than average occurrence of subsequent failure in corporations 
with highly paid CEOs in 2006, and  
(2) test if major corporate collapses that occurred in 2007-08 involved CEOs that had 
previously been in the highest paid group in 2006.  (This previous period was chosen as 
many of the CEO’s that were responsible for corporations that collapsed in 2008 left office 
during that year.) 
 
2.5.1 Australian Data 
An analysis has been carried out of Australian CEOs, their pay and risk of corporate 
failure.  In Australia’s case the 2008-09 global recession did not lead to a local recession 
but a lack of credit in early 2009 saw some failures in corporations with high debt.  Three 
large non-bank investment firms (ABC Learning, Allco Finance, and Babcock and Brown) 
and 27 smaller corporations collapsed in 200883.  The large collapses, their CEO and pre-
collapse (2006/07 or 2007/08) income are recorded in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Australian 2008 Corporate Failures and Previous CEO Pay84 




2006/07 Pay 2008/09 
Result 
ABC Learning E Groves NA 158 $1.6M Bankruptcy 
Allco Financial D Coe* NA 130(3) $2M($26M) Bankruptcy 
Babcock&Brown P Green 100 2 $17M Bankruptcy 
* Paid $26M (3rd) in 2007/08. Source: Australian Financial Review  
 
The number of major corporate collapses in Australia in 2008 is too small to develop 
reliable statistics for them.  Nevertheless, the previous pay for CEOs of two of the three 
collapsed companies was significantly higher than, the average total pay for CEOs of 
Australian top 100 corporations in 2005/06 and 2006/07 ($5.5 million).   In all three cases, 
                                                
83 Scott Rochfort, “The Biggest Losers (and a few winners, too)”, Sydney Morning Herald, 3 
January, 2009. 
84 “Salary Review 2008”, Australian Financial Review, 11 November 2008.  
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the CEO pay was ranked higher compared to peers of similar sized corporations.  High 
CEO pay relative to size of company and CEO pay at market peers appears to be a 
marker for increased likelihood of collapse in Australia, although a reliable correlation 
cannot be established. 
 
The reverse relationship can also be tested.  The ten highest paid Australian CEOs in 
2006, their corporation and its subsequent performance are shown in Table 2.2.  Only one 
of them was CEO of a company that subsequently collapsed.  There does not appear to 
be a relationship between high CEO pay and risk of collapse in Australia. 
 
Table 2.2 Highest Paid Australian CEOs and Subsequent Results 
Rank CEO 2006 Pay Corporation 2008 Result 
1 R Murdoch $38M US Newscorp Profitable 
2 A Moss $34M Macquarie Profitable* 
3 P Green $17M Babcock&Brown Bankrupt 
4 G Gailey $17M Zinifex Profitable 
5 F Lowy $14M Westfield Profitable  
6 W King $14M Leighton Profitable 
7 P Little $13M Toll Holdings Profitable 
8 D Turner $13M Brambles Profitable 
9 G Clarke $12M Lend Lease Profitable 
10 S Trujillo $12M Telstra Profitable* 
* Remained profitable although profits and share price fell heavily. 
Source: Australian Financial Review85. 
 
2.5.2 United States Data 
There were a large number of corporate failures in the United States in 2007/08, especially 
in the finance industry.  Some 25 large banks became bankrupt, and additional banks 
became insolvent and required assistance to prevent bankruptcy.  Most of the larger failed 
firms were either taken over, forced to sell in a merger, or “bailed-out” with the assistance 
of Federal government financial support.  The question arises as to whether there was any 
pattern in prior executive rewards for the failed firms.  The largest failed firms (within the 
                                                
85 “Salary Review 2008”, Australian Financial Review, 11 November 2008. 
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S&P 500), their 2008 ranking based on industry returns to shareholders)86 and 2006 CEO 
pay and pay ranking87 (within the S&P 500) are listed in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3 United States 2008 Corporate Failures and CEO Pay 




Pay 2008 Result 
Lehman Bros R Fuld 106 5 $122M Bankruptcy 
Countrywide A Mozillo 90 10 $69M Forced Sale 
Morgan Stanley J. Mack 30 32 $31M Govt bailout 
Bear Stearns J. Cayne 202 36 $28M 90% Loss 
Merrill Lynch S. O’Neal 34 49 $22M 60% loss 
Citigroup C.Prince 8 59 $20M Govt bailout 
Goldman Sachs H. Paulson 41 81 $16M Govt bailout 
IndyMac M. Perry 722 84 $16M Bankruptcy 
Washington Mtl K. Killinger 99 99 $14M 100% loss 
Wachovia G.Thompson 57 112 $13M 65% loss 
AIG M. Sullivan 9 130 $11M Govt takeover 
Fannie Mae D Mudd 53 202 $9M Govt takeover 
Freddie Mac R. Syron 50 213 $8M Govt takeover 
Bank America K. Lewis 12 85 $7M Govt bailout 
Source: Data compiled from Forbes magazine 
There is no obvious pattern in the CEO pay rates listed for corporations in Table 2.3.  
There were failed financial corporations with CEOs paid much more highly than the firm’s 
financial ranking would indicate (e.g. Countrywide, Lehman Brothers) and some with 
CEO’s with lower ranked pay (E.g. Citi Group, Bank America).  Risk of corporate failure is 
not automatically associated with higher than average executive pay.   
 
This is not a surprising result, given that US executive pay is related to corporation size 
more than performance as we have seen.  If executive pay were related to corporate 
performance, we would have expected it to be inversely related to risk of corporate failure.  
This assumes that high-performing corporations are less likely to fail.  If high performing 
                                                
86 Scott DeCarlo and Brian Zajac “Special Report: CEO Compensation”, Forbes Magazine, 22 
April 2009. 
87 Scott DeCarlo “Executive Pay: Big Paychecks”, Forbes Magazine, 3 May 2007. 
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corporations were more likely to fail, then the performance would need to be factored 
down to reflect the increased risk of failure in assessing value to shareholders. 
 
The second part of the analysis is to test whether very high CEO pay (irrespective of firm 
size ranking) is associated with increased risk of failure.  The 10 highest paid US CEO’s 
for 2006, their corporation and its performance outcome for 2008 are shown in Table 2.4.  
Note that CEO pay listed is total remuneration including salary, bonuses and stock 
options. 
 
Table 2.4 Highest Paid US CEOs and Subsequent Results 
Rank CEO 2006 Pay Corporation 2008 Result 
1 R Fairbank $249M Capital One Govt bailout 
2 T Semel $230M Yahoo Profitable 
3 H Silverman $140M Cendant Broken up 
4 B Karatz $136M KB Home Profitable 
5 R Fuld $123M Lehman Bro. Bankrupt  
6 R Irani $81M Occidental Oil Profitable 
7 L Ellison $75M Oracle Profitable 
8 J Thompson $72M Symantec Profitable 
9 E Crawford $70M Caremark Rx Profitable 
10 A Mozilo $69M Countrywide Bankrupt  
Source: Data from compiled Forbes magazine 
 
Looking at CEO’s with higher than average pay, the risk of corporate failure does appear 
to be increased. From Table 2.4, of the top ten highest paid US CEOs in 2006, four of their 
ten corporations (40%) became insolvent or required government assistance in 2008.  Of 
the corporations having the 100 highest paid CEOs in 2006, 11 (11%) became bankrupt or 
insolvent in 2008.  Overall in 2008 a total of 13 corporations in the S&P 500 became 
bankrupt or insolvent, or 2.6%.  Thus if the CEO of an S&P 500 corporation was in the top 
20% of most highly paid CEOs, the risk of that corporation collapsing was quadrupled.  It 
could be argued that this relationship is coincidental because most of the failed firms were 
finance corporations and these tend to have CEOs paid above the average and be more at 
risk from the financial crisis.  Conversely, it was precisely the behaviour of finance 
corporations and their executives, motivated by attaining bonuses, which was one of the 
causes of the crisis. 
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Note that these relationships do not prove a causal link between executive salary and risk.  
Risks are by definition uncertain and executives making high-risk decisions do not 
necessarily cause insolvency, just as some companies may become insolvent despite low-
risk strategies.  Financial losses in 2007/08 were so large, particularly in United States 
markets, that they triggered a world-wide recession.  As a result some corporations that 
had pursued low risk investments, such as savings banks, suffered large losses that in 
some cases led to their bankruptcy or need for government assistance.   Hence not all 
failures were due to high-risk strategies on the part of the corporation that failed. 
 
However some elements of the incentive-risk argument are clearly valid.  There is a 
correlation between United States executives receiving very high rewards and the risk of 
corporate collapse.  Causal mechanisms for this have been acknowledged already by 
those studying the causes of the crisis88. Executive reward practices do not merit receiving 
all the blame for causing the 2008 financial crisis but clearly it is appropriate to apportion 
some. This will be discussed further in Chapter Five. 
 
2.6 Executive Rewards and Wider Economic Performance 
The correlation studies between executive rewards and corporate performance have 
dominated the business and accounting literature on executive rewards for the past three 
decades.  However, as we have seen the results are inconclusive at best, and dependent 
on definitions of corporate performance.  Moreover they do not answer the broader social 
question of whether or not a given level of executive rewards is rational for the society.   
To answer this, we need to investigate the economic question of whether there is any 
evidence that increased executive rewards are associated with benefits to the society. 
 
That is, we seek to know if the evidence indicates that the level of executive salary 
influences the well being of the society.  For high levels of reward to be justified, it would 
be desirable to demonstrate that countries with comparatively high levels of executive 
reward had superior welfare outcomes to comparable countries with lower levels of 
executive reward.   This may be achieved by comparing levels of executive rewards with 
                                                
88 Paul Krugman, “The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008”, (W.W. Norton 
Company Limited: New York 2009). 
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social welfare between countries, to see whether there is any pattern between countries 
with comparatively higher or lower executive rewards. 
 
Benefits to society will be proxied by statistics for economic growth available from the 
OECD89 and the World Bank90. Arguably a more complete measure such as the UN 
human development index would be preferred as a comparator.  However measures such 
as these incorporate many non-monetary variables that are not influenced by the actions 
of executives or the private sector generally and hence may give rise to spurious 
relationships.  The claim of efficiency or incentive benefits from higher executive pay is 
narrowly economic and so it will be judged from the viewpoint of economic data. 
 
At the national level it is possible to compare executive rewards as represented by CEO 
pay against economic growth statistics.  This has been done for selected countries where 
data up to 2006/0791 is available for CEO pay, average income, GDP growth rate and 
share market index returns.   The data for average CEO pay has also been divided by 
average income to obtain an index representing how high CEO pay is relative to average 
pay for each country.  Similarly GDP Growth rates have been divided by population growth 
to obtain GDP growth rates per capita. 
 
Note that a correlation between national income (per capita GDP) and executive income is 
not shown. It is not considered reliable proof of a causal relationship between executive 
reward and current economic performance.  Each countries GDP and the wealth or capital 
that produces it has evolved over a substantial historical period.  It is more related to past 
growth performance than current.  If economic efficiency is related to executive reward, 
then it should be possible to demonstrate a link between current executive reward and 
current rates of economic growth. 
 
                                                
89 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Economic Statistics Database 
accessed from http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx in 2008. 
90 World Bank Open Data Initiative, accessed from http://econ.worldbank.org on 4 July 2010. 
91 Due to differences in definitions of financial years and delays in some countries reporting, 
2006/07 is the latest year for which comparable statistics are available at the time of writing.  This 
excludes the effects of the financial crisis of 2008-09. 
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2.6.1 CEO Pay and Average Incomes 
CEO pay as reported by the Economic Policy Institute92 is shown against OECD data for 
average incomes for 2005 in Figure 2.7.  CEO pay is related to, and usually much larger 
than, average income. For subsequent graphs CEO pay has been reported as a multiple 
























Figure 2.7 – CEO Pay compared to Average Income 
Regression Slope 12.3 
Correlation Coefficient  0.296 
The pay rate for US CEOs in Figure 2.7 appears to be an outlier. Removing the US data 
from the analysis is undesirable because it represents a quarter of the world’s economic 
activity.  Comparative data is only available for 13 countries, and it would be preferable to 
keep the sample size as large as possible.  Further, executive pay theories are widely 
applied in the United States and it seems appropriate to test whether the US economy has 
benefitted from them. 
                                                
92 Economic Policy Institute, “State of Working America, 2006/07”, (Cornell University Press: 
Ithaca, NY 2007). 
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National GDP growth rate per capita (OECD data) is compared with the CEO pay multiple 
(of average incomes) in Figure 2.8. When CEO pay is adjusted to a multiple of average 
incomes there is a very slight trend of rising GDP with rising CEO income multiple, 
however the effect is not significant.  The low correlation coefficient indicates there is no 
obvious relationship apparent in the data.  Conversely the economy with the highest paid 




























Figure 2.8 – GDP Growth Rate compared to CEO Pay Multiple 
Regression Slope -2.23 
Correlation Coefficient  -0.118 
 
National GDP growth rate per capita (OECD data) is compared with absolute CEO pay in 
Figure 2.9.  From this data GDP growth appears to be inversely related to raw CEO pay.  
That is, for higher CEO pay, the economic growth rate is slightly lower.  In this case the 
correlation coefficient indicates the relationship is relatively consistent (-0.57).  Again the 





























Figure 2.9 – GDP Growth Rate Per Capita compared to CEO Pay. 
Regression Coefficient -0.72 x 106 
Correlation Coefficient  -0.048 
 
Overall the graphs in Figures 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 demonstrate that there is no evidence that 
higher CEO pay results in higher economic growth.  There is some evidence of the 
opposite although the sample size is too small to be conclusive.  CEO pay rates in the 
United States appear as an outlier in all graphs. 
 
2.6.2 CEO Pay and Share Returns 
Proponents of high CEO pay might argue that performance is better measured by 
corporate returns, as national GDP growth is affected by many factors beyond the CEO’s 
control.  Average share market returns over ten years (1996-2006) for listed corporations 
(OECD data) is compared with the CEO pay multiple (derived as in Figures 2.8 and 2.9) in 
Figure 2.10.  Again there is no obvious relationship apparent in the data to indicate higher 
CEO pay leads to higher share index returns.  There is a very slight negative relationship 
evident.  The best performed share markets (Sweden, Canada, Australia) appear to be 
those where the multiple of CEO pay to average pay is medium to low.  Performance of 


























Figure 2.10 – Share Index Returns compared to CEO Pay Multiple 
Regression Coefficient -0.75 x 106 
Correlation Coefficient  -0.370 
 
In the same manner average share market returns over ten years (1996-2006) for listed 
corporations (OECD data) is compared with absolute CEO pay in Figure 2.11.  This time 
the relationship is still negative but even weaker.  No conclusive relationship is considered 



























Figure 2.11 – Share Index Returns compared with CEO pay. 
Regression Coefficient -1.1 x 10-7 
Correlation Coefficient  -0.137 
 
In summary the evidence from both economic growth data and share market returns does 
not show any significant relationship with average CEO pay.  Any relationships evident 
were extremely slight.  The strongest evidence was for a slight negative relationship 
between relative CEO pay and share returns – the higher the ratio of CEO pay to average 
pay multiple, the lower the share returns.  Larger sample sizes than those available may 
have given more conclusive results.  In all cases, the levels of executive rewards in the 
United States appear to be an outlier, that cannot be justified on macroeconomic grounds. 
 
This conclusion means that there is no evidence of any apparent economic benefit to a 
society from higher CEO pay.  This is true whether the analysis is of CEO pay in absolute 
or comparative (multiple of average wages) terms.  Hence the requirement to justify higher 
executive rewards identified in Chapter One has not been found. 
 
2.7 Corporate Governance and Executive Rewards 
One question that the quantum of executive rewards in Australia and the United States 
today raises, is whether it represents a failure of corporate governance.  The cost of 
executive rewards now represents a significant cost to shareholders, with no evidence that 
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corresponding increases in corporate performance are being gained and some evidence 
that risks are being increased.  This makes them a poor investment of shareholder funds.  
Normally, corporate governance regimes would seek to maximise returns on corporate 
investment, including executive rewards.  The question then remains whether there is any 
correlation between executive rewards and measures of strong or weak corporate 
governance regimes. 
 
A previous OECD research paper by Maher and Andersson93 compared firm performance 
to corporate governance regimes within each OECD country, rather than firm performance 
being related to executive rewards.  Firm performance was found to be positively related to 
ownership concentration (firms with more dispersed ownership performed worse), size of 
shareholding and the corporate governance regimes that affected practices leading to 
those occurrences, such as mergers and acquisitions.  Countries with weak corporate 
governance tended to be permissive of such takeovers, that might dilute share ownership 
and be correlated with poor performance. 
 
Marques and Ghose94 have examined the relationship between corporate governance and 
CEO pay level in OECD countries.  In particular they studied variation in the ratio of 
average pay to CEO pay, which varied widely.  They concluded that the following factors 
were the practical determinants of CEO pay across firms and markets: 
• Scale effect (the larger the industry/firm, the higher CEO pay) 
• Relative endowment effect (if capital - labour ratio of the country was higher, CEO 
pay was higher) 
• Rent seeking effect (inversely related to corporate governance) 
• Greater dispersion in firm ownership lowers relative CEO pay 
Marques and Ghose’s model gives a clear explanation of why US CEO pay is so much 
higher: it has large markets with large firms and weak corporate governance regulations. 
 
2.8 Norms for Leader Rewards 
One final empirical question that has not previously been considered for executive rewards 
is how they compare to rewards for other leadership positions.  Acknowledging David 
                                                
93 Maria Maher and Thomas Andersson, “Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and 
Economic Growth”, (OECD 1999). 
94 Luis Marques and Sayantani Ghose, “International Differences in the Level of Relative CEO 
Compensation”, unpublished working paper, (2006). 
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Miller’s finding that social attitudes to desert varied with circumstances, we can compare 
the ratio of the leader’s income to the average income within a range of different 
occupations.  We can then compare this ratio of leaders income to average group 
members’ income between the occupations. This gives us an indication of whether there is 
a consensus for what reward premium is considered reasonable for leadership positions. 
 
In most cases leaders of groups receive rewards greater than the average for members of 
their group, but not dramatically so.  In some cases it is difficult to compare reward of 
leaders in groups because only the highest incomes are reported, which may or may not 
be for leaders. The ratios of average to leading incomes in occupations in Australia and 
the United States for which data is readily available are shown in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5 Ratio of Average to Leader Income by Occupation 
Group Data 
Year  
Average Income Leader Income Ratio  
Australian (Rules) 
Footballers 
2004 $211,000 $800,000 3.8 
US (Gridiron) Footballers  2004 $3,200,000US $13,000,000US 4.1 
Australian State/Fed 
Public Servants 
2007 $57,000 $309,000 5.4 
United States Fed. 
Public Servants 
2005 $59,000US $400,000US 6.8 
Australian Defence 
Force 
2008 $57,000 $233,000 4.1 
United States Defence 
Force 
2008 $54,000US $206,000US 3.8 
Australian Universities 2006 $79,000 $474,000 6.0 
United States 
Universities 
2006 $77,000US $427,000US 5.5 
Australian Corporations 2007 $59,000 $2,100,000 36 
United States 
Corporations 
2008 $41,000US $10,500,000US 256 
Data Sources: ABS, Australian Public Service, AFL, NFL, US Census Bureau, Times 
Higher Education Supplement, US Defence Force; all reported for 2006/07. 
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From Table 2.5 there is a remarkable similarity in the ratio between average rewards for 
individuals in a group and the maximum rewards for high performers or leaders of the 
group across most fields.  Political, public service, academic, sporting and military groups 
all tend to have leaders or star performers receiving incomes of 4 to 7 times the average 
income for members of their group. 
 
The striking exception to these trends in relative pay is in private corporations, where 
leaders’ rewards are dozens or even hundreds of times the average income for other 
employees within the same firm.  This conflicts sharply with distributions of income for all 
other groups on which data is available.  The trend is not explained by the relative size of 
the groups being led.  The largest organisations considered are public sector departments 
(especially the US defence forces), which are larger than any corporation, yet do not follow 
the same pattern of income distribution. 
 
We cannot say that there is a social norm operating for income distribution between 
leaders and other members of groups precisely because the case of corporate executives 
is so anomalous.  However from this evidence we can say that current ratios of executive 
rewards to average rewards do not match normal community practice in income 
distribution.  Further, the absence of a norm does not mean that the majority of citizens 
would not like such a norm to exist.  If it were not for the case of corporate executives, a 
norm for income premiums for leaders would appear to already exist in Australia and the 
United States.  
 
2.9 Summary 
In looking at empirical evidence we must always be cautious and remember that 
correlation between data dos not imply causation.  Applying normal scientific methods for 
falsifiability, it would be more appropriate to test that a theory is not contradicted by the 
available data, rather than to seek evidence confirming it.  Therefore while we will examine 
links between executive salary and corporate and societal economic outcomes, any 
relationships found do not guarantee that a relationship exists between executive salary 
and corporate or societal benefits.  However the reverse does not apply: evidence of the 
absence of any relationship would disprove that such a relationship exists.  Ideally, if 
reliable relationships between executive salary and business or societal welfare exist, it 
should be possible to predict one from the other with future data. 
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The empirical evidence that is available indicates that both Australian and United States 
executive labour costs have been growing in real terms for over three decades.  This is 
contrary to normal economic theories of labour markets, unless correspondingly increased 
returns to shareholders can be demonstrated.  The growth in executive labour costs was 
especially pronounced during the 1990s.  The shift towards performance bonuses issued 
as share options resulted in windfall gains to executives as the share market grew in that 
period.  The growth has been greater in the United States, where the relative size of share 
bonuses is far higher than in Australia.  Growth in executive reward levels has stabilised 
since the 2008 financial crisis, but it is too early to say whether this change is temporary or 
indicates a change in trend.  
 
A comparison of executive rewards with corporate performance suggests that higher 
executive salaries generate marginal returns to shareholders in Australia, and negative 
returns to shareholders in the United States.  A comparison of executive rewards with 
national economic performance suggests that the executive labour market generates 
negative returns to United States society, while the evidence is inconclusive for Australia.  
The data does not support accounting or economic arguments for high levels of executive 
reward at either the micro (corporate) level or the macro (societal) level. 
 
The absence of strong correlations between executive salary and corporate or economic 
performance does not mean the question is undecided.  It indicates that no economic 
justification for high executive rewards exists.  There is no evidence that high executive 
reward acts as an effective incentive to increase corporate or national economic 
performance.  Without such evidence, the justification on social benefit grounds fails. 
 
In the absence of such evidence empirically based theories, that higher executive salary 
results in better corporate or societal economic performance, cannot be supported.  I 
consider that past claims that such evidence did exist were flawed, using statistical 
analysis that was methodologically inappropriate, and based on relationships that were too 
weak to represent a reliable standard of proof. Those relationships also failed the empirical 
tests of falsifiability and predictive accuracy. 
 
United States evidence suggests that high executive rewards are a marker for risk of 
corporate collapse. Australian evidence is not conclusive, but also shows a correlation 
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between executives paid above the average for their size of corporation and risk of 
subsequent collapse. 
 
Stronger evidence exists that maximising efficiency and firm performance is achieved 
more through strong corporate governance than high executive salary. Hence high levels 
of executive salary in the United States appear to be better explained at the corporate 
level by weak corporate governance, rather than strong corporate performance.   
 
The ratio of executive salary levels to average corporate salaries is much higher than the 
ratio of leaders salary to average salary in other occupations.  The reward premium given 
to executives for leading corporations is outside the range of practice for other leadership 
positions within Australia and the United States. 
 
We can therefore reach some definite conclusions regarding empirical evidence on 
executive salary in Australia and the United States.  They cannot be justified by corporate 
financial benefits, societal economic benefits, or norms for rewarding leadership positions.  
They may induce increased risk of corporate failures.  This begs the question of why 
increasing executive salaries have been awarded in both countries.  The strongest 
evidence points towards weak corporate governance as the cause.  The executive labour 
markets in Australia, and especially the United States, appears to have been dysfunctional 
for more than three decades. 
 
Having failed to find an empirical justification for executive salary levels in Australia and 
especially the United States using financial and economic data, I will next begin a 
theoretical examination of the problem.  I will start by developing a philosophical 
framework under which to consider executive rewards and what their appropriate levels 
should be.  In the following chapters I will use this framework to assess the validity of 
current executive reward practices, and then to evaluate the economic arguments 





3 Desert, Contribution and Social Welfare 
3.1 Overview of Desert and Contribution Theories 
We have seen that the empirical evidence for the United States suggests that current 
executive reward levels are not linked to improved financial outcomes at either the micro 
(corporation and shareholder) or macro (societal) level.  US data also suggests a potential 
for moral hazard with high executive rewards being associated with increased risk of 
corporate collapse.  Australian data is inconclusive at both micro and macro levels, but 
does not support any link between higher executive rewards and financial performance.  
Therefore current high levels of executive rewards are not rational in Australia or the 
United States in an accounting or an economic sense. 
 
The inadequacy of current financial and economic explanations of executive rewards does 
not in itself make them wrong.   Many activities may be uneconomic but still valued within 
a society.  Just as financial or economic justifications would not have been sufficient to 
legitimise executive reward levels, their absence does not automatically invalidate them.  
We can say that the levels of executive rewards in Australia and the United States are 
irrational and inefficient, and perhaps even harmful in the case of the United States, but 
whether or not they are wrong remains a normative question we have yet to resolve.   
 
To answer this question we must return to the normative criteria as defined by David Miller 
in Principles of Social Justice (1999) 95, namely equality, need and desert.  Current 
executive reward levels cannot be justified under criteria of equality or need, and so the 
relevant question is whether or not they may be justified on the basis of being deserved.  
We must define what is a reasonable basis for measuring the desert of executives and, 
based on those criteria, whether current reward levels are deserved. 
 
This question is within the field of distributive justice and of desert theories in particular.  
Distributive justice is the study of normative principles used to evaluate the distribution of 
material benefits within a society.  Desert theories are the particular category of distributive 
justice principles that take the form that a person deserves some reward X, based on 
some desert base Y that the person possesses.  This conception of distributive justice for 
                                                
95 David Miller, “Principles of Social Justice”, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1999). 
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rewards is the one most comparable to community views on justice identified by David 
Miller.  I will use it to define a theoretical basis with which we can examine the question of 
what is a reasonable level of reward for corporate executives. 
 
Other types of distributive justice theories exist.  These include strict egalitarianism, 
difference principles such as John Rawl’s min-max rule96, resource-based principles, 
welfare-based principles, and libertarian principles such as those espoused by Robert 
Nozick.  I do not intend to canvass the relative advantages and disadvantages of these 
other theories in this thesis, other than to point out that none match the commonly held 
views of distributive justice as identified in western societies by David Miller (1999) and 
referred to in Chapter One.  Therefore, for answering questions about whether executive 
rewards are justified in the context of ideas of social justice as understood in Australia and 
the United States, they are not the most appropriate theories to use. 
 
This leaves desert theories as the strand of distributive justice theory most applicable to 
this inquiry.  Desert theories were first defined by Feinberg in the context of legal justice97, 
but are now commonly applied in distributive justice.  In this application, individual desert is 
based on the involvement of the person in some productive activity that is being rewarded.  
Common desert theories all share the objective of raising the standard of living of persons 
in the society98.  Collectively this standard of living may be referred to as the social 
product.  Only activity that is intended to increase the value of the social product is valued 
under these desert theories.  Thus destructive activity, regardless of whether legal or how 
well carried out, would not deserve reward under desert theory.   
 
Within modern desert theory there are three commonly considered classes of personal 
attributes or desert bases used to define the extent to which a person deserves some 
reward.  These are not mutually exclusive, although they are generally considered 
separately.  
 
                                                
96 John Rawls, “A Theory of Justice”, (Harvard Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
97 Joel Feinberg, "Justice and Personal Desert," Nomos Vol 1; Justice, eds. C.J. Friedrich and 
J.W.Chapman, (New York, NY: Atherton Press, 1963). 
98 Julian Lamont, “The Concept of Desert in Distributive Justice”, The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 
44, No. 174 (Jan., 1994), pp. 45-64. 
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The first type of desert based theory is effort based desert, as defined by Sadurski99 and 
Milne100.  These theories assume that reward for an individual should be based on their 
degree of effort made towards the activity under consideration for reward.  This follows the 
arguments of John Locke, who felt that every person deserved the products of their labour 
as a reward for their effort.  Effort theories are vulnerable to the criticism that by rewarding 
effort rather than outcomes, they will not necessarily encourage the achieving of better 
social outcomes by motivating beneficial activities.  Hence they may not lead to as great 
an increase in social product as desert theories generally entail.  Aside from this concern, 
it seems inconceivable that current levels of executive rewards could be justified by the 
relative efforts of executives compared to the effort of other workers.  This type of desert 
theory will not be considered further. 
 
The second common type of desert based theory is compensation based desert as 
defined by Dick101 and Lamont102.  These theories assert that the reward to a person 
should be that appropriate to compensate them for the conditions and difficulties of their 
work.  This may include the complexity of the work, risk or danger, the physical 
unpleasantness of the tasks or the work environment, the qualifications required and other 
opportunities foregone.  Although not considered by David Miller (1999), this theory is 
consistent with the sorts of community attitudes to justice he identified103.  This theory can 
be applied to any occupation including the case of leaders of groups.  
 
It would be difficult on compensation grounds to justify current executive reward levels, 
since working conditions are not especially onerous.  There is no cost of foregone 
opportunities since the reward level is the highest available.  Also compensation theories 
are not directly comparable to the economic arguments raised for executive rewards.  For 
these reasons compensation theories will not be considered further in this context, 
although I consider that they offer potential in future to assess an appropriate level of 
executive salary.  I will return to them in a future chapter. 
 
                                                
99 Wojciech Sadurski, “Giving Desert Its Due”, (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel 1985). 
100 Heather Milne, “Desert, effort and equality”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, 3: 235-243, (1986). 
101 James Dick, “How to Justify a Distribution of Earnings”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4: 
(1975), pages 248-72. 
102 Julian Lamont, “Incentive Income, Deserved Income and Economic Rents”, Journal of Political 
Philosophy Vol.5, No. 1 (March 1997), pages 26-46. 
103 David Miller (1999), pages 61-92. 
 70 
The third type of desert base theory is contribution-based desert as first defined by David 
Miller (1976)104 and Jonathon Riley105. In these individuals are rewarded in proportion to 
the relative contribution they made towards the activity being rewarded.  This might also 
be referred to as productivity based desert.  This closely parallels some of the common 
arguments used to justify executive rewards which I will discuss in chapters four and five.  
 
Thinking similar to the contribution-based desert theory is frequently cited by corporate 
executives to justify their levels of reward.  For example 1990s corporate executive 
“Chainsaw” Al Dunlap, when speaking of his $100 million equity pay, said “Did I earn that?  
Damn right I did.”106  Dunlap had overseen the restructuring of US corporation Scott 
Paper, during which the stock price appreciated by 225%.  If current practice and levels of 
executive rewards can be philosophically justified, it should be possible to do so under 
contribution based desert theories.  In this chapter I will examine contribution-based desert 
theories and how they may be applied to rewards for executives. 
 
Having established that we will apply desert theory to the case of reward for executives, 
and use contribution as the desert base, we must still clarify how we will measure this 
desert base.  There are conflicting views on this question.  Shelly Kagan has developed a 
method for quantifying desert and argues that desert bases should be defined in absolute 
terms107.  An individual will have merited a particular ideal level of desert in any distribution 
of rewards, and any departure from this level of reward for that individual will represent a 
situation less ideal than if that individual received exactly the absolute level of rewards 
they deserved. 
 
Conversely David Miller argues that desert bases are comparative108, and the level of 
reward for an individual should be defined relative to levels of reward for other individuals 
being rewarded.  The actual level of reward will be determined by combining the 
comparative level of desert and the possible frontier of benefit distribution to share the total 
benefits between those individuals deserving reward.  Both methods lend themselves to 
                                                
104 David Miller, “Social Justice” (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976). 
105 Jonathan Riley, “Justice Under Capitalism”, Markets and Justice, ed. John W. Chapman (New 
York: New York University Press 1989), pages 122-162. 
106 Gideon Haigh, “Bad Company, Quarterly Essay Issue 10”, (Melbourne: Schwartz Publishing 
2003), page 9. 
107 Shelly Kagan, "Comparative Desert."  Desert and Justice, Ed. Serena Olsaretti. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2003), pages 93-122. 
108 David Miller, "Comparative and Noncomparative Desert."  Desert and Justice, Ed. Serena 
Olsaretti. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003), pages 24-45. 
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economic analysis of rewards and tying desert and rewards to economic productivity.  
Tuen Dekker has compared Kagan and Miller’s models of desert and shown that only 
comparative desert can achieve an efficient (Pareto optimal) distribution of resources109.  
For this and other reasons I will show why I also prefer Miller’s comparative approach. 
 
The next question is whether profits obtained from business executive’s activity (allocating 
resources more efficiently in a market economy) can be regarded as deserved and 
included in this desert base.  Scott Arnold (1987)110 has argued that profits arise from re-
allocating resources in a manner that creates outputs more valued by the society than 
those from their previous allocation.  This increase in value represents a gain to the 
society. When a business entrepreneur identifies such opportunities for increased value 
(profit) from re-allocating resources, that action increases the social product, and 
identifying it deserves reward.  This reward is also desirable for the society, as if the 
business entrepreneur did not gain reward for reallocating their resources, then they may 
not do so and the social product would not be increased. 
 
It will be necessary to further clarify the type of contribution based desert theory to apply to 
the case of corporate executives, and of leaders of groups generally.  Two versions of 
contribution based desert theory will be considered: the first I will define as marginal 
product theory, and the second is market rate theory as defined by David Miller (1989)111.  
I will define marginal product theories first, as they most closely resemble economic 
theories currently used for deciding executive rewards. It will be shown that they have 
many philosophical problems in addition to their practical difficulties in measurement and 
defining comparison bases.  I will then discuss Miller’s theory, which I regard as preferable 
for this purpose.  This will be followed by a discussion of philosophical objections to the 
use of contribution theories for executives, and possible solutions to them. 
 
Contribution based theory values the desert of each person (including members of groups 
engaged in group actions, such as corporations), by the increase they created in the social 
product of the society in which the group operates.  Like all desert theories, it is a 
“backwards looking” theory, in that the desert base is derived from the value of the social 
                                                
109 Tuen Dekker, “Desert and Distributive Efficiency”, Ethics and Economics, Vol. 5(2), (2008). 
110 N. Scott Arnold, “Why Profits are Deserved”, Ethics, 97 (January 1987), pages 387 – 402. 
111 David Miller, “Market, State and Community”, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
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product of the actions being performed or just completed.  In this respect desert theories 
are distinct from incentive payments which I will discuss in chapter five112. 
 
3.2 Marginal Product Desert Theory 
3.2.1 Marginal Product for Group Leaders 
 
By marginal product theory I mean to apply a modified form of the method used to 
calculate the marginal product of labour in economics, to the calculation of the value of 
desert for members of groups.  Marginal product theory has existed in economics since 
the “marginal revolution” of the 19th century, and became highly mathematical after the 
work of Arrow, Solow, Samuelson and others in the 1950s113.  It is used to calculate 
changes in the value of production from marginal (individual) changes to resources.  As 
contribution based desert theory means defining desert based on the outputs produced, 
we can apply these economic marginal product theories to the calculation of desert bases 
for individuals.  The purpose of this application is not to advocate these theories, but to 
demonstrate the difficulties that arise when they are applied to the case of individuals in 
groups, and leaders in particular. 
 
The idea of valuing a person’s desert based on their outputs follows from the Lockean 
principle that each person deserves the fruits of their own labours114.  In desert theory it 
matches the contribution theory of Kagan115, where the desert base of an individual is 
derived from the value of their production in increasing the social product.  However these 
theories consider the value of production for individuals creating a good or service, and not 
the case of individuals contributing to some group enterprise, that results in some group 
output.  I intend to develop a more refined version of this theory, which I will call marginal 
product theory, to explore the case of determining the desert base of individuals working 
within group activities, including the desert base for leaders of groups. 
 
                                                
112 Julian Lamont (1997). 
113 K. J. Arrow, H. B. Chenery, B. S. Minhas and R. M. Solow, “Capital-Labor Substitution and 
Economic Efficiency”, The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 43, No. 3 (Aug., 1961), pp. 
225-250. 
114 John Locke, “Two Treatises of Government”, edited Thomas P. Peardon (New York: Liberal 
Arts 1952) (original published 1689). 
115 Shelly Kagan, “Equality and Desert”, in What Do We Deserve? Eds. Louis Pojman and Owen 
McLeod, (New York: Oxford University Press 1999), pages 298-314. 
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I will borrow and extend concepts from Frank Jackson’s approach to moral responsibility 
within groups for group actions116 to define desert within groups.  Jackson defined a group 
action as any action jointly undertaken by the members of a group that could not be 
undertaken individually. For example, an orchestra playing a symphony is a group action.  
I will define a leadership action as any action of a group leader to direct or guide the group 
that has the effect of enhancing the outcome of the group action.  Thus the orchestra’s 
conductor would undertake a leadership action in conducting. 
 
The marginal product method for determining contribution-based desert for members of a 
group is to say that they deserve reward X, based on the value of the marginal social 
product P of their contribution to the group action.  The value of the marginal social 
product P for a group member is the difference between the value of the group’s social 
product with (P1) and without (P0) their contribution.  
 
Marginal product theory: X(reward deserved) = P1 - P0 
 
Then for groups with N members (1, 2, 3 … to N) where there is some additional 
productive value C accruing from the structure or capital of the group, the group social 
product (PN) is as follows: 
 
PN = (X1 + X2 + X3 + … XN) + C 
 
We can extend this theory to define the marginal product of group leaders.  For the group 
leader performing a leadership action, the value of their marginal product (PL) is equal to 
the difference in marginal product before (PN) and after (PN+1) the leadership action: 
 
 PL = (PN+1) - (PN) 
 
This calculation of the value of the leader’s marginal product requires some clarification.  
The difference in the value of the marginal product from the leadership action (PL) may not 
be entirely due to the leader’s action and therefore not exclusively allocatable to the desert 
base of the leader.  We also need to distinguish it from the group’s capital and any 
additional efforts or resources applied within the group. 
                                                
116 Frank Jackson, “Group Morality” in Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in honor of J.J.C. Smart, 
ed. Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan and Jean Norman, (Oxford: Blackwell 1987) page 91. 
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Arnold’s (1987) argument that profits are deserved was based on the profits of the 
business entrepreneur allocating their own resources.  He also assumed that the 
entrepreneur would suffer the losses if the re-allocation of resources reduced the social 
product117. The reward was deserved due to their bearing uncertainty in the investment 
decision, as well as for their entrepreneurial creativity.  Arnold recognised that an 
employee might suggest such opportunities, and deserve some reward in return.  However 
the executive employee will have a lesser desert base than the enterpreneur, as they do 
not bear the loss in the event that the re-allocation (leadership action) is unsuccessful.  
Thus for Arnold, to gain the full value of the marginal product from the leadership action 
(PL) in a leader’s desert bases requires that the leader also be responsible for the results 
of the investment decision118.  This need not equate to ownership, but should represent a 
substantial stake in the outcome of the action. 
 
If the change in group social product after the leadership action was achieved without the 
addition of any extra effort from the group or resources from the society, then most of the 
contribution desert base could be attributed to the leader.  That is, the increase in social 
product from the leadership action, PL would be due to an improvement in the efficiency of 
use of the groups existing resources. 
 
For cases where additional resources have been added to the group in the leadership 
action, the calculation is more complex.  For example, the leadership action may involve 
hiring new staff into the group, XN+1.  These new group members will have made their own 
contribution and have a corresponding desert base, which is separate to the desert base 
of the leader.  Assuming that the leader does not personally perform part of the group 
action (other than via direction of the actions of others), and thus has no contribution 
desert base directly, the leaders desert base will accrue from changes (increases) in the 
additional productive value C accruing from the structure or capital of the group. 
 
 PL = (PN+1) - (PN) - X N+1 
 PL = CN+1 - CN - X N+1 
 
                                                
117 N. Scott Arnold (1987), Page 398. 
118 N. Scott Arnold (1987), page 399. 
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Note that the leader’s desert base is not C, the group productive value, as this existed 
prior to the leadership action, and the leader may not have contributed to its formation.  In 
a capitalist system the value of production from C accrues to the suppliers of the group’s 
capital. 
 
The contribution desert base of the leadership action should be net of the contribution of 
any additions to the group’s resources, XN+1.  From the societal viewpoint, if the group 
social product is increased solely by increasing the resources used by the group, then 
presumably the value of other social products previously created by those resources in 
other activities have been lost.  There is only a benefit to the society from the leadership 
action if new resources are used more efficiently (create a greater social product) in the 
new activity than they were formerly. 
 
A practical example of this resource consumption effect would be for executives who 
increase the output of corporations via a large merger or acquisition of another 
corporation.  While this might increase the output of the acquiring corporation, the social 
output of the acquired corporation is lost or subsumed into it.  Unless the net social 
product of the merged corporation is greater than the sum of the previous social products 
of the two unmerged corporations, there is no gain for the society.  In practice, mergers 
are a common way by which performance targets for growth may be achieved by 
executives, when in reality the evidence for their success rate in efficiency terms is poor119.  
 
There is a further complication with the question of whether the leadership action involved 
any increase in contribution put into the group activity by each group member, X1 + X2 + X3 
+ … XN.  This might represent the ability of the leader to inspire greater effort from group 
members, or to work more effectively, perhaps via improved skills.  The additional 
contribution is partly due to the group members, who must act on the leader action and its 
directions.  In both cases there would be some proportion of this increase in contribution 
accruing to the desert base of each group member.  Thus even in a straightforward case 
of an increase in group social product via an increase in contribution per group member, 
the change in social product cannot be claimed solely as the contribution desert base of 
the leader.  
 
                                                
119 Bruce R. Lyons, “What do we Conclude from the Success and Failure of Mergers”, Journal of 
Industry, Competition and Trade, Vol.1, No.4, December 2001. 
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From a societal viewpoint, this increase in effort contributed by each group member will 
only be a social benefit, if it increases the overall social product and does not preclude any 
other contributions to social product the group members formerly made with the efforts or 
time formerly not contributed to the group.  If additional contribution from group members 
was achieved by their working longer hours, so that they have less time to contribute to the 
society in other ways, whether through other work or other voluntary activities, then the 
loss in social product from the loss in other activity should be deducted.  Disbenefits such 
as increased health costs for workers with less free time to exercise should also be 
deducted from the measure of PL. 
 
It follows that executives who achieve increased contributions from each corporate 
employee via coercive means to increase work hours at the expense of other work, 
volunteer work or needed rest do not increase the social product.  The real test of 
successful leadership actions then is whether social product per group member, per unit of 
time or resources spent on the group activity, is increased.  This net improvement in 
productivity per resource is the true desert base of the leader. 
 
There are also practical difficulties in measuring the value of the marginal product for 
group leaders including: 
• Information requirements – in order to calculate the group leader’s marginal product 
PL we need a large amount of data including the social product with the leader 
action PN+1, what the product of the group would have been without the leader 
action PN, and any change in contribution for every member of the group X1 + X2 + 
X3 + … XN. 
• Identifying Capital productivity – there is no obvious way to distinguish the 
productive value of the group’s capital C, from the value of worker’s efforts X1 + X2 + 
X3 + … XN.  Without knowing the difference in capital value we again cannot 
determine the leaders contribution base. 
• Need for comparators – we could determine PL, if we have information on the group 
product of either an identical group without the leader’s action, or the same group 
prior to the leader’s action, assuming that no other attributes of the group changed.  
Otherwise we do not have a valid comparator for the group social product with the 
leader action.  That is, in order to know PL we need to know both PN+1, and what PN 
would have been. 
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• Inability to distinguish individual contributions – the inability to distinguish 
contributions by individuals to a group action will make it extremely difficult to 
measure changes in effort or contribution for group members performing the same 
task due to changes in motivation.  This may give rise to free-rider problems in 
groups that produce complex products with multiple contributors.  This problem was 
first identified in economic analysis by Arrow120. 
 
In summary there is a legitimate desert base for leaders who improve the net productivity 
per resource in a group action.   However the value of the leader’s contribution in a group 
action is indeterminate in practical terms under a marginal product analysis.  This is due to 
the complexity of calculating contributions for other individuals within group actions, the 
reciprocal nature of some of the desert bases involved, and the question of to whom or 
what desert base the benefits of any economy of scale for the group should be allocated.  
This makes it impossible to calculate a contribution for the group leader other than in a 
comparative sense with other similar groups.  Even then, the comparison will be of the 
relative merits of the two leader’s contributions, and will not be able to be distinguished 
from other group members’ contributions in an absolute sense.  Hence the ability to 
calculate an absolute value for the group leader’s contribution remains. 
 
3.2.2 Example of Marginal Product Theory Application 
 
We can demonstrate this difficulty in allocating benefits within a group with a monetary 
example.  Suppose two individuals A and B each have a productive capacity/ income 
potential of $50,000 per annum for A and $70,000 per annum for B.  If they form a 
partnership, they have a collective productivity/income potential of $200,000.  Their 
collective marginal product has increase by $80,000 by working as a partnership.  This 
raises the question of how this benefit should be distributed.  The marginal product of A 
and B could be measured in a variety of ways, depending on how the group product is 
distributed121.  These are shown in Table 3.1. 
 
                                                
120 Kenneth J. Arrow, “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing”, The Review of Economic 
Studies Vol. 29, No. 3 (Jun., 1962), pp. 155-173. 
121 David Miller (1976) had a similar example based on workers shifting sacks together, although 
this did not consider the question of splitting rewards with managers.  See David Miller, “Social 
Justice”, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pages 107-108. 
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Table 3.1 Possible Distributions of Benefits of Partnership 
Situation Marginal Product of A Marginal Product of B 
Working separately $50,000 $70,000 
Partnership product $200,000 
Partnership input cost $120,000 




Allocate product based 
on prior input value 
$50,000 x 200/120 
= $83,333 




$50,000 + $80,000/2 
= $90,000 
$70,000 + $80,000/2 
= $110,000 
Allocate benefit to A $130,000 $70,000 
Allocate benefit to B $50,000 $150,000 
  
In terms of desert theory, the contribution attributable to the productive benefit of working 
as a group should be distributed to whoever was responsible for the two individuals 
forming the partnership.  Assuming it was a shared decision, this would mean distributing 
the $80,000 increase in product value equally between the two, for a gain of $40,000 each.  
However the question remains of what to assume for the value of the contribution of A and 
B to the group product.  B might argue that her contribution was in other circumstances 
more valuable, and she is entitled to her original productive value of $70,000 plus the 
$80,000 group benefit.  A could respond that the partnership production was not the same 
situation, and that both had worked equal hours towards the shared product.   
 
Given that the partnership results in a net increase in social product, it will be possible to 
distribute benefits so that both A and B are better off. However as Table 3.1 demonstrates, 
there appear to be several plausible alternative methods to do this, with no clear means of 
selecting between them. 
 
We will now assume that, instead of a partnership, a company was formed for the same 
purpose by business entrepreneur C.  C realises that the company can make an $80,000 
profit with A and B working for them.  If C offers A and B their same income as previously 
to work in the company, they will be indifferent to joining it.  However there is sufficient 
productive advantage in the group action for C to offer A and B a premium over their 
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previous income to join the company while still leaving a margin for the company to make 
a profit.  For example, C could offer A an income of $60,000 and B an income of $80,000 
and still make a profit of $60,000 for the company.  If C then appointed some manager D 
to lead the company, C would still expect their $60,000 profit as owner of the company, 
less some premium for the cost of D’s labour of management.   
 
Following Scott Arnold122, entrepreneur C would deserve the profit, say $60,000, if it was 
C’s idea and capital that was used to form the company and work as a group.  The profit 
then represents a reward to C for both bearing the risk of allocating C’s own resources to 
the new project, and increasing the social welfare by $80,000.  Note that the profit would 
not accrue to the manager, D, since D is not responsible for the idea that created the 
increase of social welfare by $80,000, and it is not D’s resources that are at risk in the 
company. 
 
The situation becomes more complex if the company has worked in the industry for a long 
time and the original practices of individuals working at the same tasks separately have 
disappeared.  Now there is no comparator to know what the individual value of the 
contributions of A and B would have been.  The company will pay workers the market rate 
for labour, say $60,000 each, a fee for management and the shareholders who now own 
the company will expect to receive the balance as profit.  The shareholders will seek to 
maximise their returns net of the cost of management, D.  If management costs increase, 
then returns from the company will need to increase by a greater amount to justify the 
extra  expenditure to shareholders. 
 
3.2.3 Application of Marginal Product Theory to Executives 
The fundamental difficulty of applying marginal product theory to leaders identified earlier 
remains for executives.  We do not know what proportion of the improvement in a 
corporation’s performance under the leadership of an executive is due to the efforts of that 
executive.  The market that determines the value of the corporation’s output is external to 
it, and does not make judgements about individual contributions to that output from within 
the corporation. 
 
                                                
122 N. Scott Arnold (1987), pages 395-399. 
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The larger and more complex the corporation becomes, the more difficult it will be to 
identify the contribution of an individual executive.  In the example in Table One we saw 
that there were at least five different ways to apportion the benefits of group production in 
the simple case of two persons working in a partnership.  Modern corporations employ 
thousands of individuals, working on many different tasks, and sometimes with work on the 
same group action spread over different countries.   
 
Defining the leadership action itself will be difficult.  Instead of a single executive there will 
be a large number of middle and senior managers, reporting to an executive group of at 
least five individuals.  Even if the benefits of group leadership actions could be defined and 
measured, it would be difficult to allocate them between the various managers and 
executives who carried them out.  To the executive who claims “you wouldn’t have made 
this profit without me”, the obvious reply is “how much profit would you have made without 
the corporation?” 
 
This is not to say that leadership actions in groups create no benefits via increases to the 
social product.  The difficulty is in measuring and allocating this desert base, not that it is 
spurious.  Adam Smith123 cites the long term advantages to a society from increased 
economic efficiency through specialisation in group actions (the “division of labour”) as the 
primary benefit and reason for a market-based capitalist economic system.  Group actions 
and consequent specialisation can lead to great efficiencies and increase in social product.  
 
Smith cited the example of workers making pins, where a skilled blacksmith alone might 
make 1000 in a day, whereas less skilled workers in a factory, with each carrying out a 
specialist sub-task, could make the equivalent of 2300 each in a day124.  Thus group 
actions are beneficial, and leadership actions that direct group actions are valuable. 
 
The countries having systems that encouraged specialisation and economic efficiency 
were generally the richest at the time when Smith wrote.  There is a long history of 
evidence to suggest that Smith was correct, with the gap between the richest and poorest 
countries nations having generally increased in the 230 years since he wrote.   By the year 
                                                
123 Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.” (London: W. 
Strahan and T. Cadell 1776; Penguin edition: London, 1986). Book One, Chapter One, Page 111 in 
Penguin Edition. 
124 Adam Smith, (1776), page 113. 
 81 
2000 all of the world’s richest nations125 had market-based capitalist economies and 
specialised production.  These nations almost without exception enjoy the highest per 
capita incomes, longest life expectancy, and provide the greatest benefits to their 
citizens126.   
 
3.2.4 Objections to Marginal Product Theories 
There are theoretical objections to applying marginal product theory to executive rewards.  
It cannot be proven that gains in economic efficiency for a group are the result of the 
actions or efforts of any one member of the group, including the executive.  It may be 
possible to gain a comparative measure of an executive’s performance by comparing the 
corporation to other similar corporations. Mathematically, it is possible to estimate the 
effects of a single variable on some output by using multiple regression analysis, however 
this requires an exponentially larger number of sample points being available as the 
number of other variables is increased, in order to be statistically reliable.  As was 
discussed in Chapter two, in practice there are usually too few corporations in a single 
industry for this form of comparative analysis to be reliable. 
 
Implicit in the contribution desert-base concept for the executive is the assumption that 
their leadership is to a large extent responsible for the group surplus or economy of scale 
from the corporation’s activity.  That is the executive’s desert base is assumed to be 
proportional to the economy of scale or capital value (C) of the corporation.  Therefore the 
contribution based desert theory for executives is vulnerable to the claim that there are 
other primary causes of any efficiency generated by the corporation.  
 
Most industrial economic studies have concluded that there are multiple causes of 
efficiency.  Measured at the societal level, a range of political, social, and technological 
changes may cause economic and social advances, apart from the business efficiencies 
that may be generated by a single executive or corporation.  For example, the general 
economic growth and prosperity enjoyed by most OECD nations in the 1990s might just as 
easily be traced to causes such as the “peace dividend” from the end of the cold war, 
                                                
125 As of 2006 all 27 members of the OECD, comprising the world’s richest nations, had free-
market capitalist economies.  Outside of the OECD the fastest growing developing nations, such as 
Brazil and India, were also capitalist economies.  Even “Communist” China had profit making 
corporations, stock markets, and private banks, having a capitalist system in all but name. 
126 See United Nations Development Program, “Human Development Report 2009”, accessed from 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009/ on 4 July 2010. 
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increased computerization, the population age profile ensuring record high workforce 
participation, and the increasing globalization of world trade.  Some of these changes may 
have rested at least in part on management decisions to adopt them, and so could 
represent a desert base for executives.  However it is impossible to know to what degree 
this was the case.  The shift to rewarding executives proportional to increases in share 
values implicitly allocated a share of these benefits in this period to executives. 
 
The most comprehensive studies to date of the causes of business efficiency and 
competitiveness were those carried out by Micheal Porter127 in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Porter developed a model of factors that consistently influenced the success of different 
businesses.  These included firm strategy, demand conditions, related supporting 
industries, resource availability and government policy.    Four of the five factors were 
external influences that firms had to respond to, rather than things they caused.  Corporate 
leadership was undoubtedly important in the way the firms responded to the other causal 
factors.  However only one factor was directly controlled by executives, corporate strategy.  
Overall it would seem that at best only a partial share of the productivity benefits from 
these factors could be allocated to the executive’s desert base.   
 
In an Australian study Quiggan (1998) 128 found that the apparent causes of improved 
efficiency include scale economies, technological innovations, X (factor)-efficiency gains 
and the removal of behavior aimed at merely satisficing performance targets rather than 
maximizing performance.  Gains in factor efficiency may have been due to corporate 
leadership, such as through restructuring of corporations.  This is plausible but difficult to 
prove.  It cannot be isolated from other potential causes of factor efficiency gains, such as 
changes to regulation or government policy.  For example, reforms to labor markets might 
improve factor efficiency in an industry regardless of the actions of an individual executive. 
 
For these reasons most studies of executive performance rely on comparing corporate 
performance with that of other corporations in the same industry or market.  They then 
make the assumption that any differences in comparative performance are due to 
executive leadership.  Yet this is still only an assumption.  It ignores the potential for 
exceptional contributions from other members of either corporation to influence their 
                                                
127 Micheal Porter, “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”. (New York: The Free Press, 1990). 
128 John Quiggin, (1998), “Micro-gains from Micro-Economic Reform”, Economic Analysis and 
Policy, 28(1), 1-16. 
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performance.  It is likely to overstate the value of executive contributions, by conflating it 
with the contribution of other individuals who may have caused the improved performance. 
 
When assessing comparative performance for corporations that do not have better than 
average performance, which will be a large number of the cases, it will not be possible to 
identify any contribution by the executive. This may conversely understate the contribution 
of the executive.  This will be particularly so when executives are hired to turn around 
struggling corporations, in which cases achieving average performance may be a 
significant improvement.  For these reasons the comparative analysis should be carried 
out over time, with the change in relative performance over time used as a proxy of 
executive performance.  This requires the length of tenure of individual executives to be 
substantial in order for performance trends to be measurable. 
 
This leads us to a fundamental weakness of marginal product theories for determining 
reward levels for participants in any group action, including leaders.  The results of any 
comparative analysis of performance might be able to justify differentials between the level 
of reward for an individual and their comparator group, but would not be able to justify any 
absolute level of reward.   
 
For example, suppose it is possible to determine that one executive has a 20% better 
performance than that of her peers.  When deciding her salary, it would seem reasonable, 
on a marginal product basis, to reward her with an income 20% higher than the income of 
her peers.  But the question still remains: 20% of what?  This analysis says nothing about 
whether the peer incomes are reasonable, or whether the reward is greater or lesser than 
her actual contribution to the group.  Such an analysis assumes that the labor market that 
has set the peers’ incomes is efficient, but does not prove it to be so.  This then becomes 
a circular argument. 
 
A further difficulty is that, even if the contribution to a corporation of executive decisions 
could be isolated, it may not be possible to isolate the value of the marginal product of the 
CEO or any particular executive from the value of the marginal product of the rest of the 
executive group.  One possible way to overcome this would be by identifying the period 
when a particular CEO was present and isolating the performance during their tenure from 
that before and after.  The difficulty with this is that the impact of many decisions on 
corporate restructuring or strategy take time to become evident.  The full benefits or dis-
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benefits of their decisions will not emerge till some time later, perhaps after they have left 
the corporation. 
 
3.2.5 Adverse Social Effects of Application to Executives 
There are potential adverse social consequences from applying this theory to executives.  
There is a need for consistency of application of marginal product theory in all occupations 
across a society if social benefits are to be realised. A justification of marginal product 
theory for contribution based desert is it ought to encourage persons to make correct 
(socially beneficial) decisions on choosing occupations.  Reward mechanisms are one 
means to influence that decision.  This should benefit society, by producing the most 
efficient resource allocation of people into occupations.  This benefit is only realised if all 
occupations being chosen between are given contribution-based rewards in the same 
manner.  Then individuals making decisions on their employment can make a well 
informed judgement between career paths based on the comparative societal value of 
each.   
 
However if contribution based rewards are not allocated to each alternative career path in 
a consistent manner, these choices will be biased in favour of the occupations where large 
contribution based- rewards are paid, even if they are not the most socially beneficial 
choices.  This will result in a loss of overall social product, as persons better suited to other 
fields that are socially necessary opt not to choose them due to excessive financial 
rewards in corporate careers.  Murphy et al (1991)129 found a clear correlation between the 
economic growth rate of countries and the number of scientists and engineers they 
trained.  A decline in these graduates, combined with a rise in graduates of law and 
finance, was linked to a slowdown in the US economy in the 1980s. 
 
This miss-allocation is likely to be particularly problematic for social service fields whose 
nature is such that the value of their marginal product does not accrue to the organisation 
that produces it. A good example of this problem is the comparative difficulty of many 
western nations in attracting good quality students into the field of teaching as rewards for 
other business occupations greatly exceed them.  Yet quality education systems have long 
been recognised as a prime determinant of national productivity and long term increases in 
                                                
129 Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, “The Allocation of Talent: Implications 
for Growth”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 2 (May, 1991), pages 503-530. 
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social product since the first research of Becker (1962) 130 to Blundell (1999)131 more 
recently. 
 
In this respect there is then only an efficiency case for allocating contribution-based 
rewards to corporate executives if all positions in the society with a significant impact on 
the social product are similarly rewarded.  For example, if economic analysis 
demonstrated that the number and skill of scientific researchers, engineers and maths 
teachers are all closely correlated with advances in social product, then all would merit 
high reward on a contribution basis.  Contribution based rewards need not be confined to 
economic benefits – professions affecting quality of life and social order such as health 
care professionals and police would also deserve reward on this basis.   
 
Executive rewards would not be justified in being any larger than rewards to other 
occupations having a similar (positive) impact on social product.  To be consistent, 
business economists who argue for occupational rewards based on evidence for 
contribution, should prefer that multiple other professions requiring higher skill and training 
than executives would receive similar rewards to them, based on clearer past evidence of 
their link to gains in social product. 
 
From this viewpoint, we have no reason to believe that the very high reward levels for 
corporate executive positions in recent decades are deserved on the basis of contribution.  
They are not justified in themselves and may have an undesirable effect in distorting the 
allocation of human resources to other important tasks within the society.  That is, 
excessively high rewards for executives may have induced a higher proportion of the 
societies best minds to chose careers in corporate management than would be warranted 
by their likely returns to society132. 
 
There is reason to believe that applying marginal contribution theories to executive 
salaries may also have some adverse consequences within the corporations.  The 
inequalities it creates within the corporation, is likely to have a damaging effect on staff 
                                                
130 Gary S. Becker, “Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis”, The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 70, No. 5, Part 2: Investment in Human Beings. (Oct., 1962), pages 9-49. 
131 Richard Blundell, Lorraine Dearden, Costas Meghire and Barbara Sianesi, “Human Capital 
Investment: The Returns from Education and training to the Individual, the Firm and the Economy”, 
Fiscal Studies, (1999), vol. 20, no. 1, pages 1 23. 
132 Steve Lohr, “With Finance Disgraced, Which Career Will be King?”, New York Times, 11 April, 
2009.  
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morale and productivity133.  Unjustified inequality of rewards within a group causes 
resentment among those with lesser rewards.  The feeling that the benefits of the group 
activity are not fairly shared will undermine any sense of belonging to the group, and would 
presumably also increase staff turnover.  Low staff morale lessens the work satisfaction of 
employees, and may be a cause of poor performance134.  Therefore if realized this 
consequence represents a potential loss to both. 
 
It should be noted that the potential problem in this case is the difference in salaries within 
the corporation and not their level.  An organization with uniformly high or uniformly low 
salaries is not likely to suffer from this problem.  Conversely one organization paying its 
workers consistently less than rivals in the same industry would also potentially suffer from 
this effect even if rewards within it were relatively fair.  With current executive salaries 
being tens or even hundreds of times the salary of average workers, there appears to be 
considerable potential for this effect to harm corporate productivity and social product.  
 
3.3 Miller’s Market Rate Contribution Theory 
 
I have defined the conceptual difficulties in applying marginal-product type contribution 
theories to desert, and to executive rewards in particular.  However this is not the end of 
our consideration of contribution theories.  David Miller (1989)135 has defined an alternative 
market rate contribution theory that avoids some of the difficulties of the marginal-product 
theory for defining the desert base of leaders of groups. Miller’s theory still has difficulties, 
and critically requires that there are efficient markets for wages.  I will now examine the 
pre-requisites for Miller’s theory in detail and consider arguments for and against their 
applicability to corporate executives.  In closing, I will evaluate whether current practices in 
corporate executive labour markets would satisfy Miller’s conditions for efficiency and 
fairness. 
 
                                                
133 R.G. Harris,. “The Determinants of Productivity Growth: Issues and Prospects.” Discussion 
Paper 8, (Ottawa: Industry Canada 1999).  
134 Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles, and Herbert Gintis, “Wealth Inequality, Wealth Constraints 
and Economic Performance”. UC Berkeley: Center for International and Development Economics 
Research. 1999. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3bh899fh 
135 David Miller, “Market, State and Community”, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
pages 157-174. 
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David Miller’s market valuation theory uses a different measure of the contribution of an 
individual to marginal product theory.   Miller acknowledges that measuring marginal 
contributions is difficult.  He argues that the value of any person’s contribution (Pi) to the 
social product P is best represented by the market valuation of their salary, Y.  That is, 
their salary Y is the best available proxy of their desert base.  This assumes that the 
market for setting the salary is fair and efficient.  We will return to consider the conditions 
that would be required to ensure such a market later.  
 
Miller does not claim that market values of salary will always be a just reward.  Instead, 
Miller considers that market rate valuations will be closer to a just reward for individuals 
than either attempts to value the marginal product (P1 – P0) from their actions, or the 
arbitrary imposition of a non-market valuation to their contributions.  Thus for Miller: 
 
Pi = Yi 
Where  
Pi = value of contribution of person i, and  
Yi = salary of person i. 
David Miller defined his theory for application to individuals in different occupations.  He 
did not specifically address the issues of application to members within group actions, or 
the added difficulties of desert for leaders of groups.  I assume that he intended this to 
occur via an extension of his basic theory.  Then for a group with N members: 
PN = the sum of all salaries Yi and capital productivity within the group 
PN = (Y1 + Y2 + Y3 + … YN) + C 
Again, C is the return to capital (profit) from the benefits to group production of any capital 
equipment or plant.  This would normally be paid to the owners of the group or its capital 
equipment.  These would be the shareholders in the case of a corporation.  Where a group 
is a partnership between equal members C is the added value to group production from 
any economy of scale from working together as a group.  In the case of these and any 
self-owned groups the value of returns to C would then be divided between the group 
members. 
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3.3.1 Objections to Market Rate Theory  
There is an immediate difficulty with Market Rate theory when applied to corporations in 
that it appears to involve a degree of circularity. The value of each group member’s 
contribution to the group is equal to their market salary. The value of returns to capital is 
equal to the difference between total market value of group production less total market 
value of salaries, presumably also less any other expenses for materials and 
consumables.  We can assume that the cost of expenses and consumables is known and 
fixed and substitute Net production PN-E. Then: 
 
Net production PN-E = total wages (Y1 + Y2 + Y3 + … YN) + profits C 
C = PN-E – (Y1 + Y2 + Y3 + … YN) 
(Y1 + Y2 + Y3 + … YN)= PN-E – C 
Individual Yi = PN-E – C – (Y1 + Y2 + Y3 + … YN) 
 
We cannot determine the fair value of any group member income using Miller’s theory, 
unless we know all the other incomes and outputs.  Thus we cannot use it to determine fair 
levels of both wages and profits – we must assume that one or the other is fair, and use it 
to determine the other.  Likewise we cannot determine the fair salary of any individual 
employee YN, unless we also know the (fair) salary of all other employees.  In this sense 
David Miller’s theory is a device for justifying a given level of salary as a market outcome, 
rather than calculating what it should be.   
 
If the market is fair, it could be argued that the market value of each group members’ 
income and the group’s output is the sum of each individual valuation made by persons 
active in the market.  Then the market valuation of both individual incomes and group 
output, and by difference, profits, is linked to their social utility, and is therefore also fair.   
We then return to Miller’s original conditions: if the market is fair then the salary of 
individuals and profit to shareholders are both fair.  However we have not yet proven that 
either the market or the salary and profit is fair.  This becomes a circular argument. 
 
3.3.2 Conditions for Fair Markets in Market Rate Theory 
This valuing role of market determinations of salary makes the conditions and performance 
of markets critical in David Miller’s theory to the inherent justice of market outcomes and 
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rewards.  Miller recognised a number of objections to the justice of market valuations and 
responded to each in defence of his theory136. 
 
Miller does not claim that markets are perfectly just in their outcomes, merely that they are 
more likely to be just than the alternatives.   Market allocations of desert are still preferable 
to the arbitrary allocation of desert by some third party.  In his response to these objections 
Miller identifies the need for government intervention or a regulator to ensure that 
potentially unjust aspects of markets do not build up over time.    
 
Miller goes on to define two conditions under which market transfers might be considered 
not only unfair but to represent exploitation that government regulators should act to 
prevent137.  The first is if a transfer is more advantageous to the exploiting party and less 
advantageous to the exploited party than some bench mark or equilibrium price due to the 
amount and kind of labour in it.  The second is if the transfer must occur through some 
special advantage the exploiter has through asymmetry of information and/or asymmetry 
in bargaining power. 
 
Both conditions assume the fact that the exploited party must make a transfer.  They also 
assume there is a lack of ignorance or willingness to be exploited, either of which may lead 
to similar market outcomes without exploitation being involved.  Miller does not consider it 
possible to identify simple rules to prevent these problems and further emphasises the 
need for government regulation.  
 
Applying Miller’s theory to the determination of desert for individuals engaged in group 
actions raises the following additional concerns.  Firstly, as groups become larger and 
more complex the potential for asymmetries of information and bargaining power will 
increase between individuals within the group.  The existence of formalised power, 
reporting and command structures within groups will tend to concentrate these advantages 
in the hands of those in positions of power within the group.  They will have a broader 
overall knowledge of the contribution of the group, its market position, and ability to 
provide rewards.   
 
                                                
136 David Miller (1989), pages 158-174. 
137 David Miller (1989), pages 187-193. 
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Second, positions of authority may also confer the ability to force or coerce individuals into 
acceptance of levels of reward they may not otherwise be satisfied with, unless there are 
also corresponding oversight and restraints on the use of such powers.  In most group 
employment situations any exploitation is not between two individuals deciding on a 
voluntary transfer, but between one individual acting as a group member and another 
individual acting with the strength of the organisation behind them.  These concerns apply 
to all groups with institutionalised structures, such as churches, schools, hospitals, 




Miller’s Market Rate theory gives some useful criteria by which to assess the fairness of 
the corporate executive labour market.  Miller acknowledges market valuations may be 
dependent on luck and other factors.  In the short term this is unavoidable to a degree, 
though in the long term a well-regulated market should not suffer unduly from such effects.  
Thus for Market Rate theory the long term efficiency and fairness of a labour market is 
more important than any perturbations towards higher or lower rewards in the short term.  
Taken in this light, any short-term correlation of the executive labour market between 
executive salary and corporate performance becomes less significant.  The important 
question is whether long-term trends accord with expectations of a fair market. 
 
The long-term trends in the Australian and United States executive labour market identified 
in Chapter Two suggest that this market is only marginally efficient in Australia and is not 
efficient in the United States.  Changes in real rewards for executives have not 
corresponded to increased share returns or national incomes for almost three decades.  
The average level of rewards for corporate executives has been many times that in other 
occupation for at least two decades.  Once this situation was reached in an efficient 
market there should have been sufficient incentive to encourage talented applicants to 
move into corporate executive careers.  This increase in supply should then have 
stabilised the price of labour, yet the rising trend in rewards has continued.  The trend data 
shows that the corporate executive labour market is not efficient but distorted, and 
therefore the reward outcomes are not deserved. 
 
 91 
3.3.3 Causes of Exploitation in Executive Labour Markets 
There are a number of structural aspects of the corporate executive labour market that 
appear to create opportunities for exploitative behaviour that are difficult to eliminate. 
These have been identified by Bebchuk and Fried (2004)138 for the United States 
executive labour market. Miller’s definition of exploitation give a useful framework against 
which to discuss these aspects. 
 
The first category of causes of exploitation is asymmetry in information.  There are many 
ways in which the access to information for negotiating of executive rewards is biased in 
favour of the executive. 
 
Executive recruitment practice is unusual in that rather than advertising a position and 
reward package, corporate recruiters or “headhunters” are hired by the corporate board to 
select and approach candidate executives and make offers of employment139.  This 
immediately tells the candidate executive that they are in demand from the corporation, 
and that the corporation is willing to pay them at least the offered amount.  In contrast they 
have revealed nothing of their own preferences, including the minimum reward they would 
be prepared to work for.  There is no obvious reason why this practice should continue, as 
advertising vacancies is common in other occupations where skilled practitioners are in 
high demand, including executive positions in the public service.  There is no apparent 
lack of applicants as a result. 
 
The widespread use of “commercial in confidence” contracts by corporations for 
executives makes it difficult to obtain data on the total quantum of executive rewards and 
their performance targets, and compare them with actual performance.  This can only be 
done after a time lag for reporting. 
 
Commercial in confidence contracts also makes it difficult for executive recruiters to obtain 
details of the past performance of external candidates  from previous employment in other 
corporations. 
 
                                                
138 Lucien Bebchuck and Jesse Fried (2004) pages 25-28. 
139 Timothy Clark, "Management Selection by Executive Recruitment Consultancies: A Survey and 
Explanation of Selection Methods", Journal of Managerial Psychology, Vol. 7 Iss: 6 (1992), pages 
3 – 10. 
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Once employed, the executive is in control of the performance reporting of the corporation.  
This allows them to potentially manipulate the reporting to disguise losses or inflate their 
success in order to qualify for greater rewards.  This was the strategy adopted by Enron 
executives, aided by accountants Arthur Andersen, to obtain substantial bonuses for 
executives prior to Enron’s bankruptcy in 2002140. 
 
The second cause of exploitation is asymmetry in bargaining power, which is again evident 
in multiple aspects of negotiations for executive rewards.  I will discuss each of these 
briefly in a corporate context. 
 
Shareholders do not have control over the offer of executive pay.  This task is carried out 
on shareholders behalf by corporate directors.  In theory corporate directors are the 
employers of executives, but in practice the relationship is less clear.  Bebchuk and Fried 
have highlighted numerous ways in which executives influence directors141.  CEOs and 
executive directors often recommend directors for election to boards, have power or 
influence over recommendations on their fees and rewards, and sometimes preside over 
their elections.  This gives power over the director’s position and rewards to the executive. 
 
Once in office executives have significant positional power to use as leverage in 
negotiating pay. Sudden departure of a CEO or senior executive from a corporation is 
often disruptive and seen as a negative to share prices.  They may have valuable 
intelligence on the future market plans of the corporation that competitors would value.  
This makes the threat of unplanned departure a serious one, even when the executive is 
performing poorly, due to the further damage they may do in exiting the corporation.  
 
The use of remuneration consultants to set executive rewards immediately removes power 
from the board of directors who are supposed to be the employers of the executive.  In 
practice many such consultants are reliant on obtaining other consultancy work from 
corporations and so depend on the good will of the executives.  This conflict of interest 
leads to higher reward recommendations than would otherwise be the case142. 
                                                
140 William W. Bratton, "Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value" Tulane Law Review, (New 
Orleans, May 2002), page 61. 
141 Lucien Bebchuk and Jesse Fried (2004) Pages 23-44. 
142 US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Governance Reform, “Executive 
Pay: Conflicts of Interest Among Compensation Consultants”, December 2007.  One of the two 
main proponents of performance bonuses for executives, Kevin J Murphy, while having a 
 93 
 
Executives have influence over annual meetings of their corporation’s shareholders 
through their involvement in the mechanics of organising the meetings, and in some cases 
chairing them.  In Australia shareholders vote on the size of executive rewards, however 
the vote is not binding on executives. 
 
Finally, all of this assumes that the executive labour market is a typical two-agent market 
where corporate boards negotiate reward contracts with potential executive employees.  In 
reality it may be closer to a multi-agent game between share fund directors, corporate 
directors and corporate executives.  In this situation the rewards paid to executives may be 
a mutually convenient agreement between colluding allies rather than genuine bargaining.  
This problem will be explored further in Chapter 4. 
 
3.3.4 Corporate Governance and the Executive Labor Market 
The degree to which weak corporate governance may influence executive rewards can be 
illustrated empirically.  Indexes have been compiled by the World Bank for the integrity of 
corporate governance regimes for each member nation143.  The index component most 
relevant to ethical conduct of business is the “corporate legal corruption component” 
(CLCC).  If we compare the CLCC index to average CEO pay for the national datasets in 
Chapter Two there is no clear relationship.  However if we compare the CLCC index to the 
CEO Pay Multiple (of average income) there is a significant relationship.  This is shown 
Figure 3.1. 
                                                                                                                                                            
distinguished records as an academic in business and finance fields, also worked for executive 
remuneration consultants Towers Perrin.  
143 World Bank, “Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005” Chapter “Corruption, Governance 
and Security. 
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Figure 3.1 – CLCC Index compared to CEO Pay Multiple 
Regression Coefficient -0.317 
Correlation Coefficient  0.418 
 
There is a negative correlation between the two, that is, the greater the integrity of 
governance systems to prevent legal corporate corruption in a country, the lower the 
multiple of CEO salary to average income.  The correlation coefficient (0.418) is not strong 
and the sample size is to small for statistical reliability.  However it is stronger than the 
correlations between economic performance and rewards identified in Chapter Two.  In 
other words, weak corporate governance may be a better indicator of comparatively high 
executive pay, than strong corporate performance. 
 
These results for international comparisons of the effect of corporate governance on the 
level of executive rewards are consistent with other micro-level studies that have been 
undertaken for the United States executive labour market.  Core, Holthausen and Larcker 
(1999)144 found that rewards for United States executives were related to the board and 
ownership structure.  Less effective governance structures were closely related with higher 
                                                
144 John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, and David F. Larcker, “Corporate governance, chief 
executive officer compensation and firm performance”, Journal of Financial Economics 51 (1999) 
pages 371-406. 
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CEO rewards.  Similar results were found by Cyert Kang and Kumar (2002)145.  In the one 
study of Australian relationships between corporate governance and executive rewards, 
Lau, Sinnadurai and Wright (2009)146, note that Australian corporate boards were smaller 
and had a much lower incidence of people in joint chairman/CEO roles.  This may be one 
of the factors contributing to the generally lower level of executive rewards in Australian 
corporations. 
 
The CLCC index includes aspects of political interference in measures of governance and 
corruption relating to corporations.  The idea that corporations may attempt to influence 
governments for their own ends is well recognised in public choice theory, where 
politicians and government officials are seen as self-interested agents who may influence 
and be influenced by economic forces.  One of the consequences of this is that economic 
forces may attempt to influence government to create regulations that allow them to 
undertake rent-seeking behaviour.  This is a form of “government failure”. A logical 
consequence of this is that government failure might also cause market failure, such as 
through the preservation of economically inefficient monopolies by regulation.  Thus it 
would be reasonable to expect that if high executive rewards are an instance of rent-
seeking behaviour, they will be more prevalent in countries with a higher degree of 
corporate influence that effectively “corrupts” government. 
 
In summary market rate theories of contribution as espoused by Miller appear to have 
several theoretical advantages over marginal product theories when applied to groups 
generally and corporate executives.  They can also explain how inefficiencies and rent 
seeking behaviour may develop in executive labour markets.  They do not indicate what 
the level of market rewards should be unless the market is assumed to be perfectly fair.  
However they provide an ethical justification for a market level of rewards provided 
conditions for fair (non-exploitive) markets are met.  In Australia and the United States 
current practices in executive labour markets would appear to fail to meet these criteria.  
Thus current market outcomes for executive rewards are not ethically justified under a 
market rate theory of contribution in Australia and the United States. 
 
                                                
145 R.M. Cyert, S.H. Kang and P. Kumar, “Corporate governance, takeovers and top-management 
compensation: Theory and evidence”, Management Science, Vol. 48, No. 4, (April 2002) pages 
453-469. 
146 J. Lau, P. Sinnadurai, and S. Wright, “Corporate Governance and Chief Executive Officer 
Dismissal Following Poor Performance: Australian Evidence”, Accounting and Finance, vol. 49, no. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
We have now evaluated the two main contribution based desert theories and considered 
them in the context of the executive labour market. Of these marginal product theory, 
although easy to justify and attractive in principle, appears to be deeply flawed for 
application within groups.  This includes consideration of rewards for group leaders such 
as corporate executives, which would require a very large amount of information to 
calculate.  A more theoretically sound approach might be to leave the calculation of group 
contributions to group members, in a form of workplace democracy.  This offers the 
potential to eliminate some conflicts in current approaches to determining executive 
reward. 
 
The second, and far preferable approach to contribution in groups, is the market rate 
theory as defined by David Miller.  This does not allow direct calculation of what rewards 
should be, however it does ethically justify market rates of reward provided conditions for 
competitive markets are met.  In the case of current executive labour markets these 
conditions are not met and thus current reward levels are not justified under market rates 
theory.  In fact, measures of corporate governance suggest that high executive salary is 
more associated with poor governance regimes, than high performance. Given the current 
reality of exploitation of executive labour markets, market rates theory cannot tell us what 
reward levels for executives should be. 
 
The idea that any individual corporate executive is primarily responsible for the social 
product created by efficiencies of group action is not supported by either theory.  Other 
economic factors appear to provide better explanations of the origins of group efficiencies. 
 
With current practices in executive labour markets not defensible by contribution theory, 
we are still unable to define what executive salary levels should be.  In the absence of 
such an explanation, current high salary levels for executives are unjustified.  In the next 
chapter I will turn to agency theory and market power, the first of the economic theories 
used to explain executive rewards.   These do not justify in a desert sense current 
executive salary levels.  We will see whether they offer a better explanation of why current 




4 Agency Theory and Management Power 
4.1 Context of Theories 
In this and the following chapter I will examine economic theories that have been used 
historically to analyse levels of executive reward.  These theories were first developed to 
explain the economic power relationships that resulted in the level of executive rewards 
then prevalent.  More recently they have been used to explain the causes of the current 
level of executive rewards.  They will also be compared to the philosophical understanding 
of justification for reward developed in Chapter Three. 
 
We have already seen in Chapter One that empirical evidence of current practice in 
executive rewards shows that it does not match community expectations of reasonable 
income distribution. In Chapter Two, current executive rewards levels were shown to be 
not in shareholders interests at the micro level in the United States, and not economically 
efficient at the macro level in Australia and the United States. In Chapter Three we 
developed a philosophical understanding of desert for executives that shows the current 
executive labour market is exploitive (by executives) and therefore reward levels are not 
justified.  This leaves the questions of what do relevant economic theories have to say 
about executive rewards, why current behaviour has occurred, and what level of rewards 
they would support. 
  
The finding that current executive labour markets are exploitive does not necessarily 
invalidate economic theories that have been used to analyse executive rewards.  As we 
shall see both supporters and critics of economic theories acknowledge that executive 
rewards practice has departed from their intended application in several respects. With the 
practice having departed from the theory, the practice does not invalidate the theory.  The 
question still remains whether, in principle, economic theories might be able to offer a 
logical defence of executive reward practices. 
 
I will commence by considering the agency theory and management power explanations of 
executive rewards in this chapter.  Alignment or Incentive theories will then be considered 
in the following Chapter Five.  Agency theory is the standard explanation of corporate 
management costs in economic literature.  It identifies the causes of executive salary 
levels, but does not attempt to justify them. Agency Theory is presented to understand the 
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context of the explanatory theories and I do not intend to introduce any arguments against 
it. 
 
Management power and Alignment theories are two competing explanations of current 
executive reward practice. Both theories are based upon Agency Theory.  One of them 
(management power) argues that executive salary levels are not justified, while the other 
(alignment theory) is used to defend them.  
 
Management power and alignment theories are posited as competing explanations of 
current practice by their protagonists, however they not mutually exclusive.  Their principal 
advocates, Lucien Bebchuk and Jesse Fried for management power theories and Michael 
Jensen and Kevin Murphy for alignment (and incentive) theories, differ on the degree to 
which they apply.  This distinction is not trivial, as depending on the degree to which the 
management power explanation holds, regulatory intervention in the executive labour 
market would be warranted or not. 
 
Economic theories of executive reward have generally not been based on a philosophical 
conception of desert or any other conception of a fair distribution of benefits.  They have 
focused on questions of economic efficiency and in particular on whether the executive 
labour market is economically efficient.  As I outlined in Chapter One, this is not a sufficient 
defence of a practice.  Community attitudes and philosophical theories of desert are 
relevant, and it is justifiable to intervene in markets to satisfy them.  Nevertheless, 
economic efficiency is also important, as it affects societal welfare.  An economic 
explanation of executive labour markets that was flawed and led to inefficient outcomes 
would not be satisfactory from the viewpoints of distributive justice or economics.  Hence 
ensuring that we have a sound economic explanation of how executive labour markets 
work is a necessary, though insufficient, condition for their acceptance by the community.  
Therefore I will evaluate the economic theories in Chapters Four and Five against both the 
empirical evidence on efficiency from Chapter Two, and the desert theories from Chapter 
Three. 
 
4.2 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is an organisational theory that enables an understanding of the behaviour 
of complex organisations with multiple internal stakeholders.  It is applied broadly in 
 99 
business and political science to any situation where there is a principal who delegates 
some work to an agent to act on their behalf, but the agent may not have the same 
objectives as the principal.  Therefore the agent may carry out the work in a way that suits 
the agent’s objectives and not the principal’s objectives.  This creates the “principal-agent 
problem”, where the principal wishes to ensure that the agent acts upon their wishes.  
When applied to the behaviour of corporations, it is used to explain conflicts between 
shareholders acting as principals and executives acting as agents.147 
 
Prior to the advent of agency theory, internal conflicts within corporations were recognised 
in economics but a theoretical means to analyse them had been lacking.  Throughout the 
twentieth century corporations had increased in size, complexity, income and power.  
Correspondingly more elaborate theories of the firm were developed to understand their 
structure and behaviour.   
 
Starting in the 1930s managerial and behavioural theories were developed which 
recognised conflicts between different stakeholders within firms.  Berle and Means (1930) 
148 recognised that share ownership was now diffuse in large corporations.  This meant it 
was more difficult for shareholders to communicate with each other and agree a preferred 
direction for the corporation, leaving executives with greater ability to direct them.   
 
Ronald Coase (1936)149 added the important conception of transaction costs associated 
with the use of markets to understanding the forces motivating the formation of firms.  
There were transaction costs for a firm using markets to hire resources that made it more 
attractive to have the resources within the firm.  Conversely there were also internal 
overhead costs of organisation and management within a firm.  The optimisation of these 
two costs would determine the optimum size to which firms would grow.  This was the first 
time that market costs and potential inefficiencies were recognised within theories of the 
firm. 
 
                                                
147 Kathleen Eisenhardt, “Agency theory: An assessment and review”, Academy of Management 
Review, 14 (1) (1989): pages 57-74. 
148 Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”. (New 
York: Harcourt Brace and World 1932). 
149 Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm”, (November 1937) 4(16) Economica 386-405. 
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Baumol (1962)150, Marris and Williamson developed theories to explain how executives 
would pursue corporate strategies to further their own financial interests rather than 
shareholders.  It was recognised that shareholders’ goals and managers’ goals might 
conflict.  Strategies such as growth in sales or market share were pursued, which helped 
managers justify larger personal rewards.  Managers still aimed to provide sufficient profit 
to shareholders to pacify them.  However executives did not attempt to maximise 
shareholder profits. 
 
The analytical formalisation of Agency theory in economics began with Arrow (1971)151 
who recognised that there was a form of moral hazard inherent in risk sharing between 
individuals such as shareholders (principals) and managers (agents).  Ross (1973)152 
extended this to define the principal-agent problem in a quantifiable way based on costs 
for the principal and agent under assumptions of different objectives and informational 
uncertainty for each.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)153 in their seminal paper, “Theory of the Firm: Management 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, defined agency theory as contractual 
relationships within the firm.  In this conception of the corporation the principal engages 
some agent and delegates decision making powers to them (over the corporation) in order 
to perform some service on their behalf (management of the corporation).  The principal 
and agent may have conflicting goals.  Jensen and Meckling go on to say: 
“If both parties to the relationship are utility maximisers, there is good reason to believe 
that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.  The principal can 
limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and 
by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent.”154 
 
Jensen and Meckling conceived of the relationships between principals and agents as 
types of contracts, with costs incurred by the principal. Divergences by the agent from 
utility maximising behaviour for the firm were also costs for the principal.  This occurred in 
                                                
150 William J. Baumol, “On the Theory of Expansion of the Firm”, The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 52, No. 5 (Dec. 1962), pages 1078-1087. 
151 Kenneth Arrow, “Essays in the theory of risk-bearing”, (Chicago: Markham 1971). 
152 Stephen A. Ross, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s  
Problem.” The American Economic Review, (1973) 63 (2): 134–39. 
153 Michael C. Jensen, and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360 (1976). 
154 Michael C. Jensen, and William H. Meckling, (1976), page 5. 
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conditions of incomplete or asymmetric information, where the principal may not have 
information on each course open to the agent.  Acquiring information (monitoring 
management) to ensure agent compliance was also possible at a cost to the principal.  In 
this context information was seen as a commodity available to the principal at a cost.  
Finally the agent might also incur “bonding costs” to guarantee that their actions will not 
harm the principal.  This assumes that it is not in the agents’ interest to harm the principal, 
otherwise the principal may dismiss the agents.  Together these costs were defined as 
agency costs, which will always be present in such a relationship.  In this formulation of 
agency theory the aim of the principal is to minimise the sum of agency costs.   
 
Principals might minimise agency costs through a variety of strategies, such as offering 
incentives to the agent to act in their interests, and through effort expended in monitoring 
or “bonding” the agent.  One of the questions Jensen and Meckling hoped to answer was 
what was the optimal form of contract between the principal and agent.  Alternatives 
considered were a behavioural contract (specifying governance and compliance) or an 
outcomes-based contract (specifying incentives).  In general they considered that incentive 
contracts were likely to be more efficient. 
 
Jensen and Meckling conceived their theory in general terms that were broadly applicable.  
They applied it to several questions in corporate management and finance.  These 
included the ratio of outside debt to equity, optimum size, when firms will find it efficient to 
have owner-operators, the issuing of different classes of stock, and accounting reports.   
They also considered relationships between executives as agents and shareholders as 
principals:  
“issues associated with the “separation of ownership and control” in the modern diffuse 
ownership corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency.”155   
 
Fama (1980)156 highlighted the challenges for the principal to find the optimal trade-off 
between incentives, monitoring costs and divergence losses that minimises agency costs.  
He saw efficient capital and labour markets as information mechanisms for shareholders 
(principals for corporations).  They could use this information to monitor the performance 
of the corporation and thus the performance of its executives (their agents).  Critically, this 
                                                
155 Michael C. Jensen, and William H. Meckling, (1976), page 6. 
156 Eugene F. Fama, ”Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 
April 1980, Vol.8 No.2. 
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assumes that capital and labour markets are efficient, and are based on accurate 
information reporting from firms. 
 
There are some critics of agency theories, and also some degree of argument as to how it 
should be applied in corporations157.  However I do not consider these significant for the 
case of executive rewards. Agency theory reflects the reality of the conflicts of interests 
between corporate shareholders and executives.  Acceptance of agency theory does not 
commit one to accepting any particular level of executive rewards, or any particular means 
of resolving the conflict, such as the form of employment contract.  Taken as a whole, we 
can see how the evolution of agency theory led naturally to the evolution of incentive and 
alignment theories, which we will discuss in Chapter Five.  However before we do this, I 
shall define the theoretical explanation most commonly cited for current practice in 
executive rewards: management power. 
 
4.3 Management Power Theory 
4.3.1 Management Power Defined  
In economic theory, management power is the term normally given to the organisational 
efficiencies of large corporations.  Somewhat confusingly, in the executive rewards debate, 
management power is the label that has been applied by those who argue for primarily 
non-market causes of current executive reward levels.  In this context, management power 
theory holds that the level of executive rewards is due to the abuse of positional power by 
executives, rather than being the outcome of a rational or efficient market.  Proponents of 
the management power explanation of executive rewards accept that there are conflicting 
interests between shareholders and executives, but do not accept that contract incentives 
are sufficient to resolve those conflicts. 
 
The “management power” theory in economics pre-dates agency theory, being first 
defined by Alfred Marshall (1890)158.  It is not an alternative to agency theory.  
Management power theory was developed in the late nineteenth century to explain the 
economies of scale achieved by large corporations that were then expanding.  Marshall 
used it to distinguish between the profits of capital and the profits of "management power" 
in such corporations.  The “management power” represents the surpluses resulting from 
                                                
157 Kathleen M. Eisenhardt (Jan 1989) pages 57-74.  
158 Alfred Marshall, “The Principles of Economics”, (London: Macmillan 1890). 
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modern systems of organization applied to the capital assets of the organization.  They are 
the productive benefits of the business's organizational structure compared to the 
production of the separate capital components. These included shareholders, boards of 
directors representing them, and complex corporate structures reporting to executives who 
ran the corporation on a day-to-day basis.  The larger the organization and the more 
effective its structure, the larger is this "management power". 
 
Marshall explained in economic terms why business executives’ income would be 
proportional to the revenue of the corporation in this situation.   The management power 
was in the hands of, and in part due to, the efforts of the corporation’s managers.  They 
could then use this position to obtain higher rewards from shareholders. 
 
It is important to qualify this view. Marshall was developing an explanatory theory of what 
forces tended to cause incomes in business.  He did not consider whether they 
represented a just distribution of rewards, or whether higher executive salaries were 
economically efficient.  He did not comment on what would constitute an efficient executive 
labour market either, as one hardly existed at that time.  Most corporations then were 
managed by the individuals who had founded them. 
 
Marshall went on to make a normative claim about the income of managers (executives).  
In this he identified the value to the corporation of these additional organisational tasks 
they performed: 
“The normal earnings of management are of course high in proportion to the capital, and 
therefore the rate of profits per annum on the capital is high, when the work of 
management is heavy in proportion to the capital. The work of management may be heavy 
because it involves great mental strain in organizing and devising new methods; or 
because it involves great anxiety and risk: and these two things frequently go together.”159 
 
Marshall’s view that a manager’s labour of organisation should be paid in proportion to the 
capital needs to be understood in the context of the time (the era of the invention of large 
corporations in the late nineteenth century).  The manager’s “labour of organisation” does 
not directly translate to the role of management today.  Further to N. Scott Arnold’s160 
arguments discussed in Chapter Three, Marshall’s “labour of organisation” refers to the 
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entrepreneurial organisation of firms, as well as the bearing of risk in investment 
outcomes.  Thus Marshall’s rewards to management have conflated incentives for bearing 
risk, compensation for effort expended, and contribution desert for successful investment 
and organisational design decisions.  Only the last two would apply to modern executives. 
Given this very broad definition of the labour of organisation, it is unsurprising that rewards 
should be expected to be high.  This does not economically justify, paying managers of 
existing corporations of today in proportion to their capital. 
  
From an economic incentives viewpoint, Marshall’s theory may create socially beneficial 
outcomes. If the same labour of management applied to a larger corporation resulted in a 
greater benefit than that labour applied to a smaller corporation, then it was economically 
more efficient  to ensure management rewards encouraged the most skilled manager to 
work for the larger corporation.  Paying managers in proportion to the capital was one 
means of achieving this outcome. 
 
There are other difficulties with Marshall’s view.  Even if the executive creates all this 
additional value, that does not mean that directors should pay them more in the same 
proportion.   There is no reason to believe that economic efficiency is achieved by paying 
executives proportionally to capital.  Rational directors of the larger corporation would only 
pay the minimum reward premium sufficient to make the more skilled managers transfer to 
the larger firm.  Anything beyond this is an unnecessary cost and therefore not 
economically efficient. 
 
Marshall’s view is sharply in contrast with the earlier writing of Adam Smith (1776)161. 
Smith held that the benefits of a company should be proportional to its capital, and should 
be returned to shareholders, who were the owners of that capital.  Under Smith's view it 
did not seem reasonable for the wages of any individual in the organization (including the 
managers) to be linked directly to the level of profits.  He made this point explicitly in The 
Wealth of Nations: 
 “The profits of stock, it may perhaps be thought, are only a different name for the wages 
of a particular sort of labor, the labor of inspection and direction [leadership].  They are 
however altogether different, are regulated by quite different principles, and bear no 
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proportion to the quantity, the hardship or the ingenuity of this supposed labor of 
inspection and direction.”162 
 
On balance, it seems difficult to justify the claim that manager’s rewards should be 
proportional to the firm’s capital for the reasons discussed in Chapter Three.  Once the 
corporation’s organizational structure has been formed, these profits from “management 
power” seem to be indistinguishable from the profits of capital (C), since the structure is an 
intrinsic part of the organisation that results from the capital.  The “management power” 
supervenes on the structure and cannot exist outside of the corporation in which it was 
created.  Persons in positions with “management power” would not possess that power if 
they did not hold their position in the corporation. 
 
Further Marshall’s “management power”, once defined as supervening on the 
corporation’s structure, which is owned by the shareholders, is itself then something that is 
the property of the shareholders.  Thus as per Smith’s original view, the profits generated 
by “management power” should be returned to shareholders.  Economically, Marshall’s 
view would not lead to an economically efficient setting of executive rewards, whenever 
rewards in proportion to the firm’s capital exceeded the reward level needed to attract and 
retain the executive.  That is, the larger the corporation, the less likely this view would 
result in an economically efficient setting of executive reward levels. 
 
While these are persuasive arguments against the claim that executive rewards should be 
proportional to corporate capital, they still do not support any particular level of reward.  
Directors will still rationally pay whatever level of rewards are needed to attract executives 
if they believe their efforts will benefit the firm by more than those rewards. 
 
4.3.2 Management Power as Explanation of Reward Practices 
In recent years Bebchuk and Fried (2004)163 used the term “management power” to 
describe their theory for the increase in executive rewards.  This argument was developed 
starting in the 1990s and culminating early in the 21st century after reviews of long term 
trends in the level of executive reward by Bebchuk, Fried, Grinstein and others.  By this 
stage the level of executive reward in the United States had risen six-fold in real terms 
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compared to the early 1980s and was also significantly higher than in Europe and other 
major capital markets.  Unlike alternative theories they focused directly on the level of 
executive reward as being the product of the abuse of management power by the 
executives, and not the outcome of market forces in the executive labour market.   
 
Market-based explanations of executive rewards assumed that there was a competitive 
market between corporations for the labour of executives.  The directors of corporations 
bargained on behalf of shareholders to negotiate a pay contract with executives, based on 
what was in the best interest of shareholders.  The level of executive reward was simply 
the market outcome from this situation.   
 
Bebchuk and Fried defined this assumed practice as “arms-length negotiating”, between 
the board of directors and the executives.  “Arms length” in this case meant that the board 
of directors acted independently of executives.   Bebchuk and Fried concluded, based on 
their analysis of executive rewards practice over the preceding decades, that this 
assumption was false.  The outcomes did not represent the workings of a competitive 
market.  The theoretical model of corporate board behaviour in negotiations with 
executives over rewards was also false and in reality boards did not act in this manner.  
Boards did not act to protect shareholder interests on executive rewards. 
 
Bebchuk and Fried identified eight practices that were found to prevent arms-length 
negotiations from occurring between directors and executives in United States 
corporations164.  Firstly the executive rewards setting process is typically delegated to 
compensation committees.  This tends to remove it from oversight by directors.  Secondly 
Directors’ own  rewards (fees) had risen substantially in parallel with executive rewards in 
the last three decades.  Hence directors desire to be re-elected to boards.  This gives 
directors an incentive to remain popular with the executive and other directors, in order to 
be re-elected.  Thirdly, CEOs have many powers over corporate resources that they can 
use to provide benefits to directors.  Fourthly, when directors work together with corporate 
executives closely for a long period, they typically get to know and often like each other, 
making it difficult for them to assess pay contracts impartially.   
 
Fifth, CEOs have significant influence over the composition of boards, through their role in 
assisting with the conducting of the election of directors.  Whilst directors are elected by 
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shareholders, corporate executives may influence the timing and scope of the elections 
and sometimes the choice of potential candidates. 
 
Sixth is what Bebchuk and Fried termed “Cognitive dissonance” but which I think is more 
accurately described as a form of cognitive bias.  Corporate boards tend to be staffed with 
current and former executives, who will have previously been paid under similar 
performance bonus contracts and who will hold similar values to current executives.  This 
makes it highly likely for them to believe those contracts and values are appropriate.  This 
is likely to make them biased in favour of the executive in valuing the performance of an 
executive.  This form of “group-think” also means it is unlikely that theories and processes 
resulting in higher executive rewards will be challenged.   
 
Seventh, independent directors typically lack the time and information to challenge 
executive reward recommendations and decisions.  Finally the use of compensation 
consultants has tended to bias analysis of executive rewards upwards as the consultants 
are also vying for other work from executives of the corporation.  This means they have a 
conflict of interest when dealing with the executives. 
 
Bebchuk and Fried concluded that the setting of executive rewards was an example of the 
use of “management power” rather than the operation of a market mechanism.  That is, 
executives are in positions of power and influence, with control over both the information 
and resources of the corporation.  They use this position to force or encourage higher 
levels of reward than are justified from shareholders165.  This is an example of rent-seeking 
behaviour by the executives. 
 
Bebchuck and Fried argued that corporate executives are in almost complete control of the 
reward setting process.  The only reason that prevents them from setting reward levels 
even higher is what Bebchuck and Fried refer to as an “outrage constraint”166.  That is, 
executives set their reward levels just below the level at which community resentment 
would force governments to make regulatory changes to the way in which executive 
rewards are set.   
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Another means by which executives maintain this system is “camouflage”.  Executives are 
in control of corporate accounting and information flow.  They have many opportunities to 
hide or confuse the perception of the true value of their level of reward.  This is particularly 
the case with the value of future stock options, which can be easily manipulated by the 
executive as they control reporting of corporate performance to the stock exchange.  
Alternative explanations for trends in corporate rewards such as mistakes or 
misunderstandings by boards are rejected by Bebchuk and Fried as implausible, because 
the direction of the “mistakes” is not random.  Board decisions have consistently been in 
the direction of higher rewards, which suggests an underlying force and motivation in the 
pattern of behaviour. 
 
Bebchuk and Fried were not the only scholars to reach this conclusion on the reality of 
corporate executives’ power and the inability of boards of directors to control them.  Lorsch 
and MacIver (1989) had reached a similar conclusion ten years earlier167. 
 
One difficulty with Bebchuk and Fried’s management power explanation of executive 
rewards is that it is difficult to measure and prove that management power has increased.  
Murphy and Hall (2003)168 argued that the management power theory must be false 
because they considered management power fell during the 1990s.  During this era focus 
on corporate governance increased and more independent directors were appointed to 
corporate boards.  If the management power theory were the correct explanation for 
executive reward levels, then those rewards should have fallen during this period when in 
reality rewards kept on rising169. 
 
However as Bebchuck and Fried (2004)170 pointed out in reply, Hall and Murphy assume 
that management power did actually fall due to the addition to boards of independent 
directors.  They cited several reasons why independent directors did not greatly reduce 
management power. Other countervailing forces saw overall management power continue 
to rise, in parallel with executive rewards.  One of the most obvious reasons was that 
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independent directors were typically recommended for election by the incumbent 
executives171. 
 
A similar counter-argument to management power theory as Hall and Murphy’s could be 
made regarding the increase in corporate regulation, corporate governance requirements 
and reporting following the dot-com collapses of 1999-2000.  The passing of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (2002)172 in the United States, effectively prohibited some of the eight practices 
and required greater transparency in executive pay contracts. In Australia parallel reforms 
to corporate regulation and reporting of executive rewards was made with the CLERP9 
reforms of 2004173.  Critics might argue that this should have reduced management power 
and executive rewards if they were not market based.  
 
Bebchuk and Fried concluded that the Sarbanes Oxley Act may improve the situation 
slightly.  However they considered that the underlying cause of excessive CEO pay was 
managerial power, and that it was not due to a lack of transparency in the market.  Lack of 
transparency is still an essentially market-based explanation of executive rewards.  
Managerial power was not greatly altered by the Sarbanes Oxley Act.  Bebchuk and Fried 
felt that significant problems would remain, and average CEO pay would remain very high.   
 
As we saw in Chapter Two, there was no change to the growth trend in executive rewards 
in Australia or the United States from subsequent to the Sarbanes – Oxley Act and 
CLERP9 up to the financial crisis of 2008-09.  This suggests the likely growth of 
management power through this period, but neither proves nor disproves the management 
power theory in isolation.  It does highlight one weakness of the management power 
theory.  As management power is not a market-forces theory, some further explanation of 
the cause of increasing management power, beyond asymmetry of information, is 
required. 
 
4.3.3 Structural Causes of increased management power 
Proponents of management power explanations for the continued rising trend in executive 
rewards in the United States (and Australia) argue that management power has risen 
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despite the changes in corporate regulation and governance that have occurred in the past 
three decades.  This requires explanation of what else could have changed in this period 
to cause this rise in management power.  Many theories could be advanced to explain this.  
I will now suggest an alternative hypothesis of what I consider to be the most likely cause 
of increasing management power: increasingly diffuse and indirect share ownership. 
 
In the more than two centuries since Adam Smith first began modern economic theory, the 
nature of private firms has changed greatly.  In particular, they have become much more 
structurally complex.  In addition, the nature of share ownership arrangements outside the 
structure of the corporation has grown in parallel.  More layers of ownership and control of 
shares have been added over time.  This has made the link between ownership and 
control of corporations more remote. 
 
In the 18th Century, when Adam Smith wrote, the first limited stock companies consisted of 
shareholders who passed their instructions to the company directly, or via the “principal 
clerks” Smith referred to, who fulfilled the role of managers or executives.  This also 
created the first separation between ownership and control within the company.  Smith 
warned in the Wealth of Nations, when ownership is separated from management (i.e. the 
actual production process required to obtain the capital), the former will inevitably begin to 
neglect the interests of the latter, creating dysfunction within the company.   
 
In the 19th Century a revolution occurred in the organization of businesses, as many 
formed into the first modern corporations.  Corporations were made possible by several 
critical legal “inventions”, notably the establishment of joint stock companies (the UK Joint 
Stock Companies Act, 1844) and the concept of limited liability for companies (the UK 
Limited Liability Act, 1855).  These decisions defined companies as legal entities separate 
to their creators, and having liability for their actions limited to company assets.  
Subsequent court decisions saw some legal rights of citizens extended to corporations174. 
This represented a significant government intervention in capital markets in favour of 
corporations, in assigning them new rights and powers.  Large corporations were not a 
solely market-based outcome.  They had not been possible before these legal 
interventions.  Economically this resulted in significantly larger and more powerful 
corporations, however the social success of these changes could only be defined in terms 
of whether they made the society better off.  
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This concept of corporations as “corporate souls” was introduced in all western countries 
and enabled businesses to grow rapidly in size.  Boards of directors represented the 
interests of shareholders to the executives, who then acted upon them within the 
corporation.  In this way ownership became effectively two steps removed from the control 
of the company.  
 
In the latter part of the 20th Century, two further changes in the nature of share ownership 
occurred which have tended to reduce the influence of dominant shareowners in 
corporations.  Previously most share ownership was in the hands of a small number of 
wealthy individuals, who dominated the boards of the corporations.  By the late 20th 
Century many individuals of average levels of wealth were purchasing shares in 
corporations, known in Australia as “mums and dads”.  This did not add another layer of 
separation between ownership and control, but made share ownership more dispersed.  
This more dispersed nature of ownership, first recognised by Berle and Means (1933) 
increased the potential for executives to exercise management power. 
 
In the past 30 years this trend has been taken a step further, with Australia and the United 
States compulsorily requiring workers to save for their retirement through investment of a 
fixed percentage of their income into superannuation funds and pension plans.  These 
“institutional investors” are not companies and their managers cannot be voted out by 
investors.  The holdings of institutional investors have become the dominant form of share 
ownership.  In Australia institutions owned 78% of shares in public companies by 2004175, 
and in the United States over 60%.  With institutional investors, share ownership is now 
three stages removed from control, with share fund directors, corporate directors and 
corporate executives all standing between the investor and the company.  In recent years 
a further trend towards share ownership via unreported private equity funds has had a 
similar effect for private equity investors176. 
 
Agency theories of corporations recognise that shareholders and corporate executives are 
different groups with different interests and that behaviour of executives may diverge from 
                                                
175 Colin Scully, “Australian Share Ownership Study.” Australian Stock Exchange, 24 February, 
2005. 
176 Douglas J. Cumming, and Uwe Walz, “Private Equity Returns and Disclosure Around the 
World.” EFA 2004 Maastricht, EEA 2004 Madrid, EFM 2005 Madrid, Journal of International 
Business Studies, forthcoming (2010). 
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that which best suits shareholders, resulting in an agency cost.  Yet this is now not the 
only level of agency cost.  Agency theory as applied by Jensen and Murphy treats 
shareholders and the directors representing them as one group, with no divergence or 
monitoring costs between shareholders and directors.  This was acknowledged as a 
weakness in the original paper of Jensen and Mecklin177. 
 
Management power theory as defined by Bebchuck and Freid considers directors and 
shareholders as distinct, effectively resulting in two sets of agency costs, between 
shareholders and directors and between directors and executives.  I would agree with 
Bebchuk and Fried on this point and consider their model as an advancement over Jensen 
and Murphy’s assumptions.  However in my view it is still an insufficient explanation of all 
the agency costs now occurring in corporate ownership. 
 
I propose a new, more complex theoretical model of corporate ownership and control to 
better explain management behaviour, control and agency costs.  If management power 
theory also took into account the increasingly indirect nature of share ownership via 
institutional funds it would result in three sets of agency costs.  Each layer of agency costs 
creates the potential to distort the market.  Costs would be incurred in the interfaces 
between institutional (fund) investors and fund managers, fund managers and company 
directors, and company directors and executives.  These three models are shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 4.1.  
                                                
177 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, (1976), page 356. 
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Figure 4.1 Models of Corporate Ownership 
 
The models in the figure may be taken as applying to Jensen and Meckling’s explanation 
of agency theory (18th century model), Bebchuk and Fried’s explanation of management 
power (19th century model) and current practice as I have defined it in this thesis (late 20th 
century model).  The components of the late 20th century model are not controversial and 
are implicitly acknowledged in most modern business writings.  The glaring inconsistency 
is that most theories used to analyse corporate executive rewards are based on the 18th 
century model (Jensen and Meckling) or the 19th century model (Bebchuk and Fried), even 
while acknowledging the reality of the late 20th century model. 
 
In practice the effect of these changes is likely to be far more complex than simply 
increased agency costs.  Each set of agency costs is the product of a game-theoretic set 
of decisions by the different agents.  As the corporate management “game” becomes more 
complex, with more actors involved, the number of decision trees and possible outcomes 
increases greatly.  It is not the intention of this thesis to analyse all of the possible 
interactions between the four sets of actors and identify the likely outcomes.  However it 
would seem at least possible under the third model (allowing for institutional investors) for 
some or all of the agents (fund managers, directors and executives) to bargain with each 
other so that their own interests are achieved at the expense of shareholders.   
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Hartzell and Starks178 found in the 1990s that the presence of institutional investors led to 
lower executive rewards.  Conversely David, Kochar and Levitas179 found that institutional 
share-owners with business relationships with the firm were associated with higher 
executive rewards. 
 
This risk of collusion increases greatly when it is appreciated that in reality the power 
relationships between institutional managers, directors and executives are not necessarily 
one-way.  As Bebchuk and Fried180 demonstrated, some of the agents may have power 
over the principals.  Corporate executives can influence the selection of directors, 
supposedly their employers.  Corporate directors and executives can also influence 
institutional investor managers, through their ability to offer them board directorships and 
other personally lucrative incentives to act as they wish. 
 
At this point it would seem that the one group without any ability to influence outcomes are 
the institutional share investors, most of whom are compelled to invest by law.  In this 
model, the reality of corporate power structures in the early 21st century is better illustrated 
by the diagram shown in Figure 4.2. 
                                                
178 Jay C. Hartzell, and Laura T.Starks, , “Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation”, 
Journal of Finance 58: 2351-2374, 2003. 
179 Parthiban David, Rahul Kochar and Edward Levitas, “The Effects of Institutional Investors on 
the Level and Mix of CEO Compensation.” Academy of Management Journal, 41: 200-208, 1998. 
180 Lucien Bebchuk, and Jesse Fried, (2004). 
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Figure 4.2 Power Relationships in Modern Corporate Structures 
 
The possibility of multiple-level agency costs has been proposed previously by Spiller 
(1990)181 in the context of politicians, interest groups and regulators.  Spiller showed that 
this quickly leads to outcomes different from the traditional self-interest hypothesis.  The 
idea of multiple levels in organisational contexts was considered by Klein, Danserau and 
Hall (1994)182 who advocated more research and more complex theoretical models.  Since 
then the idea has been pursued in research on pure agency theory and its application 
within organisations and political science, but not on executive rewards. 
 
In my view this gradual evolution of increasingly indirect corporate ownership is the 
primary reason for the rise in management power over the past three decades.  Share 
funds including private equity, superannuation funds and pension plans are generally all 
outside the corporate governance regimes developed to control corporations.  Investment 
in the latter is compulsory in Australia and the United States, without the ability of investors 
to control fund managers.  Thus while corporate governance regimes for corporations 
                                                
181 Pablo T. Spiller, “Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency 
Theory of Regulation, or "Let Them Be Bribed",” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1 
(Apr., 1990), pages 65-101. 
182 Katherine J. Klein, Fred Dansereau, and Rosalie J. Hall, “Levels Issues in Theory Development, 
Data Collection, and Analysis”, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Apr. 1994), 
pages 195-229. 
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have tightened, the overall degree of accountability of executives as agents towards their 
ultimate principals, now mostly share fund investors, has declined.  The lack of 
comparable reporting rules for private equity funds makes this problem difficult to quantify.  
Further research into this aspect of investment and governance should be an urgent 
priority for corporate regulators. 
 
4.3.4 Social Causes of Increased Management Power 
There are further non-structural reasons why management power may be increasing.  The 
increasing professionalisation and specialisation of business executives increases rather 
than decreases these risks.  Previous economic theories of the firm assume that 
corporations are separate entities that compete with each other to minimise costs 
(including agency costs) and maximise profits.  Share fund managers, directors and 
executives are (as previously) defined as different interest groups in trying to analyse 
these markets.   
 
Yet in sociological terms, for the majority of corporations, this is clearly not the case.  It 
would be more accurate to characterise share fund managers, corporate directors and 
corporate executives as members of a common occupational group – business executives. 
In Australia and the United States the majority of directors are current or former 
executives, while in the United States the majority of CEOs were also executive 
chairman183.   
 
There has been a parallel move to develop more comprehensive corporate governance 
regimes to control such influences. The incidence of non-executive directors has become 
more common after Jensen and Fama’s influential 1983 paper, when the importance of 
“outside” or independent directors became recognised184. Prior to this the majority of board 
members were acting as both directors and executives of the same firm at the same time.  
 
However corporate governance may still be greatly influenced by social links between the 
individuals charged with responsibility for the governance.  Social or peer group networks 
will often connect between directors and executives that should in theory be policing one 
                                                
183 Jay W. Lorsh, and Elizabeth M. MacIver, (1989). 
184 Eugene F. Fama, and Michael C. Jensen, “The separation of ownership and control.” Journal of 
Law and Economics, (1983), 26: 301-325. 
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another185. In the case of directors, the widespread practice of individuals holding 
directorships on multiple corporate boards makes it likely that individuals will hold more 
than one of these roles at the same time.  For example, Carroll, Fox and Orstein showed 
that the vast majority of Canada’s banks were controlled by a small group of individuals 
holding multiple directorships186. Davis and Thompson have linked social groupings to 
corporate control mechanisms187.  Similarly Kramarz and Thaspar found that social 
networks strongly influenced the composition of French corporate boardrooms188.  That is, 
boards tended to choose new board members from individuals they already knew.   
 
There are more concrete manifestations of such links.  The Business Council of Australia 
(BCA) is composed of the CEOs of Australia’s 100 largest corporations.  It purportedly 
represents the interests of Australian corporations (and presumably their shareholders).  In 
2010 its board was composed of a collection of CEOs, Directors, Managing Directors and 
Board Chairs and Presidents, including three individuals who were both managing director 
and CEO of their corporation189.   
 
The much larger United States Chamber of Commerce aims to represent all private 
business interests in the United States, and claims over 300,000 member businesses.  
Again, its board is a mixture of CEOs, other corporate executives, Directors, Managing 
Directors and Board Chairs and Presidents, with many individuals who were both 
Chairman of Directors and CEO of their corporation190.  In practice, it can be seen that 
corporate directors and executives do act and think of themselves as members of one 
group.   This creates the obvious potential for conflicts of interests and increases the risk 
of collusion.   
 
                                                
185 T. Koenig and R. Gogel, “Interlocking corporate directorships as a social network.” American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol.40, No.1, January 1981. 
186 William K. Carroll, John Fox and Michael D., Ornstein, “The Network of Directorate Links 
among the largest Canadian firms.” Canadian Review of Sociology, (1993) Vol.30, Issue 1, Pages 
44-69.   
187 F. Davis and Tracy A. Thompson, “A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control.” 
Gerald Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pages 141-173. 
188 Francis Kramarz, and David Thesmar, “Social Networks in the Boardroom.” CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. 5496 (February 2006). 
189 Retrieved online from Business Council of Australia website at 
www.bca.com.au/Content/100828.aspx on 14 July 2010. 
190 Retrieved online from United States Chamber of Commerce website at  
http://library.uschamber.com/about/board/board-directors on 14 July 2010. 
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Following the work of Fama and Jensen there have been many studies of the 
effectiveness of boards and their structural causes.  Most of the evidence that is available 
suggests that board composition does affect performance.  Daily and Dalton found that 
bankrupt firms were more likely to have had executive chairman191.  Carter, Simkins and 
Simpson found that where boards were more diverse, corporate (share) value was 
increased192. Uzen, Szewczyk and Varma found a strong correlation between a lack of 
independent directors and the incidence of corporate fraud for United States 
corporations193.  As Fama, Jensen and Meckling hypothesised, the majority view is that 
boards with greater independence exercise greater oversight of the corporation, which 
leads to better performance. 
 
There is a dissenting view that boards with close internal ties foster cooperation and may 
still perform well.  Westphal found that boards with social ties between members tended to 
be more cooperative and effective194.  Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard195 found that 
there was no evidence that directors with multiple directorships were less effective at 
preventing fraud.  This does not contradict Uzen Szewcyzk and Varma’s findings, since 
directors with multiple directorships may still be a cause of increased independence. 
 
Even if treated as members of competing organisations, there is no reason to believe that 
individuals with a shared interest will not cooperate in achieving that interest while 
competing in other respects.  Members of other professional groups such as doctors, 
lawyers and engineers may belong to competing firms but still act jointly through 
professional associations when trying to achieve higher incomes for their members.  This 
is simply the pursuit through group action of a rational self-interest shared at the individual 
level by all members of the group.  Business executives have formed their own 
professional organisations such as the Company Directors Association (CDA) in Australia, 
                                                
191 Catherine M. Daily, and Dan R. Dalton, “Bankruptcy and Corporate Governance: The Impact of 
Board Composition and Structure.” The Academy of Management Journal Vol. 37, No. 6 (Dec., 
1994), pp. 1603-1617. 
192 D.A. Carter, B.J. Simkins and W.G. Simpson, “Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and 
Firm Value.” Financial Review (2003) 38: 33–53. 
193 Hatice Uzun, Samuel H. Szewczyk, and Raj Varma, “Board Composition and Corporate Fraud.” 
Financial Analysts Journal Vol. 60, No. 3 (May - Jun. 2004), pages 33-43. 
194 James D. Westphal, “Collaboration in the Boardroom: Behavioural and Performance 
Consequences of CEO-Board Social Ties.” The Academy of Management Journal Vol. 42, No. 1 
(Feb., 1999), pages 7-24. 
195 S.P. Ferris, M. Jagannathan and A.C. Pritchard, “Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by 
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which lobbies government on their behalf on matters including legal liability and incomes of 
corporate directors and executives. 
 
In this environment it is at least possible that share fund managers, corporate directors 
and corporate executives may act as members of competing groups when dealing with 
aspects of corporate strategy, but as members of a shared interest group when negotiating 
their personal incomes.  Thus collusive games may emerge between them.  For example, 
as Bebchuck and Fried pointed out, corporate directors may agree to executive 
remuneration committees that grant higher executive reward contracts, in implicit 
exchange for executives recommending higher fees or other benefits to directors196. 
 
Proponents of incentive theories or other market based theories for setting executive 
rewards could argue that each agency cost within the more complex structure could be 
reduced to a secondary market.  Assuming each market is efficient, owners/investors 
could choose to leave that market if dissatisfied with the performance of their agent.  Thus 
the extraction of economic rents by various agents would soon cease.   
 
In practice the ability of owners/investors to leave is questionable due to the compulsory 
nature of most retirement fund investments.  Further, in Australia and the United States the 
rules on the management behaviour and reporting of institutional funds, notably private 
equity funds, are much weaker than comparable rules for public companies.  Investors in 
such funds can choose to remove their capital from the investment fund, however they 
have little ability to influence the management of the fund.  In such circumstances the 
likelihood of such a secondary market developing and operating efficiently would seem 
remote. 
 
Theoretically, the assumption that a secondary market can be established to solve the 
multiple-agency cost problems faces other difficulties.   It is not clear that the structure and 
behaviour of such funds constitutes a competitive market.  In an environment where wage 
earners are legally obliged to invest in such institutions, there appears little incentive on 
the part of the funds to compete in a way that would eliminate economic rents being 
extracted from their investors. They might prefer to act as oligopolists to give one example 
of an alternative outcome structure. Institutional fund members in Australia and the United 
States cannot vote to sack their managers. In such an environment economic rents could 
                                                
196 Lucien Bebchuck, and Jesse Fried, (2004), page 30. 
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be extracted by fund managers in a lasting manner, via collusive agreements between 
fund managers and executives. 
 
4.4 Summary 
In summary, we have reviewed two economic theories to explain corporate management 
costs (agency theory) and executive rewards (management power).  Agency theory 
recognises that there will be conflicts between principals and agents, such as shareholders 
and executives. The theory fits with the structure of corporations and the evidence of 
trends in executive rewards.  
 
Management power theory builds on agency theory to explain current corporate executive 
reward practices.  Over time corporate power structures have grown more complex and 
share ownership has grown more indirect.   The potential for increased management 
power to be acquired by agents has grown in an era of institutional share ownership and 
compulsory investment in share funds.  The difficulty for management power theory is that 
once again, it cannot determine an appropriate level of executive rewards.  It also requires 
some causal proof that management power has increased in an era of increasing 
regulation of corporate governance. 
 
The cause of the increase is the change in share ownership that has occurred in recent 
decades, with the majority of share ownership now in institutional share funds. These 
generally operate outside the corporate regulations and governance practices developed 
for corporations.   Thus while corporate governance for corporations has increased, control 
of corporations has largely moved outside this regime, and overall management power has 
increased. 
 
The conventional understanding of agency theory in corporations needs to be replaced by 
one that includes institutional (share) fund investors and fund managers as well as 
directors and executives.  This adds additional layers of agency cost.  Collusion then 
becomes possible between any two of the agents, or all three agents in combination.  If we 
assume that all agents do act in investors’ interests, the informational requirements for 
investors to make rational choices between agents would still be extremely complex, and 
may be beyond the ability of most individuals without specific training to comprehend.  If in 
practice the individuals comprising fund managers, directors and executives are all known 
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to each other, they are more likely to cooperate to extract and share economic rents from 
investors.   
 
In my view, this is precisely what has happened in the executive labour market over the 
past thirty years, and explains the rise in management power that Bebchuk and Fried 
identified as the cause of increased executive rewards.  This is a more complex version of 
the management power thesis than Bebchuk and Fried’s.  However it still relies on 
management power as the cause.  It reinforces and extends, rather than contradicts, 
Bebchuk and Fried’s explanation.  Increased management power remains the explanation 
of increased executive rewards.  Changes in share ownership and corporate power 
structures are the cause of the increased management power.  
 
Despite the strength of this explanation, the predominant view in business management 
remains that executive rewards are the market determination of the amount of reward 
executives need to be paid to work for their corporation. Next in Chapters Five and Six I 
will examine the alternative market based theories for rewards and their application to 
corporate executives.  These are the alignment and incentive theories most commonly 
used as justifications of current practices by defenders of executive remuneration levels in 
Chapter Five, and remaining market based theories in Chapter Six.  I will review 
arguments for and against each to see if either theory is more likely to result in an 
economically efficient executive labour market, or can justify current levels of executive 
reward.  This will lead to a consideration of policy recommendations in Chapters Seven 




5 Alignment and Incentive Theory 
5.1 Alignment Theories 
 
In this chapter I will examine what I define as “alignment theory” for executive rewards.  
This has been the predominant model used for both explaining and justifying the level of 
executive rewards in the business and accounting fields over the past three decades. I will 
focus on alignment theories as defined by Jensen and Murphy, who gave the most 
commonly cited form of the theory used in executive compensation literature.  Alignment 
theory is not a normative theory of rewards, though as we shall see, it has been used as 
such by its authors and others to defend the legitimacy of executive reward practices. 
 
I will evaluate the validity of alignment theory against both the empirical and normative 
criteria we have previously discussed in Chapters Two and Three.  I will demonstrate that 
alignment theory as applied in the case of executive rewards does not satisfy either of 
these sets of criteria.  I will then discus common criticisms of alignment theory, and 
whether or not it could be made more acceptable in a modified form. 
 
Like management power theory, alignment theory recognises that there are agency costs 
in corporations, which prevent them from being optimally efficient in an economic sense.  
Unlike management power theory, alignment theory considers that it is possible to 
minimise agency costs through market-based contractual mechanisms between firms and 
their executives.  The level of executive rewards that is the outcome of those mechanisms 
should then be efficient if executive labour markets are efficient.   
 
The central assumption of alignment theory is that while an agent has different interests to 
the principal that hired them, the agent’s rewards may be structured so as to align the 
agent’s actions with the principal’s aims.  That is, the structure of the reward gives the 
agent an incentive to act to achieve the objectives desired by the principal.  Thus 
alignment theory is a sub-set of the broader category of incentive theories.  
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This solution to the “principal – agent problem” is not confined to executive rewards.  
Incentive theory has been recognised since the writing of Stiglitz197 and others and has 
been applied to fields such as agricultural production, and transport economics198 as well 
as pay-performance.  I will briefly discuss the general context of incentive theories and 
how alignment theories are distinct from them.  This distinction is important.  There is 
evidence that incentive theories can be an efficient way to minimise agency costs in 
principal – agent problems if applied in an appropriate manner and circumstances199.  The 
concerns I will demonstrate are with the peculiarities of alignment theory, and its 
application in the case of executive rewards.  I will argue that incentive theories such as 
alignment theory are not a solution to the principal – agent problem in the case of 
corporate executives. 
 
5.1.1 Jensen and Murphy’s Alignment Theories 
We saw in Chapter Two that current practice for executive pay in Australia and the United 
States relies on the use of performance-based bonuses to executives.  This trend is often 
justified by reference to studies of the relationship between performance-based executive 
rewards and corporate performance.  Two figures, Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. 
Murphy, are most commonly associated with the evolution of these practices and research 
supporting them.  Jensen and Murphy did not explicitly define a theory to explain this form 
of executive rewards, however their views became apparent over a series of papers.  A 
brief history of Jensen and Murphy’s work gives a useful overview of current practice, 
which I will call alignment theory. 
 
Following Jensen and Meckling’s200 1976 paper, the possibility of using incentive 
payments to minimise agency costs had already been raised.  It was claimed that 
contracts between principals (shareholders) and agents (executives) could be structured 
so that it was in the agent’s personal interest to act to maximise shareholder wealth.  The 
question remaining was how to structure such contracts.  Together first Jensen and then 
                                                
197 Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping.” Review of Economic Studies, 
61(1974), 219-256. 
198 Bent Flyvbjerg, Carsten Glenting and Arne Ronnest, “Procedures for Dealing with Optimism 
Bias in Transport Planning: Guidance Document.” (London: UK Department for Transport, June 
2004). 
199Edward P. Lazear, “Performance, Pay and Productivity.” The American Economic Review, 
vol.90, No. 5 (Dec. 2000) pages 1346-1361. 
200 Michael C. Jensen and William Meckling, “Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360 (1976). 
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Murphy pioneered forms of empirical analysis that they claimed to establish relationships 
between payments to executives and corporate performance.  They then argued for 
executive rewards to be structured on a corresponding basis.  It should be noted that the 
claims made in these early papers were based on economic analysis of what would be 
financially efficient for a business, and were not normative claims about the legitimacy of a 
reward practice. 
 
Jensen (1985)201, Murphy202 and others who were familiar with agency theory undertook 
quantitative research on executive salary and firm performance in the United States.  
There had already been previous investigations of the topic, but this was perhaps the first 
systematic program of research to understand executive reward practices from the 
viewpoint of agency costs.  As stated previously in Chapter Two earlier studies had not 
indicated a relationship between executive rewards and corporate performance in the 
United States.  By shifting the analysis from profits and pay to increases in executive and 
shareholder wealth (share price) significant relationships were found.   
 
Jensen and Zimmerman (1985) claimed they had found evidence that the following 
executive pay practices were correlated with corporate performance: 
1. Changes in executive remuneration were positively related to share price performance 
(Murphy 1985). The correlation was weak. 
2. Managers with bonus plans choose accounting accruals that increase the value of their 
bonus awards (i.e. the share price). 
3. The adoption of short and long term executive compensation plans and “golden 
parachutes” (contracts that gave executive large bonuses if their contracts were 
terminated early) were associated with positive share price reactions. 
4. The stock price increases with the death of a firm’s founder. 
5. Stock prices increase with the announcement of golden parachute clauses for 
executive contracts. 
 
                                                
201 Michael C. Jensen and Jerold L. Zimmerman, “Managerial Compensation and the Managerial 
Labor Market.” Journal of Accounting and Economics,  Vol. 7 , No. 1-3 (1985), pages 3-9. This 
paper summarised research by Jensen, Murphy, Anne T. Coughlan, Ronald M. Schmidt, Paul M 
Healy, Hassan Tehranian, James F. Waegelein, Wilbur Llewelyn, Claudi Loderer, Ahron Rosenfeld, 
Wayne H. Mickelson, and Richard S. Ruback. 
202 Kevin J. Murphy, “Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical 
Analysis.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7 (1985) pages 11-42. 
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Jensen and Zimmerman hypothesised reasons for these relationships.  They argued that 
most demonstrated that markets react positively to actions that tie the executive closely to 
the performance of the firm.  The executive will presumably be rewarded when the 
corporation performs well in the share market.  Reasons for the other relationships were 
less obvious but could be inferred.  Golden parachute clauses in executive contracts were 
perceived to resolve a significant conflict of interest for the executive if a merger was 
involved.  They would counteract the motivation of the executive to block a merger in order 
to preserve their own position and self-interest. 
 
These findings led Jensen to the conclusion that “executive compensation plans 
[containing bonus plans for executives] help align managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests”203.  Shareholders benefited from the plans because the increase in share prices 
and consequent increase in shareholder wealth coincident with use of the plans exceeded 
the cost of the compensation plans to shareholders.  Thus agency costs were minimised. 
  
 This was the foundation of alignment theory for executive pay, which was described as 
the “incentive hypothesis” by Jensen.  Jensen and Murphy would continue to refine and 
defend the theory for the next twenty-five years.  The core belief in it remained that the 
interests and actions of executives could be aligned to the “shareholders’ interests 
(presumed by Jensen and Murphy to be wealth maximisation via share prices and 
dividends) via contracts that closely linked executive reward to corporate performance.  
The link (alignment) would be achieved by paying executives performance bonuses of 
shares in the corporation, based on the achievement of performance targets such as 
improvements in the share price.  It was intended to be as Jensen wrote in his 1985 
conclusion: 
“In summary the papers in this volume are consistent with the conclusion that executive 
compensation plans help align managers’ and shareholders’ interests.”204 
 
This conclusion was a subtle but significant shift from the conclusions on agency theory 
referred to in Jensen’s earlier 1976 paper, where managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
were taken to be different.  Agency theory allows for the possibility that agent’s actions can 
be aligned with the principal’s interests through incentives structured into the agent’s 
                                                
203 Michael C. Jensen and Jerold L. Zimmerman (1985), page 8. 
204 Michael C. Jensen and Jerold L. Zimmerman (1985). 
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rewards.  It does not assume that the agent’s and principal’s interests are aligned.  That 
their interests might conflict is one of the assumptions of agency theory.   
 
Jensen viewed the alignment mechanism as purely a means to minimise agency costs 
rather than manage a fundamental conflict of interests.  He did not consider that 
executives failed to act in shareholders interests in practice.  He wrote in his 1985 paper: 
“For example an extreme view that has received considerable attention holds that 
executives do not act in their shareholders interests and that they control their boards of 
directors.”205  
There seems to be no theoretical basis for Jensen’s shift from alignment of actions as in 
his paper with Mecklin to alignment of interests as in the above quote from his paper with 
Zimmerman.  This shift enables the elimination via alignment theory of a conflict of 
interests between principal and agent that is fundamental to agency theory.  Contrary to 
Jensen’s view, I do not think we have any reason to believe that the conflict of interests 
can actually be eliminated, at least not solely by a contractual mechanism.  I will return to 
this point later. 
 
5.1.2 Assumptions Implicit in Alignment Theory 
Jensen and Murphy’s conclusions are based on empirical research, but it is important to 
understand the theoretical and methodological assumptions that are inherent in them to 
determine whether they are valid.  We will examine them to see whether they are valid in 
principle, and whether they are consistent with the empirical evidence discussed in 
Chapter Two.  We will also note their implications for any normative conclusions that have 
been made using alignment theory. 
 
The first and most obvious assumption in alignment theory is that it implicitly assumes that 
corporate performance, as measured by share price, is due to the executives’ efforts.  
Jensen and Murphy acknowledge other factors also influence corporate performance and 
do not suggest that executives are the sole or even primary cause of profits or share 
prices.  Nevertheless, in using empirical relationships between corporate performance and 
executive rewards to justify their theory, they are assuming that the two are causally 
linked.  This assumption of executives being the causal agents, without testing if other 
causes are more valid, as already discussed in Chapter Two, is methodologically unsound.   
                                                
205 Michael C. Jensen and Jerold L. Zimmerman (1985), page 2. 
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Other explanations can be posited for why corporate performance and executive rewards 
are related, that do not imply a causal link from the executive’s performance.  For 
example, proponents of management power explanations could argue an alternative 
explanation.   More efficient or profitable corporations will be more financially capable of 
giving larger rewards to executives.  Astute executives will then seek out positions with 
corporations known to be efficient and/or profitable to obtain correspondingly larger 
rewards.  However, subsequent large rewards being paid to those executives would not 
prove that they were responsible for the corporation’s performance, only that they had 
benefited from it.  To be scientific in their approach, Jensen and Murphy should have 
discussed such alternative hypotheses and explained why they were less valid, rather than 
simply present their own hypothesis and fit it to the data. 
 
The second major difficulty for this assumption is empirical.  Putting aside questions of 
cause and effect, the relationships in Australian and United States data we saw in Chapter 
Two are extremely weak.  They do not meet the normal standards of proof in social 
scientific research. Defenders of alignment theory might argue that this may be due to the 
incomplete implementation of the theory due to the many market distortions identified in 
chapter four, and in the absence of these distortions stronger relationships may become 
evident.  Nevertheless after three decades of analysis and attempted implementation, the 
proof empirical proof for alignment theory remains weak.  This is a fatal flaw in a theory 
that relies on empirical evidence, rather than any underpinning meta-theory of behaviour, 
for its legitimacy. 
 
A second critical set of assumptions centres around the view that share prices are 
accurate predictors of the corporation’s performance.  The first of these is that share 
markets are assumed to be efficient.  This assumption is based on Fama’s “efficient 
markets hypothesis” (EMH), which holds that markets would rationally seek sufficient 
information to be efficient without external regulation206.  Jensen had earlier written with 
Fama on aspects of this theory207.  In alignment theory this is taken a step further, with the 
further assumption that share market prices assumed to accurately reflect all information 
known to the market. 
                                                
206 Eugene F. Fama, “The Behavior of Stock Market Prices.” Journal of Business (1965) 38: pages 
34–105. 
207 Eugene F. Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen and Richard Roll, “The Adjustment of 
Stock Prices to New Information.” International Economic Review, Vol. 10 (February, 1969). 
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An important conclusion of EMH is that it is impossible to outperform the market in the long 
term except by luck.  In recent times EMH has been criticised by behavioural 
economists208 who have found that markets are in practice not efficient.  It has particularly 
fallen out of favour since the global financial crisis has exposed markets’ inability to price 
complex risks in asset markets209. 
 
Jensen and Murphy’s view on executive rewards is best understood in the context of 
prevailing trends in political and economic theory during the 1980s.  There was a strong 
push towards decreasing market regulation of all sectors in most western countries, 
including Australia and the United States.  This was the case during the period from their 
first writing in the late 1970s up to the global financial crisis that commenced in 2007/08.  
Free market ideologies such as those espoused by economist Milton Friedman210 became 
increasingly dominant in economic and political thought.  Achieving social policy outcomes 
via market mechanisms such as bargaining for performance-based contracts came to be 
seen as inherently preferable to government regulation or “interference” in the market.  
Jensen and Meckling shared this view211. 
 
Assuming EMH theory holds, alignment theory has obvious benefits from an economic 
efficiency viewpoint.  The share market is efficient in accurately reflecting the performance 
of a corporation in its share price.  The share price is then also an accurate reflection of 
the executive’s performance, assuming that the share price is influenced by it.  The 
executive labour market then is accurate in setting the level of executive rewards based on 
the executive’s performance, since the rewards are linked to the share price.  In that case, 
an executive rewards package linked to the corporation’s share price will accurately 
reward the executive’s efforts, since their rewards will match the share price determined by 
                                                
208 B. Rosenberg, K. Reid, and R. Lanstein, “Persuasive Evidence of Market Inefficiency.” Journal 
of Portfolio Management 13:9-17 (1985). 
209 "We are all Keynesians now." Boston Globe, Editorial November 25, 2008. Retrieved on-line 
2008-12-16.  Chicago school economist Robert Lucas was quoted as saying “I guess everyone is a 
Keynesian in a foxhole”.  Lucas had formerly won the Nobel Prize in Economics for theories 
critical of Keynesian economics. 
210 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, “Free to Choose: A Personal Statement.” (San Diego: 
Harcourt 1980). 
211 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Corporate Governance and Economic 
Democracy: An Attack on Freedom.” in “Corporate Governance: A Definite Exploration of the 
Issues.” C. J. Huizenga, Editor, (Los Angeles: UCLA Extension Press 1983). 
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their efforts.  Alignment theory then promises an economically efficient means of setting 
executive rewards, provided these assumptions are correct. 
 
The difficulty with this approach is that it is a circular argument.  If all three assumptions 
are true (efficient share market, efficient executive labour market, executives influential on 
corporate performance) then alignment theory may be valid.  If any one of these 
assumptions is false, then alignment theory is not valid.  For example the failure of EMH 
for share markets alone is sufficient to invalidate alignment theory, because if share 
market prices are not accurate reflections of corporate performance, then neither are the 
executive rewards linked to them.  This means that Jensen and Murphy’s empirical 
analysis does not in itself prove alignment theory correct.  It would only prove that the 
analysis has been undertaken consistently with the assumptions of alignment theory. 
 
Against this criticism, a weaker form of alignment theory could be argued, that abandoned 
bonuses tied to share prices and still claimed the general principal of the theory: a contract 
that tied the rewards of the executive to the performance of the corporation might be 
sufficient to motivate the executive to act in the interests of shareholders.  This would be 
an easier proposition to support, although it would negate virtually all of Jensen and 
Murphy’s supporting analysis.  Alignment theory would then be theoretically possible, but 
unproven. 
 
5.1.3 Level of Executive Rewards 
Jensen and Murphy’s 1985 studies did not consider the level of executive reward. This 
was a major omission, since the overall level of executive rewards is, as we saw in 
Chapter One, the area of greatest community concern.   Consideration of the level of 
executive rewards is relevant to evaluating alignment theory in several respects.   
 
Firstly, arguments for alignment theory are based on empirical evidence that executive 
rewards can be linked to achieving greater economic efficiency.  The level of executive 
rewards will itself be a factor in determining whether they are economically efficient.  
Secondly, alignment theory has been used in an explanatory or justificatory manner to 
rationalise executive rewards as an outcome of the executive labour market.  Jensen and 
Murphy commented on the level of executive rewards in this manner in later papers, and 
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so it is appropriate to consider the broader question of whether executive reward levels 
can be explained by alignment theory. 
 
Finally, and most significantly for this thesis, reward levels are relevant to making 
normative judgements about whether the rewards are justified.  Jensen and Murphy’s 
analysis of differences in reward between executives is only relevant to the justice of 
reward levels internally, within the practice of corporate executives, but not externally, 
within the wider community.  This is not sufficient for making a normative judgement on 
executive rewards.  Principles of justice are not confined within a practice, but extend 
throughout the community in which it is based. 
 
For example, when debating whether the pay rate of plumbers is fair, the debate does not 
focus on whether the difference in pay between the highest paid and lowest paid plumbers 
relates to their difference in skill.  The question is whether the overall level of reward for 
plumbers, relative to the rest of the workforce, seems reasonable, given the skill and effort 
required in the occupation.  The same principle applies to considering the justice of 
rewards for all occupations, including executives.  Thus alignment theory is not an 
adequate basis for making normative judgements about the level of executive rewards 
though, as we shall see, it has at times been used in that manner. 
 
I will consider economic efficiency first.  Without consideration of the overall level of 
executive rewards, Jensen and Murphy’s analysis can only show whether the dispersion of 
executive rewards matched the dispersion of corporate performance.  This is not sufficient 
to prove performance incentives are efficient.   To be economically efficient, alignment 
theory must result in a level of executive rewards that is the minimum level sufficient to 
achieve optimum corporate performance.  Otherwise agency costs are not minimised and 
so the result is not optimal for shareholders.  Even if a distribution of executive rewards is 
perfectly consistent with the distribution of corporate performance, it would not be efficient 
if the same could be achieved with a lower level of rewards. Not considering the level of 
executive rewards is an extraordinary omission by Jensen and Murphy, since 
consideration of the level of rewards is a standard aspect of assessing the efficiency of 
labour markets for any occupation in economics212,213. 
                                                
212 212 Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Alternative Thoeries of Wage Determination and Unemployment in 




For example, suppose that three corporations in an industry, A, B and C, have annual 
returns to shareholders of +10%, +20% and +30% of capital value.  If their annual 
executive rewards were correspondingly $1 million, $2 million and $3 million, then under 
Jensen and Murphy’s analysis this would give a perfect correlation between reward and 
performance.  Suppose the same performance were achieved and the level of rewards 
was divided by ten, so that executives received rewards of $100,000 for A, $200,000 for B, 
and $300,000 for C.  Under Jensen and Murphy’s analysis the same perfect correlation 
result would be achieved, even though the shareholders would be better off by $0.9 million 
for A, $1.8 million for B and $2.7 million for C.  Clearly, the second level and distribution of 
rewards is more efficient than the first.   
 
This argument does not in itself prove that alignment theory results in economically 
inefficient levels of reward for executives.  Conversely, it shows that alignment theory does 
not guarantee an economically efficient outcome either. Without that, one of the key 
justifications for accepting alignment theory is eliminated. 
 
I will next turn to attempts to use alignment theory to explain levels of executive reward.  
The question of the level of executive rewards is not an arbitrary or subjective one.  
Jensen at the time of his first papers in 1985 did not view executive rewards as too high, 
contrary to public opinion.  He stated that: 
“the studies in this volume do not address the complex issues associated with the 
frequently made, but unsupported, assertion that executive pay is “too high”.”214   
Jensen claimed that it was equally plausible, though also unproven, that executive rewards 
might be “too low”.  At this time executive rewards in the United States had been 
increasing, in comparison to 1970s levels.  The 1970s were themselves the lowest point in 
executive reward in real terms since the 1930s.  Executive pay in the United States in the 
1980s was still higher than for any other occupation, and higher than for executives in any 
other country, and so Jensen’s claim that executive pay being too low was equally as 
plausible as it being too high seems highly improbable.  Jensen did acknowledge that the 
question of the level of executive rewards needed further study and both he and Kevin 
Murphy considered it in subsequent work. 
                                                                                                                                                            
213 George Akerlof, and Janet Yellen, “Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market.” (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1986). 
214 Michael C. Jensen and Jerold L. Zimmerman, (1985) page 8. 
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Alignment theory was developed further in a later paper by Jensen and Murphy (1990)215.  
At that time executive rewards had risen significantly in real terms in the United States 
throughout the 1980s and had begun to attract wider attention and criticism216. Despite 
this, Jensen and Murphy considered the level of executive rewards as the outcome of a 
free labour market and did not regard them as problematic. They had researched data on 
executive rewards and corporate performance from the 1980s back to the 1930s, when 
corporations were less regulated.  The higher executive reward levels (in real terms) in the 
1930s, relative to the 1980s, were used to argue that rewards in the 1980s had not risen 
over historic levels.  
“The current popular belief that CEO pay in the largest corporations has increased 




This view is even less defensible than the comments on reward levels in Jensen and 
Murphy’s 1985 papers, given the intervening rise in the level of executive rewards.  Their 
view that the level of executive rewards in 1990 was acceptable because it had returned to 
unregulated 1930s levels is arbitrary.  Adoption of a different earlier comparison point 
would have resulted in a different conclusion.  Again, there was no attempt to link the level 
of executive rewards to any definition of economic efficiency.  
 
The key empirical claims in Jensen and Murphy’s 1990 paper were218: 
1. Claims of excessive CEO pay growth were disputed because CEO pay in real terms 
had only returned back to the level of the 1930s. 
2. Performance bonuses were now widely used but the performance measure (typically 
stock price) was usually based on absolute changes in the corporation’s share price 
and not relative to the rest of the market (relative performance evaluation or RPE). 
3. There was little correlation between performance and CEO reward; the highest 
rewards were not going to the best performing CEOs. 
                                                
215 Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Executives.” 
Journal of Political Economy, April 1990. 
216 Graef Crystal, “In Search of Excess: the Overcompensation of American Executives.” (New 
York: Norton 1991). 
217 Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, (1990), page 38. 
218 Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, (1990), page 46-48. 
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4. The lack of variability in CEO bonuses suggested they were almost always awarded, 
suggesting performance targets were set too low. 
5. The share of stock held by the CEO was continuing to decline. 
 
They acknowledged that the evidence did not support what they defined as agency theory 
(alignment theory): 
“We believe our results are inconsistent with the implications of formal agency models of 
optimal contracting.  The empirical relation between the pay of top-level executives and 
firm performance, while positive and statistically significant, is small for an occupation 
where incentive pay is expected to play an important role.”219 
  
At this point Jensen and Murphy should have been prepared to acknowledge that the 
executive labour market in the United States was not efficient.  The explanatory strength of 
their (alignment) theory in regard to executive reward levels was shown to be weak.  The 
empirical relationships identified in their earlier work and used to justify alignment theory in 
rewards for executives were declining in strength, despite the weaknesses described 
earlier in their original formulation.  If EMH was correct for share markets and executive 
labour markets, this should not have been the case.  If EMH was incorrect for those 
markets, alignment theory was invalid.  
 
Jensen and Murphy considered opposing hypotheses to alignment theory but disagreed 
with them220.  Instead they suggested an alternative “implicit regulation hypothesis”, that 
acted in addition to alignment theory, to explain discrepancies between the data and the 
results expected from alignment theory.   In this “political forces operating in both the 
public sector and inside organisations limited [minimised] large payoffs for executive 
performance”221.  This was then justified with comparisons  to the 1930s data referred to 
previously.  Again, there was no political or economic meta-theory introduced to support 
this.   In my view this hypothesis is not sound.  Applying Ockham’s razor, it is unsound to 
hypothesise additional elaborations of a theory, in order to justify its departure from 
available evidence, when it would be simpler to conclude that the theory was invalid.  As 
an explanatory theory of executive reward levels, alignment theory had proven 
unsatisfactory by 1990. 
                                                
219 Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, (1990), page 2. 
220 Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, (1990), page 34. 
221 Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, (1990), page 35. 
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Jensen and Murphy responded to critics of the level of executive rewards in other papers 
with proposals to better structure and target the payment of rewards222.  They still retained 
their view that incentive based pay was appropriate and the high levels of CEO pay were 
justified.   
 
Murphy later stated that the campaign against CEO pay "is a disguised attack on wealth."  
By holding CEO pay up to public criticism, he said, "we run the danger of driving our best 
people out of the boardroom."223  These later views were Murphy’s opinion and he 
provided no evidence in support of them. 
 
In continuing to hold their support for alignment theory in the face of contrary evidence, in 
my view Jensen and Murphy at this point ceased being impartial analysts and became 
advocates for particular (high) levels of executive rewards224.  As stated previously, that 
position cannot be justified on grounds of economic efficiency.  They remained open and 
honest in describing their findings and requirements for further research.  Yet explanations 
of the observed data that might contradict alignment theory, such as management power, 
were dismissed.  
 
The trend towards rising levels of executive rewards accelerated through the 1990s, with 
CEO pay in US corporations reaching four times early 1980s levels in real terms by the 
late 1990s.  Jensen and Murphy continued researching and writing on the topic.  Murphy 
defending incentive type contracts with performance bonuses for executives in a 1999 
paper225.  Murphy believed that market mechanisms, such as contracts with performance 
based bonuses, were the preferable form of managing agency conflicts.  The managerial 
labour market was an ideal field to study them. 
 
                                                
222 Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, “CEO Pay: Its Not How Much but How.” Harvard 
Business Review, May/June 1990.  
223 Thomas McCarroll, “Executive Pay.” Time Magazine, 4 May 1992. 
224 Subsequent to this in 1994-95 Kevin J. Murphy worked as a consultant for Towers Perrin, a 
prominent firm for advice on executive remuneration in the United States.  Murphy acknowledged 
the potential conflicts of interest in compensation consultants in his 2009 paper: Kevin J. Murphy 
and Tatiana Sandino, “Executive Pay and 'Independent Compensation Consultants”, Marshall 
School of Business Working Paper No. FBE 10-09 (2009). 
225 Kevin J. Murphy, “Executive Compensation.” in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds) 
“Handbook of Labor Economics.” Vol. 3b, (North Holland: Elsevier Science 1999), Chapter 38: 
2485-2563. 
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Murphy noted in his 1999 paper a number of empirical changes in US CEO reward 
practices since the previous 1990 paper with Jensen: 
1. CEO reward had doubled in real terms in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.  This had 
matched an increase in firm size. 
2. US CEO pay was higher than other countries regardless of firm size, by a decreasing 
margin.  This suggested a globalisation of the market for executive talent, as firms 
expanded internationally. 
3. The link between CEO turnover and performance had declined; 
4. Retiring CEOs were tending to do so younger, with shorter tenures; 
5. Stock options tended to be exercised immediately, upon vesting; 
6. The majority of CEO pay was now in the form of stock options and bonuses.  The 
proportion of CEO share ownership had not risen. 
7. Murphy identified further research needed especially on subsequent performance of 
corporations after bonuses.  CEO pay was an ideal “laboratory” to investigate 
incentive-based rewards.  
8. Murphy concluded that the targeting of bonuses had improved, with performance and 
reward more closely correlated.  However he noted the use of relative performance 
evaluation (RPE) for awarding bonuses remained very rare, which seems 
contradictory.    
 
Murphy (1999) acknowledged that several of these results were departures from the 
predictions of alignment theory.  The evidence of declining pay-performance sensitivity, 
declining CEO turnover – performance sensitivity, shorter CEO tenure, and immediate 
exercising of stock options could not be explained by alignment theory, and were instead 
consistent with management power theory. 
 
Murphy identified causes of these departures from alignment theory and the need for 
reform of executive reward practices.  He concluded “Although there is ample evidence 
that CEOs (and other employees) respond predictably to dysfunctional compensation 
arrangements, it is more difficult to document that the increase in stock-based incentives 
has led CEOs to work harder, smarter and more in the interests of shareholders.”226   
 
Despite the honesty of these admissions, Murphy seemed unable to acknowledge that the 
excessive use of stock options suggested alignment theory was invalid.  Stock options had 
                                                
226 Kevin J. Murphy, (1999), Page 54. 
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become the means of escalation in executive rewards, rather than a market solution to 
them.  Jensen and Murphy cannot be blamed for this trend.  Studies have also linked other 
trends to increases in real incomes for corporate executives.  For example, as taxes on 
very high incomes were reduced, high incomes increased, including those of corporate 
executives227.  Yet equally, Jensen and Murphy were unable to accept that an alternative 
explanation of corporate rewards was required.  Murphy’s preference remained for further 
research and refinements to alignment theory-based rewards. 
 
After the corporate collapses of the “dot-com boom” in 2000 public attention on executive 
rewards increased again.  Following this Murphy did express concern about the level of 
executive rewards in several papers228.  By 2003 average CEO pay for large corporations 
in the United States had increased six fold over the early 1980s229. This resulted in a 
further paper by Murphy with Brian Hall in 2002 that investigated the cost to share holders 
of stock options issued to CEOs and executives230. Hall and Murphy identified that 
corporate boards and executives discounted the value of future stock options due to their 
inherent risks.  This discounting of the value of future bonuses made them a costly way of 
providing incentives to executives.  Hall and Murphy saw this as a technical failure in 
implementing alignment theory that had prevented it from properly achieving its objectives.  
Murphy remained committed to his preference for market based alignment theories of 
executive rewards. 
 
5.1.4 Response to Management Power Theory 
By the time of Jensen and Murphy’s later papers in the 1990s other authors such as 
Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002)231, had begun to publish papers on executive rewards.  
They highlighted that the real cost of CEO share bonuses was becoming extremely high, 
and hypothesised that this was due to increasing management power rather than any 
market-based incentive theory in operation.  Management power was a contradiction of 
                                                
227 Austin Goolsbee, "What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive 
Compensation." Journal of Political Economy (2000). 
228 Kevin J. Murphy, “Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power vs the Perceived 
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230 Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy. "Stock Options For Undiversified Executives." Journal of 
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alignment theory, as it represented a non-market based explanation of executive rewards.  
Murphy responded to these critiques. 
 
Murphy had by then become concerned about the level of CEO rewards as well as the 
implementation of incentives in rewards.  In a 2002 paper Murphy responded to Bebchuk, 
Fried and Walker (BFW), acknowledging their evidence that the level of CEO pay had 
become excessive and was not justified relative to performance.   
“The BFW analysis is comprehensive and provocative, and their evidence that pay 
practices reflect more than optimal contracting concerns is compelling.  Equally compelling 
is their evidence that most pay decisions are not made by truly independent boards in 
legitimate arm’s-length transactions.” 232 
 
However, Murphy disagreed that this was evidence of management power and economic 
rents being extracted by executives and attacked Bebchuk, Fried and Walker’s arguments 
in three respects which I will describe in turn.   
1. Murphy pointed out the evidence that he felt was not consistent with the 
management power theory.  This included the rise in CEO pay in the 1990s 
coinciding with more independent members being on boards, the tendency for 
CEOs hired from outside corporations to be paid more, and the escalation in the 
use of performance bonus-based contracts.   
2. Murphy argued that the “outrage costs” BFW defined to explain why executives 
prefer to be paid more in bonuses than base salary were so vague as to be 
irrefutable.  
3. Murphy offered an alternative (market based) hypothesis to management power to 
explain the apparent data on executive rewards. 
 
Regarding the composition of boards, Murphy is correct to point out that there were a 
larger number of independently chosen board members on average during the period of 
the fastest rise in executive rewards in the 1990s.  This trend should have reduced 
management power of executives over boards.  Yet the impact of more independent board 
members on reducing management power could still be counteracted by other trends that 
increased management power.  These trends included the increasing institutional share 
ownership I identified in Chapter Four.  The impact of other countervailing forces on 
management power was not considered by Murphy.   Independent board members are 
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only one factor in assessing management power, and their increase does not prove that 
management power overall has decreased. 
 
Murphy’s argument that externally paid CEOs were paid higher than internally paid CEOs 
does not appear to provide evidence either way on management power.  For Bebchuck, 
Fried and Walker’s hypothesis of management power, the question is whether the pay-
performance link has improved, not whether they are internal or external to the firm.  If 
management power exists the executive, whether hired internally or externally, will exert 
influence on the board and increase their pay over time in real terms. As Murphy 
acknowledged, the pay – performance link did decline in this period, consistent with 
management power theory.  Similarly the increasing use of stock options for executive 
rewards does not disprove management power.  Again, the question is whether the pay 
received is increasing out of proportion to performance, not whether it is received as a 
salary or bonus. 
 
In my view the only valid criticism of the management power hypothesis that Murphy made 
was that the explanation of “outrage costs” by Bebchuk, Fried and Walker was vague and 
could not be quantified or tested.  Just as Jensen and Murphy’s “implicit regulation” 
hypothesis from their 1990 paper was not provable, neither was “outrage costs” as 
defined.  This part of Bebchuk, Fried and Walker’s paper remains speculative.  This still 
does not invalidate Bebchuk, Fried and Walker’s overall conclusion about management 
power.   
 
Instead of management power, Murphy preferred a market explanation.  He argued that 
executive rewards were still based on market negotiations between executives and 
corporate directors.  The questionable outcomes (i.e. too high rewards paid) in executive 
contracts could be explained by what he hypothesised as the “perceived cost” problem.  
Under this view both boards and executives underpriced the cost of executive share 
options when negotiating executive reward contracts.  Murphy recognised this 
underpricing was a “market failure of sorts”233.  Again, as with the “implicit regulation” 
hypothesis developed with Jensen in 1990234, Murphy preferred to posit a new, unproven 
revision to alignment theory, rather than to acknowledge the contradictory evidence  and 
discard it. 
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Murphy felt that the solution to the “perceived cost” problem was greater education of 
executives and directors and altering accounting rules to eliminate the asymmetry of 
information.  He rejected the implications of Bebchuk, Fried and Walker’s management 
power thesis, stating it was: “revising corporate governance to require truly independent 
boards, without any real evidence that such changes would lead to improved corporate 
performance or more rational compensation decisions” 235.   Murphy remained convinced 
that a market-based solution to executive rewards was inherently preferable to regulation 
of market outcomes.  Yet if the management power explanation of executive rewards is 
correct, as Murphy acknowledges the evidence suggests, education of directors is unlikely 
to be effective as a solution, since the directors do not control the outcome. 
 
In summary I consider this to be an inadequate response by Murphy in defence of 
alignment theory.  He did not dispute that management power may be causing rising 
trends in executive pay, and acknowledged a degree of market failure.  Yet he still 
considered that a market solution (alignment theory) was a preferable explanation.  Most 
of his counter-arguments amounted to assembling particular pieces of evidence that did 
not fit the management power theory, while ignoring the fact that the overall pattern of 
executive rewards was inconsistent with alignment theory.  An overall conclusion should 
be based on the overall trend, and this clearly favours the management power 
explanation. 
 
Further, whether or not management power was a primary or partial explanation of 
executive reward practices did not justify Murphy’s rejection of the need for regulation of 
executive labour markets that had been outlined by Bebchuk, Fried and Walker.  Murphy 
described their recommendation to focus regulation on executive rent extraction as being 
“potentially misguided and diverts attention from more important issues regarding 
executive compensation”236.  In acknowledging that market failure was apparent, he 
should have acknowledged the parallel need for regulation.  His own conclusion that 
education of director’s was the solution to rising executive rewards, will be ineffectual if 
management power is the cause of the rise. 
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5.1.5 Asymmetric Information and Executive Control 
A final concern for alignment theory not considered by Jensen and Murphy is the difficulty 
of designing performance targets that cannot be “gamed” by highly intelligent and highly 
self-interested executives.  To work as intended under alignment theory, executive 
contracts must select performance targets that maximise corporate performance, translate 
them into measurable and reportable parameters of the corporation, and identify 
appropriate rewards for executives that meet those targets.  The contract must also ensure 
that executives do not “game the system” by maximising reportable targets rather than 
corporate performance itself.  For this to occur it is critical that performance measures 
correctly reflect the structure of the corporation and that performance reporting is accurate.   
 
Yet while the shareholders, via the directors, control the contract (in theory) the executives 
control both the corporate structure and the corporate reporting.  This makes it possible for 
a self-interested executive to manipulate contractual outcomes in their favour by 
manipulating the information on which the outcomes are based.  For example, deliberate 
misreporting of profit results by the Enron Corporation prior to its collapse was a classic 
example of this risk being realised237.  Setting executive contracts with performance 
targets for bonuses seems an almost impossible task to perfect, if the executives control 
both the reporting and the framework within which it is assembled.   
 
Specialist auditors and advisors could be used to determine and monitor the targets.  
However if these are appointed by the corporation, this runs the risk of reinstating the 
agency problem one step removed, with corporate executives influencing the behaviour of 
the auditors. The behaviour of Andersens Consulting in auditing Enron demonstrated this 
risk.  If they are appointed by the directors, this places a large management burden upon 
them, and negates some of the advantages of having separate executives to manage the 
corporation.  The more complex the reporting mechanisms become, the more likely the 
directors will need some assistance from executives to manage them.  This is a classic 
example of an agency cost that cannot easily be eliminated. 
 
Murphy has argued that the main difficulty with the application of alignment theory has 
been the lack of adequate information on the part of both executives and directors in 
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assessing the value of corporate bonuses238.  I do not agree with Murphy on this point – 
the evidence is not random, and only points to a lack of information on the part of 
directors.  If the lack of information applied to both sides then it would not produce an 
upward pattern in executive rewards.  The data suggests there is a consistent pattern of 
stock option bonuses being defined to the benefit of executives, hence the rising rewards 
in real terms.  Theories of asymmetric information (one side in a bargaining session having 
an advantage of additional information over the other side), rather than  insufficient 
information, explain how this may distort market outcomes.  This may be reduced by 
tighter regulation of reporting. 
 
The reality of this problem can be demonstrated by considering the incidence of payment 
of executive performance bonuses against the accuracy of share performance forecasting.  
As has already been indicated, performance bonuses were paid to executives in the large 
majority of cases throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  This suggests that performance 
targets were set too conservatively, and targets were too easily met as a result.  This is not 
in itself a fault of executive contracts based on alignment theory, if the nature of the error 
was random.  However in can be shown that the “error” was not random. 
 
Analysis of the accuracy of United States stock market forecasting by McKinsey 
Consulting for the period 1985-90 to 2004-09 (five year rolling averages were used), 
shows that overall, market forecasters were consistently non-conservative in their 
predictions of future share returns.  The only exceptions were in the periods immediately 
after the US recession of 1999-2000.  On average, market forecasters were 25% high in 
their forecasting.  This is shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 Accuracy of US Market Forecasters 1985-2009239 
 
The question for alignment theorists is, if share market forecasts have been generally 
optimistic, why were executive reward targets usually conservative?  Under a climate of 
optimistic share market forecasts, we would expect impartially negotiated performance 
targets to also be optimistic and thus not to be achieved by the majority of executives.  The 
opposite has been the case, suggesting that the problem of overly-generous performance 
targets is not random, and is based on more than lack of information. 
 
I contend that the power of executives over a corporation makes this problem much more 
than a question of asymmetrical information. Tightening of regulations on corporate 
reporting and the structure of financial products do not change the fact that the executive, 
if the incentives are strong enough, may still be in a position to restructure the corporation 
itself, or its products, as well as its reporting, so as to avoid such regulations.  In this case 
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the purely self interested executive will weigh up the personal gain from the manipulation 
against the risk of being caught and the personal cost of any penalty.  They will not 
consider the cost to the corporation of the manipulation.  The invention of sub-prime 
mortgage investment products by financial corporations that allowed executives to claim 
large performance bonuses, but carried high financial risks for the corporation, is an 
example of this risk occurring240. 
 
Tightening of corporate reporting has been a consistent feature of the reforms that have 
occurred in Australia and the United States from the early 1990s onwards.  Yet none of 
these reforms have halted the rising trend of executive rewards or the continued incidence 
of scandals arising from executive behaviour in pursuit of their bonuses.  Ackerloff and 
Shiller (2009) have shown how new forms of manipulation have arisen after each 
reform241.   
 
In some respects the financial scandals of 2008-09 were worse than the Enron Scandal.  
Enron’s losses were the product of deliberate wrongdoing that is difficult to halt under any 
system.  The sub-prime crisis was the result of the legal manipulation of an insufficiently 
regulated market.  The causes of the 2008-09 financial crisis are complex and 
apportioning blame is still a sensitive question.  However there is agreement from several 
analysts that achieving personal bonuses was a motivating factor for most of the 
participants242.  Once it is recognised that there will always be a motivation for executives 
to manipulate reporting under incentive theories, then it can be seen that there will also be 
a motivation for executives to search for new manipulations of corporate activity and 
structure, and a continual need for counter reforms. 
 
Resources such as tax accountants, corporate lawyers and remuneration consultants will 
continue to be used by self-interested executives to exploit any loophole in existing 
regulations for personal gain.  Where none exist, corporations and their products may be 
restructured to create such opportunities.  This was exemplified by the creation of the 
collateralised debt obligation (CDO) markets by trading bank executives in the post 2000 
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decade.  These products were designed to be outside existing reporting regulations.  This 
enabled the banks to report huge profits, and realised large rewards for their executives, 
but also accrued even larger unreported financial risks that led to the global financial crisis 
of 2008-09.  The crisis in turn greatly reduced share values, to the cost of shareholders, 
and was clearly not in their interest.  Manipulation of corporate reporting, and 
corresponding changes to reporting standards, will remain an ongoing struggle between 
self-interested executives and regulators.  There is no reason to believe in principle that 
this weakness of incentive theory will be eliminated by regulation of reporting.  Reform of 
the control mechanisms in corporations is required. 
 
The 2008 crisis also highlights a counter-argument to those who argue in favour of high 
executive rewards on grounds that it will improve corporate performance.  If they argue 
that executives are responsible for the financial crisis then their performance bonuses are 
a motivating factor in creating the crisis.  If they argue that executives are not primarily 
responsible for the financial crisis and the losses of their corporations during it, then they 
are also not primarily responsible for the performance of their corporation during growth 
conditions either.  In that case, the executive reward – corporate performance correlations 
calculated by Jensen and Murphy cannot form a credible justification for performance 
bonuses, or current US executive reward practices. 
 
In summary, alignment theory as defined by Jensen and Murphy represented an ambitious 
program to develop market-based executive rewards that would minimise agency costs 
and optimise shareholder returns.  It became synonymous with incentive-based share 
bonuses in executive contracts.  Its widespread adoption coincided with the dramatic and 
unjustified growth in executive rewards during the 1980s and 1990s.  There were several 
historical trends that influenced that growth.  It would be incorrect to say that the adoption 
of alignment theory (alone) caused higher executive rewards.  Alignment theory 
contributed to the trend, and is related to an underlying shift in regulatory policy.  It was 
also used as a justification for them, although the actual behaviour of executives and their 
reward levels has been an example of rent seeking.  
 
Jensen and Murphy’s alignment theories were consistent with the prevailing economic 
views of their times, but are not theoretically sound.  They are empirically based, yet rely 
on relationships that were statistically weak and declined in strength over time.  They rely 
on a circular justification that assumes executives cause corporate performance and 
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cannot explain the level of executive rewards.  They therefore do not provide an 
explanation of how they will achieve an economically efficient (minimal) level of agency 
costs.  Despite this omission Murphy in particular continually sought to defend the level of 
executive rewards in the United States, at least until they reached their post 2000 levels.  
Paradoxically, his own thorough and prolonged reporting of executive reward trends 
provides the best evidence on which to judge alignment theory.  Both economically and 
normatively, alignment theory alone cannot justify United States executive rewards 
practices.  After thirty years of implementation, alignment theory cannot be shown to 
achieve an economically efficient level for executive rewards and should be discarded. 
 
5.2 Alignment as an Incentive Theory 
 
Philosophically one way in which Jensen and Murphy’s alignment theory might be made 
more defensible is to consider it as a form of incentive theory.  I have shown that the 
application of alignment theory in the context of corporate executive rewards appears 
flawed in principle.  The difficulty with the application of incentives under alignment theory 
is that they do not resolve the imbalances in management power identified in Chapter 
Four.  However incentives more generally may still form a useful contractual form of 
reward structure.   
 
In other situations, where such management power does not exist, incentive rewards can 
form a useful contractual tool to minimise agency costs243.  Further, if they are combined 
with some regulation to contain the impact of management power, there seems no reason 
why incentive rewards might not form a useful part of efficient executive reward contracts.  
I will now consider more generally incentive theories in this context and arguments for and 
against them.  I will then examine whether a modified forms of alignment theory can be 
developed that might be more defensible for use in executive rewards. 
 
5.2.1 Defining Incentives 
Incentive theories were developed in behavioural science literature, notably by B. F. 
Skinner.  The concept is that a reward, or incentive, will be given to a subject after 
performing a desired behaviour, to encourage them to repeat the behaviour.  This may be 
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done repeatedly, to encourage the behaviour to become habit.  Incentives may be tangible 
or intangible, and internal or external, such as community recognition.  In this context, I will 
define incentives as any reward given to a worker for completing a socially beneficial task, 
that is given in such a manner that it would encourage the worker to repeat the 
performance of the socially beneficial task. 
 
Care needs to be taken in the design of incentives, to ensure that they do not result in 
unintended adverse behaviours.   Kerr244 highlighted that poorly designed incentives may 
have the effect of rewarding harmful behaviour A, while trying to encourage beneficial 
behaviour B.  Kerr cited examples of badly designed rewards in political, military, medical 
and academic reward systems.  An example of badly designed rewards from executive 
reward practices would be the payment of “golden parachute” termination payouts to 
departing executives.  These were introduced in the hope that they would align executive 
behaviour in mergers with shareholder interests.  In practice they have encouraged 
excessive risk taking, contrary to share-holder interests.  In behavioural research 
incentives are also distinguished from reinforcers, which are rewards designed to increase 
the rate of occurrence of an existing behaviour. 
 
In the case of executives increasing returns to shareholders would equate to increasing 
the social product.  Then performance based executive salaries may be justified if they act 
as incentives for executives to behave in a manner whereby shareholder returns are 
increased.  Incentive theories are forms of entitlements, and are distinct from desert 
theories that are discussed in later chapters.  To be entitled, the incentives must result in 
actions that increase shareholder returns in this case.  That is, executive rewards are not 
necessarily deserved, but may still be entitled if share returns are correspondingly 
increased. 
 
Incentives are distinct from economic rents, which represent higher than necessary 
rewards extracted by their recipient245.  Rents are by definition not economically efficient.  
Incentives intended to achieve a beneficial behaviour will be economically efficient if the 
value of the encouraged behaviour is greater than the value of the incentive, and if they 
are the most economical way to achieve the behaviour.  Hence performance bonuses paid 
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to executives would only meet the definition of incentives if they motivated social benefits 
that would not have otherwise occurred, and would only avoid categorisation as rents if 
they were the lowest level of reward required to achieve the behaviour. 
 
In principle incentive theories are forward looking not backward looking.  They rely on 
causing future improvements in social product for rewards to be justified as entitlements, 
rather than being rewards for past contributions to social product.  In this sense 
performance bonuses in executive pay might fit the concept of incentive theories, provided 
that bonuses are vested at some time in the future, when beneficial corporate performance 
can be demonstrated.  For example, the previously cited behaviour of Wall Street 
investment banks achieving short term profits by creating massive long-term risks would 
not merit reward.  The validity of this application of incentive theory to executives would 
then be an empirical question, dependant on social data after its application.  On balance 
this is the most plausible argument for using an incentive theory in the case of executive 
rewards, provided the evidence holds. 
 
Jonathon Riley has described this justification of incentive theories on grounds of 
economic efficiency as a “second best” theory, that is, it is only a partial justification, and 
IFF the empirical evidence actually supports the claim246.  There is no inherent benefit to 
the society in high rewards for leadership actions to executives in themselves, and 
arguably some dis-benefit from the effects this will have on equality in the society.  Thus 
the high rewards are only justified for the society if the high rewards lead to additional 
benefits to the society.  From Chapter Two we have seen that this is not the case for 
executive rewards in Australia and the United States (and most other nations examined).  
This disproves an incentive theory argument for executive rewards as currently practiced.  
Nevertheless it remains at least possible that an incentive based reward system for 
executives could be justified if distortions in executive labour markets and undesirable 
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5.2.2 Benefits of Incentives 
Proponents of incentive theories could point to the socially beneficial outcomes that they 
are intended to achieve.  These benefits are much broader than the reduction of agency 
costs discussed under alignment theory.  Incentives might be applied to payment for any 
task, to motivate better performance by the person(s) performing it.  Thus they may affect 
any productive activities to better utilise resources to meet a society’s needs.  This in turn 
benefits all members of the society.  This is a purely empirical argument and depends for 
its validity on whether or not the incentives do actually result in a social benefit. 
 
The widespread use of performance pay and higher rewards to corporate executives was 
one example of policies of the period of the “neo-liberal revolution” of the 1980s and 
90s247.  This period of market deregulation had been in response to the failure of 
government regulation of markets in the previous decade of the 1970s, when western 
economies were largely stagnant.  Other economic policy changes, such as tax cuts, were 
also described at the time as incentives to achieve greater social benefit, as defined by 
GDP growth.  It was claimed that tax cuts would act as incentives to work more, and raise 
GDP, thereby also indirectly raising tax revenue248. 
 
The effects of these changes were mixed, with equity declining in most western 
economies.   Economic growth was higher in Australia, but lower in some other countries.  
In the United States equity also declined and economic growth rates were higher in the 
1990s than in the 1970s, but also accompanied by severe losses from market failures249.  
The causes of economic growth in this period were multiple, and could not solely be linked 
to incentive policies.  Nevertheless, in so far as any net improvement can be linked to the 
neo-liberal revolution, deregulated markets and greater incentives are among those policy 
shifts which might be allocated some of the credit. 
 
The benefits of neo-liberalism have been greater in non-western countries.  Market 
liberalisation in China and India has created large increases in economic growth in those 
countries and improvements in welfare for millions of their population.  Critics of market 
liberalisation and neo-liberalism (including performance pay and high executive rewards) 
have sometimes criticised this on equity grounds, citing the widespread losses of low paid 
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jobs in western countries (transferred to countries such as India and China) that 
accompanied these policy shifts.  From the viewpoint of equity within individual western 
countries this may be a valid concern, as high executive rewards have accompanied lower 
real wages for many sectors of the economy, including the lowest paid workers.  However 
if we apply equity principles from a global perspective, the changes in the world economy 
have greatly benefited a far larger number of people in poorer countries such as India and 
China than those made worse off in richer countries250.  From a global viewpoint, equity 
has improved, although it has worsened within western countries. 
 
A stark example of this benefit is the comparative economic progress of North and South 
Korea since their separation in the Korean War in the 1950s.  Prior to separation both 
halves of the country were equally undeveloped and had a low standard of living after 
centuries of colonial rule by first China then Japan.  Both had the same culture, and similar 
levels of education, resources and industry.  In the decades since partition South Korea 
introduced a privately owned free market economy while North Korea adopted a state 
controlled Communist system.  By the year 2008 South Korea had become a modern 
industrialised nation with per capita incomes of $17,724US per annum, ten times higher 
than the $1161 US  per annum in North Korea251.  The advantages were not confined to 
economics. South Koreans enjoyed a better quality of life by every available measure, 
ranking 25th on the United Nations Human Development Index, compared with 75th for 
North Korea.252  This case shows that rewarding a more efficient system of resource 
allocation in a society does greatly benefit the society in the long term, and justifies 
incentive payments if they achieve greater efficiency. 
 
Critics could argue that while some incentives may create social (GDP) benefits, this does 
not justify all cases of incentives and the inequality they may create.  Lamont has pointed 
out that most studies show countries with lower levels of inequality have higher rates of 
economic growth, and vice versa253.  Krugman has shown that under increasing inequality, 
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where economic growth does occur, the benefits may be so concentrated that the majority 
do not benefit from it254.  This suggests that incentives that greatly increase inequality in a 
country do not result in social benefits. 
 
5.2.3 Incentive Theory does not require high rewards 
Jensen and Murphy both tended to defend the level of rewards paid to executives. They 
both at times acted as advisors to executive remuneration consulting firms.  Over time 
both came to be seen as advocates for high executive rewards as well as performance 
based rewards, even though both began to criticise the level of executive rewards from 
2002 onwards.  This has had the unfortunate consequence of alignment theory and 
incentives generally being closely linked with high executive rewards in the public mind.  
This need not be the case –performance based rewards may be applied to any type of 
employment contract and are not restricted to any particular level of reward.  Jensen and 
Murphy were explicit on this point – that they were not considering the level of rewards – 
from as early as Jensen and Zimmerman’s 1985 paper255. 
 
One of the reasons for the association of high rewards with performance based rewards 
was that when performance based rewards were introduced via bonus plans in the 1980s 
and 1990s, they were usually added in addition to the previous base salary for most 
executives256.  Thus when the bonuses were awarded there was an immediate inflationary 
effect on total executive rewards.  However no aspect of Incentive theory requires this to 
be the case.  The fault for this lies with the Boards of Directors that approved such bonus 
plans without adjusting base salary, and not with Jensen and Murphy’s alignment theory, 
or with Incentive theory. 
 
Critics of Incentive theory might argue that it contained causal mechanisms that led 
inevitably to higher executive rewards, even if that was not the original intention.  
Defenders of Incentive theory could counter that this is not proven, and that the need for 
further research on the consequences of the theory was never disputed.  Jensen and 
Murphy identified the need for further research in almost all of their papers.  In their later 
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papers Jensen and Murphy both began to criticise the level of executive rewards, while still 
advocating incentive-based rewards257.   
 
Jensen and Murphy could also legitimately point out that their theory was never put into 
practice in its pure form.  From their earliest papers on the topic, they identified changes to 
observed practices in setting executive rewards required to match their theory.  Over the 
years these changed from being recommendations for improvement to criticisms of 
undesirable practice. An incentive theory reward for executives applied to an undistorted 
executive labour market, is still an untried concept. 
 
Against this, as we have seen in Chapter Four, there is good reason to believe that there 
are structural forces in corporate organisation and ownership that act to prevent alignment 
theory being implemented as intended.  Thus alignment theory remains unable to be 
implemented.  However, if in future the imbalances that create management power could 
be reformed or regulated, incentive rewards of executives might then be able to be a 
feature of an undistorted executive labour market. 
 
5.2.4 Other Criticisms of Incentive Theories 
Agency theories were developed based on a meta-theory of the interests of corporations 
and executives, and empirical investigation of their performance.  However there was no 
articulated meta-theory of alignment theories in themselves, and how they might rationally 
function.  Nor was there any consideration of rational arguments against such a meta-
theory.  Redefining alignment theory as a form of incentive theory gives it a more sound 
theoretical basis, however there are still counter arguments against incentive-type 
theories, especially when used in the context of executive rewards.  In completing this 
chapter I will briefly discuss these general counter arguments to incentive theories as they 
might apply to executives.  These are not primary to this thesis, and I will not develop them 
beyond the discussion here. 
 
5.2.4.1 Confusion of Interests with Actions 
Jensen concluded that executive contracts and structured rewards could align executives’ 
interests with shareholder’s interests.  This is a significant change and false from the 
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normal agency theory viewpoint.  Agency theory (and virtually all economic theory) 
assumes individuals are rationally self-interested, in this case including both shareholders 
and executives.  No contract can change the interests of the executive, but they may make 
it instrumentally useful for the executive to act in the shareholders’ interests under a given 
set of circumstances.  If the circumstances change the relationship may break down.  
 
This difficulty remains even if alignment theory is reformulated as a form of incentive 
theory.  For purposes of analysing Jensen and Murphy’s argument further we will assume 
that incentive theory could have referred to a motivation for the alignment of executive 
actions and shareholders’ interests.  Even so, this distinction is significant and will be 
returned to in a later Chapter. 
 
The conception of shareholder interests as solely in profit maximisation is also 
philosophically problematic.  It assumes shareholders have a shared interest.  There may 
be a variety of reasons for individuals having a share of ownership of a firm.  Many 
voluntary shareholders will seek profit maximization as an objective.  However this does 
not make it their sole interest, or a common interest.  Speculative investors will seek 
maximum share price growth in the short term.  Long term investors will seek long term 
profit maximization and capital growth as their objective.  Retirees will have minimal risk 
and income security as objectives.  Shareholders may have other non-financial interests 
such as employment security, economic development and community stability.   
 
Philosophically, the conception of shareholders as a group of separate individuals having a 
common interest is inconsistent with the normal understanding of interests.  There will be a 
range of interests, some of which will be shared, most of which will include profit 
maximisation to a degree.  This reality of diffuse shareholder interests increases the ability 
for the executive to insert their own interest into decision making. 
 
5.2.4.2 Inconsistency with other Labour Market Theories 
Some criticisms of the level of executive salaries have been characterised as “sour 
grapes” or jealousy258.  However it seems a valid criticism of incentive theory, and 
executive reward practices generally, that they are inconsistent with reward practices for 
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other occupations, even within the same corporation.  It is then not surprising that 
bitterness and resentment are caused by this perceived inequity.  Although equity issues 
are not the subject of this analysis, such resentment may have a negative effect on 
corporate performance and societal wellbeing. 
 
The task of valuing the worth and appropriate salary ranges for occupations is a common 
aspect of human resource management.  There are many examples of methodologies and 
guidelines for this evaluation.  Typically, these involve evaluations of the role, knowledge 
and skill requirements, responsibilities and comparisons with other positions259.  Note that 
it is rare that the salary for an occupation would be left solely to a market mechanism, 
without some consideration of the relative worth of the role compared to other positions 
within the same organisation.  The need to maintain some degree of internal pay equity 
within organisations is also recognised in business management260. 
 
The practice of allocating a very high proportion of potential executive rewards in the form 
of performance bonuses is inconsistent with practice in most occupations.  Guidelines from 
a leading human resources consultancy261 suggested that while typical bonuses might 
range from 10% to 25% of base salary for middle managers, higher bonuses are 
recommended for executives of 50% to 60% of base salary, and for the CEO 100% of 
base salary. There seems no reason why the bonus should be so much higher a 
percentage of salary for executives than for other employees, if the principles of incentive 
theory apply to each. 
 
5.2.4.3 Alternative theories of Motivations  
Alignment or incentive theory effectively assumes that financial rewards are the sole 
motivator for executive actions, or at least can be designed so that they trump all other 
motivations for the executive.  Jensen in later writing recognised that human motivation is 
far more complex than this262.  Yet the basis of alignment theory remained that reward 
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incentives could be sufficient to overcome other motivations of agents.  There are various 
theories of motivation that would contradict this approach.  I do not propose to consider all 
such theories, but will discuss some prominent examples to demonstrate that the 
motivational assumptions of Jensen and Murphy are too narrow to be reliably assumed. 
 
The claim that higher rewards will act as an overriding incentive for executives may be 
considered from a psychological viewpoint.   One of the seminal investigations into the 
motivations that influenced employee performance in businesses was by Maslow 
(1943)263.  Maslow identified a hierarchy of psychological forces that motivated individuals.  
These were ranked from primary needs (for survival), followed by three other levels of 
“deficiency needs” to a higher level of growth needs.  Maslow’s theory was that primary 
needs had to be satisfied first, and that individuals then sought the higher level growth 
needs. 
 
Deficiency needs were defined by Maslow in ascending order as first physical needs (able 
to provide food, clothing, shelter etc), then security (certainty of position, values, 
belongings), belonging (to a group eg firm or category of executives), and finally esteem 
(respect for position).  Growth needs were described as the need for self-actualisation 
(creativity through setting direction of firm). 
 
For the executive, physical needs have probably already been satisfied in the preceding 
middle management career and are not relevant.  Security is arguably reduced for the 
executive, due to higher risk of dismissal for poor performance.  Satisfaction of the need 
for belonging is also questionable, as the holding of the power to discipline or dismiss 
other employees in a firm presumably reduces the ties of friendship to them.  Conversely, 
the existence of an “old boys club” among executives suggests that being an executive 
represents belonging to a prestige group in itself.   The desire for esteem would appear to 
be readily satisfied by executive employment for the same reason.  The satisfaction of the 
desire for self-actualisation through executive employment is considerable, with frequent 
decision making, problem solving, and the opportunity to create a new direction for a large 
complex structure of people. 
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It could be argued that executive employment also contradicts Maslow’s theory in some 
respects.  Many executive contracts represent individuals trading off deficiency needs (eg 
security of employment) for growth needs (e.g. self-actualisation/ability to direct the firm).  
The less popular aspects of executive employment (cutting cost through dismissal of staff, 
accepting salaries many times higher than fellow staff and citizens) might threaten the 
need for belonging and esteem. 
 
Maslow’s theory has been criticized by subsequent behavioral researchers.  For example, 
Wahba and Bridwell (1976)264 found that there was little empirical evidence for Maslow’s 
ranking of needs, or any apparent hierarchy.  Max-Neef (1992)265 and others have argued 
that fundamental human needs as identified by Maslow are ontologically different and 
cannot be ranked or compared.   On balance, it would be better to say that there are a 
range of different psychological needs and desires, which executive employment will 
satisfy to varying degrees.  Whether taking Maslow’s view, Max-Neef’s, or others, it does 
not seem plausible to say that additional executive salary will in itself satisfy psychological 
motivations on the part of the executive.   
 
Offering continually higher salary and incentives may simply preselect a category of 
persons to become executives, namely those who value material reward more highly than 
other motivations normally considered by persons.  This carries the risk of narrowing the 
base of corporate leadership.  It is likely to become associated with selfish and highly 
materialistic individuals, whose motivations are not representative of the norms of the 
community.  These individuals are presumably more likely to do harm to the corporation, 
and this may actually increase the principal – agent problem. 
 
I do not pretend that altruism is normal in executives or other individuals.  However there is 
a spectrum of preferences for choosing material rewards over other life goals, just as there 
is a spectrum of willingness to consider the needs of others ahead of one’s own needs.  
Incentive theory (and alignment theory) may ultimately lead to an unhealthy concentration 
of individuals at the extreme end of both spectrums in corporate leadership positions.  
Although few empirical studies have been undertaken, the evidence that is available 
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suggests that sociopathic individuals may be over-represented at the highest levels of 
organisations266.  This creates the risk that such individuals will use their position to do 
harm to the organisation and other individuals in it267.  Narrowing the base of corporate 
leaders to a particular psychological type also risks “group think” between similar 
individuals, leading to poorer decisions. 
 
It has been suggested that Australian executives seek higher salaries more in comparison 
to other executives, as a means of recognizing their comparative ability or performance268.  
That is, high salary is a means of recognizing the status of the executive amongst their 
executive peers, not their performance.  If this is the case regulations requiring the 
reporting of executive salaries as a means of restraining them would be self defeating.  
The information about salaries of executive peers would serve to motivate executives to 
seek parity with any more highly paid executive.  If executives with superior to average 
performance then received a higher salary it would result in a cycle of continual increase of 
executive salary, precisely as has been happening in the past three decades.  
 
This motivation explains the desire for continually increasing executive salaries, but does 
not justify them.  Nor does it explain why the higher salaries are agreed to.  Recognition of 
ability is an understandable desire in members of every profession, and higher salary is 
one of the means of providing it.  Yet it is not the case that salaries in every other 
profession are continually rising quickly in real terms.  Thus the desire for recognition 
might explain the motivation of executives seeking higher salaries, but does not explain 
why they are awarded.  This motivation also has the undesirable feature that executives 
may seek higher salary as proof of their ability irrespective of performance, rather than as 
a reward for performance. 
 
In summary there is good reason to believe that the assumptions about motivations 
underpinning alignment and incentive theories are too simplistic and do not adequately 
explain human behaviour.  Emotions and motivations have been a feature of research in 
                                                
266 Richard J. Pech and Bret W. Slade, "Organisational sociopaths: rarely challenged, often 
promoted. Why?" Society and Business Review (2007) Vol. 2 Iss: 3, pages 254 – 269. 
267 Clive Roland Boddy, "The dark side of management decisions: organisational psychopaths." 
Management Decision, (2006) Vol. 44 Issue 10: 1461 – 1475. 
268 Gideon Haigh, “Bad Company, the Cult of the CEO.” Quarterly Essay, Issue 10, 2003. 
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behavioural economics for several decades269.  Following the work of Ackerlof and Shiller 
(2009)270, the role of emotions is beginning to be incorporated into macro-economic 
theories.  There is a pressing need to incorporate a more complete understanding of 
human emotion and motivation into alignment and incentive theories as applied to 
executive reward, and into theories of corporate decision making more generally. 
 
5.3 Summary 
Alignment theory is the primary market-based explanation of executive rewards.  Starting 
from the understanding of agency costs in common with management power theory, 
alignment theory as conceived by Jensen and Murphy holds that it is possible to align the 
interests of principals and agents by structuring the agent’s rewards to provide incentives 
to act to meet the principal’s objectives.  In the case of corporate executives, this would be 
done via the awarding of performance-based share-options, whose value would rise with 
the performance, and thus the share price, of the corporation. 
 
Alignment theory as proposed by Jensen and Murphy assumes that both share markets 
and executive labour markets are informationally efficient.  The theoretical attraction of this 
is that, if this is the case, then alignment theories allow the achieving of an economically 
efficient minimisation of agency costs without external interference or regulation.  This also 
requires the assumption that share prices are causally influenced by the executive’s 
performance.  As we saw in Chapter Two, there was weak evidence of this in Australia, 
and evidence that this assumption was false in the United States. 
 
Proponents of alignment theory have argued that executive rewards as implemented did 
not match alignment theory and so the outcomes do not disprove the theory.  However 
after almost three decades of application of incentive-based rewards for executives, as a 
minimum it seems clear that the market will not adopt efficient levels of such rewards 
without external oversight.  This is contrary to the predictions of alignment theory, and 
suggests that at least some degree of management power must be at work in the 
executive labour market.  
 
                                                
269 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." 
Econometrica (The Econometric Society) (1979) 47 (2): 263–291. 
270 George A. Ackerlof, and Robert J. Shiller, (2009). 
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In addition to the practical concerns, there remain serious theoretical concerns with 
alignment theory.  The charge of circular reasoning remains, in that unless corporate 
performance is due to the efforts of the executive, and the share market and executive 
labour markets are both efficient, the theory is not sound.  Even if these assumptions were 
all true, other problems would remain.  Alignment theory can only determine the relative 
level of executive rewards appropriate through comparison to other corporations.  It cannot 
determine what the average level of executive rewards should be, which is the primary 
issue of public concern.  Moreover, since alignment theory seems to offer no way to 
minimise executive rewards, it cannot define an economically efficient solution, since 
executive rewards are also agency costs that must be minimised to achieve an efficient 
outcome. 
 
Alignment theory may be improved by defining it more broadly in the context of incentive 
theories.  There is no in-principle difficulty with the use of incentives in reward structures.  
Incentive rewards could be used in a reformed executive labour market.  However these 
need to be developed in the context of a broader understanding of human motivation than 
exists in agency theory, which underpins alignment theory.  Potential exists for this in the 
expanding field of behavioural economics, however this will require a substantial revision 
of both agency and alignment theories.  In the absence of such a revised theory, there 
seems no prospect that the application of alignment theory in isolation will result in a level 
of executive rewards that is justified or economically efficient.  
 
In the next chapter I will examine the remaining economic theories that are applied to 
executive rewards.  These are not comprehensive theories of corporate decision-making 
and rewards comparable to agency theory, management power and alignment theories, 
however they are sometimes used to explain executive reward trends in the relevant 
literature.  I will then proceed to consider the policy implications for these economic 
theories, in the light of the evidence of current trends discussed in Chapter Two, and the 
philosophical understanding of justifiable rewards discussed in Chapter Three. 
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6 Other Economic Theories 
 
I have now discussed the main philosophical and economic theories used to analyse and 
justify the trends in executive rewards identified in Chapter Two.  Before addressing the 
policy implications arising from these theories and possible solutions, I will complete the 
survey of relevant theories with a discussion of other economic theories that have 
sometimes been raised in the context of executive rewards.  I do not regard these theories 
as comprehensive philosophical or economic explanations of current practice, as will be 
explained in this chapter.  They are all “market-based” theories of executive reward 
practice, although they do not all lead to the  conclusion that the executive rewards market 
is economically efficient.  In reviewing them, my aim is to highlight a number of practical 
issues that will be relevant to any policy formulation for executive rewards. 
 
6.1 Economics of Superstars Theory 
6.1.1 Definition of Theory 
The economic theory most commonly used to explain large differentials in the earnings of 
individuals is Sherwin Rosen’s “Economics of Superstars” theory271.  Like alignment theory 
and management power, this theory has been raised to explain the existence of high 
levels of executive reward, but it is not an ethical justification of them.  If true, it offers an 
economic explanation of why it might be rational for shareholders to pay high rewards to 
executives given the returns on investment they might then achieve. 
 
Rosen’s theory was based on analysis of fields, notably sporting, arts and entertainment, 
where “superstar” performers earn rewards far greater than the average reward for that 
field.  The potential incomes in these fields have the character of prizes in a tournament, 
with a comparatively small number of prizes relative to a large number of competitors.  The 
majority of competitors who don’t receive a prize then earn comparatively little.  This 
theory is also referred to as “tournament theory” as further developed by economist 
Edward Lazear272.  The distribution of rewards is therefore not proportional to effort, with 
                                                
271 Sherwin Rosen, “The superstar effect – The Economics of Superstars.” American Economic 
Review, 71 (1981). 
272 Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen, “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor 
Contracts.” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 5, (October 1981), pp. 841-864. 
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little or no reward going to most competitors, and the only significant rewards being gained 
by prize winners. 
 
If a competitor has a difference in ability that makes them consistently more likely to win 
the prize, then they will gain a large share of rewards compared to other competitors, even 
if the difference in performance is small.  In economic terms the rewards are likely to be 
distributed according to relative differences in ability between individuals competing in the 
field, and not according to their absolute level of ability or marginal productivity as I defined 
in Chapter Three. 
 
It has been recognized in economic analysis by Rosen (1983) that in such highly 
competitive fields, a slight edge in performance may create a significant increase in the 
chance of competitive success.  Where there is a market to employ such performers it is 
rational for a potential employer to recruit these “superstar” performers, even if paying 
them a reward premium.  An employer of the superstar (or the superstar themselves if 
effectively self-employed) can charge users or spectators a premium fee for the 
performance.  Thus high rewards for superstars might be in the rational self-interest of 
their employer. This allows superstar performers and their employers to gain a reward 
premium far greater than the actual difference in performance. 
 
In philosophical analysis of distributive justice, the concept that a person or resource will 
consistently receive a reward greater than that needed to employ them is referred to as 
economic rent.  “Rent” as defined in this fashion may be gained due to shortages, 
positional advantages or some other structural cause in the market.  In each case though, 
economic rent represents a level of reward beyond that which would be deserved by the 
person or resource on grounds of desert alone.  Thus the higher level of reward may be 
rational economically, but not justified philosophically. 
 
Rosen and others demonstrated that this pattern of rewards applied to a number of fields, 
including sports, music, writing, acting, and media presentation.  Any field where there is 
non-rival consumption, and a wide range of performers can be selected from by 
consumers who will only make a limited number of choices, will encourage the 
employment of “superstar” performers.  For the same performance cost a superior 
performance will be consumed by a wider audience, generating a higher revenue.  For 
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example, Krueger (2004)273 found that the top 5% of concert performers earned over 60% 
of concert revenue in the United States.  The question remains as to whether the 
executive labor market shares these characteristics. 
 
This theory could be applied to executive rewards in one of two ways, which I will consider 
separately: 
1. that highly rewarded executives are superstar earners within their field and thus attract 
a reward premium over other executives; or 
2. that corporate executives are superstars within the broader field of business 
management and attract a reward premium over lower level business managers who 
do not reach the level of executive.   
 
6.1.2 Executives as Superstars within their Field 
For this version of Rosen’s theory to hold for corporate executives, there would need to be 
a large dispersion between the salaries of executives, with the highest performing 
“superstar” executives being paid considerably more than average executives.  The 
difference in earnings could then be explained by the presumed difference in performance 
between the worst and best performing executives. 
 
Empirically, there is evidence of a large dispersion in rewards in the executive pay market.  
The executive pay markets in Australia and the United States are not normally distributed, 
with the highest paid examples earning several times more than lowly ranked executives 
earn. This pattern in CEO and executive income for the 300 largest Australian corporations 
in 2008-09 is shown in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 Australian CEO and Executive Pay Distribution, 2009274  
 
The differences in earnings are significant both across and within levels. The highest paid 
CEOs are paid much more than the average CEOs. The highest paid other executives are 
paid much more than the average for other executives.  There tended to be a smaller 
dispersion in rewards between CEOs and executives within a particular corporation.   
 
The pattern for United States data appears to be similar to that shown in Figure 6.1.  
Gabaix and Landier (2008)275 argued that CEO pay is normally determined by the size of 
[their] firm and aggregate size of firms in the market.  They found that the empirical data 
for the six fold growth in market capitalisation of (US) firms from 1980 to 2003 matched the 
six fold increase in CEO pay over the same time.  Gabaix and Landier found that, in such 
a market, a small dispersion in CEO talent justified large pay differences.  That is, if a 
better performing CEO increased a corporation’s performance, it was rational for a larger 
corporation to offer them a larger reward to attract them to the larger corporation, so that 
their performance benefit could be applied to the outputs of a larger corporation. 
 
In reaching this conclusion Gabaix and Landier assumed that differences in executive and 
CEO performance were responsible for differences in corporate performance.  Hence their 
research is vulnerable to all the criticisms identified previously for such circular 
assumptions in incentive theory research.  In assuming that CEO pay is proportional to 
                                                
274 Source: Productivity Commission Inquiry: Executive Remuneration in Australia, 2009, Chapter 
3, Figure 3.3.  Data Source: Financial Review. Companies are ranked in size from left (largest) to 
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275 Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier, “Why has CEO Pay Increased so Much?” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, MIT Press vol.123(1) , (2008)  pages 49-100. 
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firm size, Gabaix and Landier have also implicitly adopted Marshall’s management power 
hypothesis and the criticisms associated within it.  That is, market rewards are not proof of 
“superstar” performance, but are proof of the exercising of management power. 
 
The economics of superstars theory has been applied to CEOs more directly by 
Malmendier and Tate (2009)276.  They examined subsequent performance for CEOs 
identified as “superstars” by their earnings and other measures of status.  Their finding 
was that “superstar” CEOs, although paid significantly more than others, did not show a 
performance differential in their corporation to account for this level of reward or status.  
Overall the financial consequences to shareholders of engaging superstar CEOs were 
found to be negative.   
 
Similarly Main, O’Reilly and Wade (1993)277 surveyed over two hundred UK firms and 
found that the dispersion in executive rewards between firms was consistent with a 
tournament theory but the dispersion in executive rewards within a firm (top five 
executives) was not.  The degree of dispersion or collectivism in executive rewards within 
a firm may partly be explained by the degree of collectivism or competitiveness in the 
business culture for that nation. 
 
Considered at the level of comparing CEOs and executives between firms, if exceptional 
CEOs can generate exceptional performance for their firm, this theory would predict (but 
not justify) a large range in CEO salaries, ranging from very low for poor to average 
executives, to very high for exceptional executives. Bebchuck and Grinstein argue that the 
actual distribution of CEO salaries is not as would be predicted by this theory278.  While 
there are some CEOs paid more than others, none are paid poorly, and the average salary 
for CEOs is exceptional. 
 
There are theoretical reasons why CEOs and corporate executives more generally do not 
seem an appropriate application of the theory of the economics of superstars.  The nature 
of the CEO and corporate executive markets is far less transparent and not directly 
consumer led like the sorts of markets for which the theory was developed.  Rosen 
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developed his superstar theory for markets such as entertainment and professional 
athletes.  In these markets, consumers evaluate performances that are widely transmitted 
and reported and select their preference directly based on those performances.  The 
markets are highly transparent and competitive.  Failed entertainers and athletes are 
quickly discarded by music companies and sporting clubs.  For entertainers in particular 
consumption is non-rivalrous in that purchase of a star’s music by one consumer does not 
prevent its purchase by another consumer.  Their rewards reflect their market potential, 
which can be individually measured.   
 
For executives the market and consumption effect is very different.  “Consumption” by the 
corporation is exclusive, preventing an executive from working for another corporation.  
Shareholders do not check the performance of candidates before directors select them.  
The executive labour market itself is far less transparent than the entertainment and sports 
labour markets.  Recruiting is rarely competitive between executives with “head-hunting” 
employment agencies seeking out candidates rather than all competing on an open market 
for advertised positions. Corporations are large group activities where it is difficult to 
measure the marginal product of any one executive.   Entertainment and sports markets 
are either individual or small group actions where the performance of individuals can be 
easily assessed. 
 
Overall then, differences in reward between CEOs and executives of different corporations 
does suggest that some form of tournament or prize system is operating, but does not 
support it as an example of Rosen’s superstar theory.  First the differences in reward 
between the highest and lowest paid executives are far less than those cited by Rosen in 
music and sports, where the highest paid are millionaires and the lowest paid may struggle 
to earn the average wage.  By comparison, all executives in an Australian and American 
context are paid many times the average wage.  Second there is no indication that the 
highest paid executives are correlated with the best performing corporations.  The 
strongest correlation is between size of corporation and size of executive rewards, 
suggesting management power rather than superstar economics is the causal factor. 
  
6.1.3 Executives as Superstars within Management 
A more plausible interpretation of Rosen’s economics of superstars theory as applied to 
the executive labour market would be to see all executives as superstars in the broader 
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field of business management.  Executives would then be assumed to be the best 
performed managers, having worked their way through the ranks of management to obtain 
an executive position279.  The small number of executive positions relative to the many 
thousands of management positions in most industries would then explain a large 
dispersion of rewards between the two. 
 
This conception of the theory has the advantage that there clearly is a large difference in 
rewards between middle and lower level managers and executives.  Management 
employment streams now comprise a significant percentage of all of the labour market 
participants in the economies of both Australia (over 7% of workers) and the United States 
(over 5% of workers).  Manager incomes are much less than that of executives, though still 
higher on average than for any other group, including professionals, both in Australia280 
and the United States281.  In the 2008 United States occupational wage survey manager 
incomes were more than double the national average. 
 
However we have no way to know whether the difference between executive and middle 
management wages is due to performance.  In absolute terms the same problem identified 
in Chapter Three for executives remains for lower level managers – we cannot determine 
a marginal product for the leader of a group.  The situation is worse in comparative terms 
than for executives.  There is no available data to indicate whether differences in lower 
and middle level managerial rewards, as opposed to executives, are correlated with their 
performance relative to other lower and middle level managers. 
 
In summary then, Rosen’s superstar theory cannot be credibly be used to explain 
executive rewards.  There is a large dispersion of executive rewards as the theory would 
suggest.  However this dispersion cannot be shown to be due to superior performance on 
the part of the highest rewarded executives, because the performance of executives and 
managers as a whole does not correlate with their incomes.  Nor can the superstar theory 
explain why the rewards of all executives are much higher than average.  Under the 
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superstar theory the poorest performers should receive below average rewards, which is 
not the case.   
 
Comparing executive rewards with rewards of lower and middle level managers does not 
resolve either problem.  There is no database with which to show that the rewards and 
performance of lower and middle level managers are correlated.  It is not possible to 
identify what their marginal product is, or how it compares to the contribution of executives.  
Lower and middle level manager rewards are still above average for both Australia and the 
United States, which is contrary to the tournament prize theory.   
 
6.1.4 Incentive Argument for Superstar Theory  
A broader incentive theory interpretation of superstar theory could be considered for 
executives.  In this large executive rewards would act as a tournament prize not only for 
incumbent executives, but for all those in management careers aspiring to executive 
positions.  That is, the incentives have a motivating effect on the whole apparatus of 
business management.  
 
From a philosophical viewpoint this theory, if proven for executives, would give a 
consequentialist justification for the quantum and structure of executive rewards.  Unlike 
claims about the effect on corporate performance of individual executives, it does seem 
plausible that better  motivating all business managers would improve overall corporate 
performance.  This motivating effect would presumably include more junior managers as 
well as executives.  Defining executives as superstars in the management career stream 
then has a much stronger justification than incentive theories for executives.  This would 
benefit both shareholders and the community as a whole. 
 
Considered at the level of comparative salary within firms, this theory might justify a wide 
variation of salaries between CEOs and other corporate executives, and between 
executives and other employees.  In this case, the position and salary of the CEO could 
act as a prize that executives compete for, motivating higher performance from the 
executives, to the benefit of the corporation (Benjamin 2002).  While this application of the 
theory would implicitly acknowledge that CEO salaries were not justified by the 
performance of the individual in the role of CEO, it would justify high executive reward if 
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the overall performance of corporate executives and managers as a group produced a 
corresponding benefit to the shareholder and/or community.  
 
Against this, the incentive justification only holds if the positive benefits of such incentives 
are not outweighed by other negative consequences.  These would include resentment 
created among lower paid colleagues, and the risk that internal competition for executive 
and CEO positions might cause some individuals to act in a destructive manner towards 
the corporation. Khurana (2002)282 cites examples where “superstar” CEOs were 
disastrous for the corporations that hired them.  He suggests that the desire to have a 
“superstar” CEO is in itself a mistake, based on an overly emotional approach to 
leadership that does not rest on rational analysis. 
 
The empirical evidence in Chapter Two suggests that on the whole the negatives do 
outweigh the positives.  The countries with lower multiples of rewards between average 
wages and CEOs had better corporate performance (average returns to shareholders) 
than the countries with higher ratios of average to CEO wages. This does not prove that 
the disparity in rewards within corporations was the cause of the lower performance, but 
conversely, there is no evidence that the incentive version of the superstar theory is true. 
 
6.1.5 Other Consequences of Tournament Prizes 
This leads to consideration of further counter-arguments against superstar theories for 
executive rewards.  Rosen’s theory suggests that rewards for executives would motivate 
high performing managers by their potential to become executives, and high performing 
executives by their potential to become CEO.  Yet such promotions across management 
streams appear to be becoming rare.   
 
Balogun and Johnson (2004)283 considered that management and executive management 
are both becoming increasingly specialised, with executives having studied for and 
embarked on that career path early in their working life.  The number of manager positions 
in most organisations is now very large, and the likelihood of a manager being promoted to 
an executive is correspondingly small.  As executives and managers become increasingly 
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separate career streams, the potential for advancement breaks down, undermining the 
rational for executive and CEO positions to be seen as prizes in a tournament game. 
 
Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988)284 spoke against the idea of promotion from middle 
management to executive level as a tournament prize.  They warned that it “will result in 
type-B employees being promoted to top 
management, which is clearly inconsistent with optimal matching ”.  For Baker, Jensen and 
Murphy direct performance incentives being paid for each manager at every level were 
preferable to executive rewards being an incentive in a tournament type promotional 
contest.  
 
This trend will also have a consequent demotivating effect on non-management career 
streams.  As the ABS and Bureau of Labor Statistics data demonstrated285 management 
rewards are now already higher than for any other career stream, including professions 
such as medicine, law and engineering, which also require highly talented individuals to 
practice.  If all persons are motivated by financial self-interest as the superstar justification 
for executive rewards assumes, this will have a negative effect on the quality of labour for 
other fields and hence the performance of non-executive employees in the corporation, 
who will feel correspondingly devalued.   
 
Further, there will then be a corresponding cost to the wider society, from the lack of high 
quality applicants into complex fields that are necessary but outside private financial 
markets.  This will particularly affect social services.  In recent decades labour shortages 
have emerged in several such fields in Australia and the United States, notably in 
medicine, nursing, teaching, science and engineering.  This will harm the quality of social 
services in the case of health care, and the long-term economic performance of the society 
in the case of teaching, science and engineering. 
 
Overall the economics of superstars may offer a more defensible market justification of 
executive rewards than incentive theories, especially by defining executive positions as 
tournament prizes in the management career stream.  However we have good reasons to 
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question that the economics of superstars theory explains current executive labour market 
practice.  Empirical evidence on individual performance is difficult to isolate in order to 
prove the case.  Analysts who favour this explanation again make the circular assumption 
that differences in corporate performance are due to, and therefore indicators of executive 
performance.  As with Jensen and Murphy’s incentive theories, this is at best unprovable 
and at worst false.   
 
Even if the evidence suggests that the theory did apply, it might explain a high dispersion 
in executive earnings, but still would not explain the very high level of average CEO and 
executive rewards.  Ultimately then, superstar theory may be the best market explanation 
of why executive rewards are at their current level but, without a better link between 
performance and pay, it does not justify them philosophically.  In addition, there is nothing 
in the superstar theory to disprove the management power thesis. 
 
6.2 Historical Argument 
This argument has been proposed by Jensen & Murphy (1990), and Nichols and 
Subramanian (2001)286 based on empirical analysis of corporate performance and 
executive salaries over three decades.  It recognizes the large rise in corporate executive 
salaries in the 1980s and 1990s.   The argument is that corporate executives of today are 
not overpaid, but rather that their predecessors (presumably in the 1970s) were underpaid. 
Hence their salaries may still be economically efficient, and therefore justified. 
 
This is a purely empirical and comparative argument, based on a type of contribution 
theory.  As such, it is vulnerable to a number of criticisms of the empirical claims.  Firstly, it 
is a circular argument that effectively assumes the conclusion.  It only validates current 
executive rewards in comparison to the past by assuming that past reward practice was 
too low.  The question arises by what criteria were the past rewards considered to be too 
low?  As stated, it is in comparison to present rewards, which are therefore implicitly 
assumed to be reasonable.  In itself this argument does not prove either that current 
rewards are reasonable, or that past rewards were too low. 
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Secondly, empirically this argument can only be true at a point in time, and does not justify 
defence of any subsequent changes in rewards practice.  In the time since it was originally 
proposed in 1990 by Jensen and Murphy and again in 2001 by Nichols and Subramanian, 
executive rewards increased in real terms afterwards in both cases.  If the executive 
rewards of 1990s levels were considered justified by Jensen and Murphy in comparison to 
executive rewards of the 1970s, then executive rewards of the year 2000 should have 
been regarded as too high in comparison to the 1990s.  Likewise if Nichols and 
Subramanian argue that executive reward levels of the year 2000 were justified compared 
to the 1990s, subsequent rises to a higher level were therefore not justified in comparison 
to 2000 levels. 
 
Thirdly, it cannot take into account the many other performance factors that may have 
changed which would invalidate comparisons across time.  Nichols and Subramanian 
(2001) have argued that it is not valid to compare CEO pay with other worker’s pay or 
corporate performance.  They offer no sound reason for this claim, but even if accepted it 
still fails to answer the basic question: what is a satisfactory comparison base to assess 
executive compensation against? 
 
Long term evidence on US executive salaries by Frydman and Saks (2005)287 suggests 
that the situation is far more complex than the historical arguments assumes.  The 
evidence shows that real rates of pay for executives were much lower in the 1970s than in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  However, this does not prove that executives were underpaid in the 
1970s.  Frydman and Saks argue that other changes, particularly to taxation policy, made 
current practices of granting stock options to executives unattractive prior to the 1970s.  
Differences in the regulatory, taxation and international trade environments made larger 
profits, and larger executive rewards possible since then.   
 
Further, while that might explain how such levels of reward became possible, it does not 
morally justify them, or mean they are economically rational or efficient.  Corporate 
performance in terms of returns to shareholders was generally poorer in the 1970s than 
the 1980s or 1990s.  Earlier still in the 1950s though, returns to shareholders (capital 
growth and dividends) were both higher, but executive salaries were not.  If the 1950s 
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were taken as the base for comparison, then executives from the 1980s to the present 
were all paid too highly. 
 
In summary this empirical claim, whether proven or not, is not in itself a justification for any 
particular level of executive reward, past or present.  To say that a particular level of 
executive reward is justified by comparison with some other level of executive reward is a 
circular argument.  It assumes that one level of reward or the other is justified.  Yet it is not 
justified in comparison to any external measure, such as the levels of reward in the rest of 
the society, or in comparison to the increase in shareholder or social value created by the 
executive.  The historical argument is neither an economic nor a moral justification for any 
level of executive reward. 
 
6.3 Supply and Demand 
 
Another argument raised for high corporate rewards by economists such as Robert 
Frank288 and executives themselves289 is that it is a response to supply and demand 
pressures in the executive labour market. This is based on the normal theory of 
equilibrating markets and explains the continued trend of corporate executive rewards to 
rise. According to economic theory any field where resources are in demand, including 
labour markets, will see a rise in the price asked for the resource, so that those with the 
greatest demand for the resource will acquire the resources available.  The market will 
then adjust so that more resources enter that field.  In the long term the price will then 
adjust down again so that returns to those resources equate to normal levels of reward.   
 
This explanation has been most recently examined by Gabaix and Landier (2008)290.  
Parallel with the growth in executive rewards during the 1990s was a corresponding 
growth in the size of corporations. This increased the competition and demand for top 
executive talent, driving up the level of rewards in the executive labour market.  The trend 
in United States executive rewards (blue and green lines) and share market value (red 
line) is shown in Figure 6.1.  Reward growth matches company size. 
                                                
288 Robert H. Frank, “Should Congress Put a Cap on Executive Pay?” New York Times, 3 January, 
2009. 
289 Jack Welsh and Suzy Welsh, “CEO Pay: No Easy Answer.” Bloomsberg Businessweek, 3 July 
2008. 
290 Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier (2008), page 85. 
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Figure 6.1 US Executive Rewards and Market Capitalisation291  
 
Supply and demand is a market-based theory of executive rewards.  It is an explanation 
for apparent data, though the data does not in itself represent proof of the theory.  
Assuming that data on rising executive rewards indicates rising demand does not prove 
that is the cause of the reward increase, unless it can be shown that the demand for 
executives is also rising, or the supply is falling. Where a market price increases without 
evidence of rising demand or falling supply it is generally seen as evidence of rent-seeking 
behaviour, and a market that is not perfectly competitive.  Such markets will not deliver 
efficient outcomes that would be socially optimal. 
 
The difficulty with fitting this theory to executive rewards is that there is not a reliable data 
source on the number of executives available in the labour market.  Gabaix and Landier 
modelled executive rewards against the size of firms and the population of countries.  In 
doing this they assumed, but did not prove, that demand for executives rises with the size 
and number of corporations, and that the supply of executives rises with population.  None 
of these assumptions were proven.  Moreover there are counterexamples in the data, such 
as countries that have large corporations but lower executive rewards (Japan) and 
                                                
291 Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier (2008), Figure 1, page 69. 
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countries with small executive labour markets but very high executive rewards 
(Switzerland). 
 
There may be a valid case to say that the demand for corporate executives has grown in 
recent decades.  The relative proportion of the world’s economic activity carried out by 
large corporations has been growing in the long term292.  This trend has accelerated since 
the end of the cold war. There has been the replacement of former Communist economies 
with market-based capitalist economies containing privately owned corporations.  Within 
OECD countries, the trend has been to reduce the proportion of government spending 
(other than welfare) and privatize formerly government-owned services as profit making 
corporations.   
 
The size of individual corporations has also grown in real terms, with 51 of the 100 largest 
economic entities in the world being corporations by the year 2000293.  Within each 
corporation, while other staff functions have typically been “downsized” or “outsourced” 
throughout the 1990s, there appears to be no trend to do this to executive positions.  Thus 
overall there are more and larger corporations than before, and therefore a need for more 
executives. 
 
However if the demand for corporate executives has risen, the apparent supply has risen 
even more dramatically.  The number of persons being educated in the disciplines seen as 
entry level qualifications into business management careers – accountancy, business, 
economics and law – have greatly increased in all OECD countries in recent decades294.  
If these are the skills required, then the supply of labour has increased to the point where 
some correction in the price of executive labour would be expected.  If the supply of 
persons with the required skills to be an executive has not increased after two decades of 
constant increases in executive salary, this is contrary to normal labour market theory and 
raises the question of what blocks or prevents increases in the skill supply. 
 
                                                
292 See J.K. Galbraith, “New Industrial State.” (San Diego: Houghton Mifflin 1967). 
293 Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh, “Report on the Top 200 Corporations.” Institute for Policy 
Studies, 2000. 
294 In Australia in 2004 there were 945,000 university students, of which 267,000 were studying 
management or commerce.  This exceeded the combined total for all students in education, 
engineering and health disciplines (260,000).  Source: Commonwealth Department of Education, 
Science and Training. 
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There is no obvious reason why increasing the supply of corporate executives should be 
unusually difficult.  There is not the same long period of uncompensated and costly 
education other professions require, such as medicine, law or academic careers.  
Business degrees are typically shorter (3 years) than professional degrees (4 to 7 years).  
In many cases executives have not done any formal tertiary study.  Business executives 
will typically have worked in paid positions in middle-management before becoming 
executives.  Thus the “opportunity cost” of a business executive career would appear to be 
low, since it represents the culmination of a previous (well-paid) management career. 
 
There do not appear to be any structural barriers to entry of the field.  To date there are no 
formal qualifications required in any OECD country to act as the executive of a 
corporation.  Possession of qualifications such as degrees in accountancy, law and MBAs 
is growing295, although by no means predominant, even among CEOs of the largest 
corporations.  Academic entry requirements for business programs in Australia tend to be 
lower than for professional and scientific degrees in most universities.  Studies of the 
effects of formal education in business leaders have shown little relationship between level 
of study (eg MBA programs) and level of business success or income296.  This does not 
support the argument that the knowledge required to run a corporation is exceptionally 
complex or difficult to acquire. 
 
Some might argue that the critical skills for success as an executive are not gained from 
formal education.  If so this leaves two possibilities – either the required skills are inherent 
qualities that cannot be taught, or they can be learnt through experience in the business 
concerned.  If the required skills are inherent, then the executive labour market is an 
example of a market where economic rents are being extracted by individuals possessing 
them.   
 
If the skills are learnt from experience, it is in the rational self-interest of corporations to 
train individuals to become future executives.  If there has not been a sufficient number of 
future replacements trained, so that there is a shortage of labour with executive skills, it 
would seem perverse to reward executives with higher rewards now because of their own 
                                                
295 By 2002 there were over 140,000 MBA graduates each year in the United States. 
296 Jeffrey Pfeffer and Christina T. Fong, “The end of business schools? Less success than meets 
the eye.” Academy of Management Learning & Education, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Sep., 2002), pages 78-95 
2002; and 
Andy Raskin, “What’s an MBA Really Worth?”, July 2002, published on-line at 
www.business2.com  
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or previous executives’ past failure to train sufficient replacements.  The continuation of 
such a skill shortage would suggest the use of management power by executives to 
protect their own position at the expense of shareholders. 
 
In fact there is evidence that salary expectations are a significant but by no means 
determining factor in the career choices of school leavers297.  This is true even in places of 
comparative economic hardship298. Major factors influencing choice include educational 
performance and opportunities, family environment, advice of school counsellors and 
friends, location, gender, nationality and ethnicity299.  A career being able to generate a 
sufficient salary to live on was a factor, but maximising salary was not usually the primary 
motivation in career choice.  It would appear that the claim that the “best talent” can be 
attracted to a career simply by offering very high rewards is empirically false. 
 
The comparative lack of influence of salary over career choice means that it is possible 
that the supply of persons capable of being executives into the executive labour market 
has not increased in the past three decades. In that case, if demand has risen, executive 
rewards would rise due to supply and demand.  However the corollary of this is that if the 
supply is insensitive to price in the long term, contrary to economic theory, then there was 
no corporate or societal benefit to raising executive rewards.  Thus at best, if supply and 
demand is the cause of increased executive rewards, it is also evidence of market failure.   
 
Further, this is not to say that the case for supply and demand being the cause is proven.  
It still assumes that demand is insufficient, presumably because executives have rare and 
unique talents that cannot be developed by training.  Reinhardt (2009) dismisses this 
claim: 
                                                
297 Monika Merz, and Axel Schimmelpfennig, “Career Choices for German High School Graduates: 
Evidence from the German Socio-economic panel.” European University Institute, Economic 
working papers 1999/011 (1999). 
298 E. A. Mugonzibwa, E. N. Kikwilu, P.N. Rugarabamu, and M. K. Ntabaye, “Factors influencing 
career choice among high school students in Tanzania.”, Journal of Dental Education, vol 64, Issue 
6 (2000) pages 423-429. 
299 James Athanasou, “Young People in Transition: Factors influencing the educational-vocational 
pathways of Australian school-leavers.” Education + Training, Volume 43, Number 3 (2001) pages 
132-138. 
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“As a general proposition, of course, that argument may be no more valid than the idea 
that the supply of potential gold-medal winners at the Olympics is roughly equal to the 
number of athletes who actually won gold medals. But economists rest their case on it.”300 
 
Economists have also made other criticisms of this theory as an explanation for executive 
rewards.  The supply and demand theory only explains the rewards for executives rising to 
such high levels if it is assumed that the executive is the primary determinant of corporate 
performance.  Reinhardt refers to this as the “lone ranger theory of management”301.  I 
have already shown in Chapters Two and Three why this assumption is false. 
 
In summary supply and demand is not an adequate explanation of reward practice.  It 
cannot explain the differences in reward levels between the United States and other large 
corporate markets.  Nor can it explain why the rising trend in rewards has continued for 
such a long period of time without a major market correction.  If the skills required for 
executives are unique then it is at best an explanation of market failure.  If those skills are 
trainable then it is proof of the abuse of management power.  Supply and demand may be 
discarded as a plausible explanation of executive reward trends.  In addition, it leads us to 
another recognised labour market phenomena that has implications for executive rewards, 
but has not been adequately considered to date. 
 
6.4 Income and Substitution Effects 
 
The incentive argument assumes that the predominant motivation influencing the 
behaviour of corporate executives is the desire for personal financial reward in the form of 
salary.  A bonus (higher) reward is then assumed to increase the degree to which the 
executive works for the corporation’s interests.  This ignores the fact that there are two 
recognized effects on the supply of any type of product (including labour) from an increase 
in the price of that product – an income effect and a substitution effect.  These effects of 
price changes were defined in micro-economic theory by Hicks (1939)302. 
 
                                                
300 Uwe Reinhardt, “Supply, Demand and Executive Pay.” New York Times, 6 February 2009. 
301 Uwe Reinhardt, (2009). 
302 J. R. Hicks, “Value and Capital: An Inquiry into Some Fundamental Principles of Economic 
Theory.” (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1939, 2nd ed. 1946). 
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For labour markets, the income effect means that an increase in labour income will make 
workers more willing to work in that field, increasing the supply of labour.  Conversely the 
substitution effect means that the increased income per unit of work supplied will also 
allow at least some workers in that field to reduce their hours of work and receive the 
same income.  They may prefer to substitute some of their work hours for leisure hours, 
thereby increasing their total utility.  Thus it is not certain that increasing the price of labour 
in a field will increase the supply of labour.  The net outcome will depend on the relative 
size of the income and substitution effects.   
 
The income effect is at its greatest when incomes are low, so that an increase in labour 
price greatly increases the attractiveness of the work.  Conversely when the income for a 
field is already very high, further increases are unlikely to greatly influence a person’s 
choice to work in it, and so the income effect is then low.  For the substitution effect, the 
opposite is the case.   We would expect that at very high incomes the income effect will 
eventually become marginal and will be exceeded by the substitution effect.  Yet for the 
incentive argument to be true for executives, it must always be the case that the income 
effect is greater than the substitution effect in the executive labour market.  Logically, this 
is likely to be false given the high level of executive rewards. 
 
If the substitution effect outweighs the income effect this will adversely influence the 
overall corporate labour market. If incentive bonuses are made too high then the amount 
of labour willing to be supplied by each individual executive may begin to decrease.  
Executives may choose to work for a shorter tenure, increasing recruiting costs.  Assuming 
a diminishing marginal utility of income, the higher the level of rewards for executives, the 
greater this impact will be. 
 
There is evidence that the era of continuously rising executive rewards led to a reduction 
in the average amount of work contributed by executives.  While there is no available 
evidence on reduction in the working hours of executives, the length of tenure of CEOs in 
the United States declined.  CEO tenure reduced by 23% during the period 1995 to 
2001303.  CEOs were retiring younger, and having shorter careers.  Hasenhutl and 
                                                
303 Chuck Lucier, Eric Siegel and Rob Schuyt, “Why CEOs Fall: The Causes and Consequences of 
Turnover at the Top.” (New York: Booz Allen & Hamilton 2002). 
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Harrison (2002)304 looked at firm specific data and found that higher CEO salary did not 
increase CEO retention, and the awarding of stock options appeared to increase CEO 
turnover.  This represented a significant cost to corporations, as recruiting CEOs was 




A review of these remaining economic theories commonly used to explain executive 
rewards shows a varying degree of validity.  CEO rewards have been compared to 
economic theories for the rewards of superstars.  CEO and executive rewards are widely 
distributed as the economics of superstars theory would suggest.  However the high 
average reward for executives, and the inability to correlate rewards with performance, 
invalidates superstar theory as an explanation for executive rewards.   
 
Historical data has been used to attempt to justify current executive rewards by comparing 
with executive rewards in past eras.  Such historical arguments are circular, in that they 
assume the reward levels of previous eras were justifiable, and can be dismissed on 
logical grounds. 
 
This leaves theories relating to supply and demand, and income and substitution.  Supply 
and demand cannot be proven as an explanation of executive rewards, due to the lack of a 
reliable database on the available supply of executive labour.  Empirically it seems 
implausible, given the enormous growth in business management education in recent 
decades.  If such education is relevant then the supply should be ample to meet demand.  
If such education is not relevant then supply and demand becomes an explanation of 
market failure.   
 
Finally, considering income and substitution effects (which are notable for their absence of 
consideration from the financial accounting literature) there is a strong theoretical reason 
why continual increases in executive rewards will not necessarily lead to increased 
executive performance and has already resulted in a reduction in supply. 
 
                                                
304 Maria Hasenhuttl and J. Richard Harrison, “Exit or Loyalty: The Effects of Compensation on 
CEO Turnover”, Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas School of Management (2002). 
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Having now examined the evidence for executive reward trends and the economic theories 
used to explain them, and having defined a philosophical basis in distributive justice with 
which to assess them, we can form some judgements about whether executive rewards 
are justified.  In the next chapter, I will state some of these initial conclusions, discuss their 




7 Policy Implications 
7.1 An Explanation of Executive Reward Levels 
 
The public demand for action over executive rewards, and the legitimacy of that demand, 
was shown in Chapter One.  The fact that the executive labour market is not economically 
efficient in Australia and especially the United States was shown in Chapter Two.  In the 
following chapters we considered first a philosophical framework for examining theories for 
executive rewards, and then we reviewed the predominant market-based and non-market 
based economic theories.  We can now use this analysis to answer several critical 
questions. 
 
The first question to answer is the core one for this thesis, whether current executive 
rewards levels can be justified in a normative sense.  This will lead to the second question, 
whether to accept the market or the non-market explanation of the causes of current 
executive reward levels.  In reality we have seen that there are elements of both market 
and non-market factors at work in the executive labour market.  The question is to what 
degree one or the other set of factors appears to be the primary cause of reward levels.  
This is a question of interest to more than economic theorists.  Depending on the answer, 
different forms of market intervention or regulation will be justified or not.  
 
This will then lead us to conclusions on the final question – what is the appropriate degree 
of policy intervention?  If executive rewards are the result of an efficient market, then they 
would be seen as just under David Miller’s market rate theory, and government 
intervention in the market would not be justified.  If executive rewards are not the result of 
an efficient market, then they would not be seen as just and would be an example of 
market failure.  Government intervention in the executive labour market would then be 
justified, either to reform the market, or to set reward levels by some other means.  
 
7.2 The Justification of Executive Reward Levels 
 
We return to the original question of Chapter One, to ask whether Carol Loomis was right, 
that executive reward levels are wrong.  In a normative sense, there are very few ways in 
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which it is possible for them to be right.  The disparity between executive rewards and 
rewards for other occupations in Australia and the United States is now very high.  
Current executive reward levels would not be justifiable under any other form of equity or 
rule-based distribution theory.  Desert theories based on effort or compensation would also 
be unable to justify executive rewards.  I therefore limited normative considerations of 
executive rewards in Chapter One to contribution-based desert. 
 
Contribution theories allow the possibility of high reward levels to be ethically justified if it 
can be shown that they benefit the society as a whole.  The evidence in Chapter Two 
indicated that this is not the case for corporate executives, with societies having higher 
executive rewards not showing any benefit, and in some cases some dis-benefit.  While 
the evidence of dis-benefit is not conclusive, it is sufficient to dismiss any claims that there 
is a social benefit from high executive rewards.  For an extra-ordinary level of reward to be 
justified, some evidence of a corresponding benefit should be required.  We do not find 
conclusive evidence of such a benefit at either the corporate or societal level.  Therefore 
from a contribution viewpoint, high executive rewards are not justified.  The popular view in 
the community, that executive rewards are too high, is correct.  It is not sour grapes, but 
based on legitimate concern. 
 
From a philosophical viewpoint the application of contribution based desert theories to 
executives is complex.  The contribution to social product of a corporation is the result of 
the actions of all of the individuals within the corporation, as well as the application of the 
capital resources owned by the corporation.  Hence it is false for any executive to claim 
that the social product or profits of a corporation are due to their efforts alone.  Executives 
may be able to claim a substantial proportion of any changes in social product (and profits) 
caused by their decisions as a personal desert base.  However even then they will not be 
able to claim the whole amount.  Further, if the effect of a decision on social product is 
negative there is a case to financially penalise the executive, rather than simply ceasing 
rewards, if this doctrine is to be consistently applied. Economic analyses that attempt to 
correlate corporate performance with executive rewards are therefore philosophically 
flawed. 
 
David Miller’s market-rate theory gives a sounder basis for defining how executive rewards 
should be determined.  This theory requires that a market should meet procedural 
conditions for its outcomes to be just.  We saw that the current corporate executive labour 
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markets in Australia and the United States do not meet those conditions.  They represent a 
form of exploitation as defined by David Miller.  This does not mean that an executive 
labour market could not be made legitimate, though the current market would require 
substantial reform to achieve this.  After three decades of rising executive rewards, there is 
no evidence of any internal motivation to reform the executive labor market. 
 
7.3 The Causes of Executive Reward Levels 
 
While it is straightforward to conclude that current executive reward practise and levels are 
not justified, explaining what has caused this situation is more contentious.  Both market-
based and non-market based explanations have been offered.  From an economic 
viewpoint both the market and non-market based theories considered assume cost 
structures within corporations that approximate the assumptions of agency theory.  This 
may be simplistic in comparison to modern motivational theories in behavioural 
economics, however it is sufficient to understand economic theories currently used to 
explain executive rewards.  
 
None of the market-based economic theories of executive rewards we have reviewed 
(alignment theory, incentive theory, historical comparison, superstar theory and supply and 
demand theory) adequately explain or justify current levels of executive rewards in 
Australia and the United States.  Alignment theory is theoretically attractive as it promises 
an internalised market solution to setting executive rewards that should minimise agency 
costs.  The claim of alignment theory is that paying performance bonuses to executives as 
incentives will align their actions with shareholders interests.  This is flawed in theory and 
empirically proven to have failed.  It does not recognise the more complex motivational 
factors at work on executives, or their ability to manipulate the firm and its reporting to 
achieve bonuses.  It also relies on the circular reasoning that share markets and executive 
labour markets are assumed efficient to justify the level of rewards set.  Neither 
assumption is valid based on the findings in Chapter Two.  Modifying alignment theory to a 
broadly based incentive theory might reduce these problems.  This would require 
theoretical development that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Historical comparisons can be disposed of quickly as a circular argument that neither 
proves efficient nor justifies any particular level of executive rewards.   Superstar theory is 
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not relevant to the executive labour market because of the high average rewards and low 
opportunity cost of the career. 
 
The only market-based economic theory that might explain current executive rewards, 
supply and demand, is effectively only true as an explanation if the supply of executive 
labour has been insufficient despite a massive increase in business education.  I do not 
consider this plausible and, even if it were, would be an indication of another market failure 
that would itself warrant government intervention. 
 
This leave the non-market based explanation of executive rewards – management power.  
As defined by Bebchuk and Freid, this appears to fit the observed trend in executive 
reward levels in Australia and the United States.  Executives use their positional power 
over directors to achieve reward levels and contractual conditions that are not in the 
interests of shareholders. The difficulty with Bebchuk and Fried’s explanation is showing 
how management power has increased, when corporate regulations and reporting have 
tightened as executive rewards were increasing.  Management power cannot easily be 
measured and correlated with executive rewards to prove the theory. 
 
I have proposed an explanation for increasing management power via the increasing 
complexity of corporate structures and changes to share ownership.  Modern corporate 
structures and share ownership patterns are such that the traditional two-agent 
explanation of bargaining for executive rewards (shareholders and executives) is obsolete.  
An explanation involving four different sets of agents (share investors, share fund 
managers, corporate directors and executives) is more representative of current corporate 
ownership structures.  In this more complex model there is an obvious potential for 
collusive games to evolve between share fund managers, directors and executives, to the 
mutual benefit of those agents and to the disadvantage of investors. The result is likely to 
be a substantial loss to investors, via both an excessive share of corporate profits being 
paid to executives, and through capital loss from high-risk investment strategies being 
adopted by executives to meet bonus targets. 
 
In conclusion the non-market explanation of high executive rewards – management power 
- is clearly to be preferred on both theoretical and empirical grounds.  Market based-
theories do not explain observed trends in rewards and have substantial theoretical 
weaknesses, especially in the circularity of their reasoning.  As management power is an 
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explanation of market failure, this means that some form of regulatory intervention into the 
executive labour market is required.  The next question is, what form of intervention would 
be preferable.  However before discussing that I will examine the consequences of high 
executive rewards, to assess to what degree government intervention is justified.  
 
7.4 Adverse Consequences of the Executive Labour Market 
 
It is worth examining the practical consequences of the market failure in executive 
rewards.  This is both to define the justification for regulation, and to identify some of the 
specific areas requiring intervention.  Current executive reward practices based on 
alignment theory have given rise to several difficulties, which I will discuss individually. 
 
Executives share bonuses may dilute shareholders ownership as they acquire an 
increasing proportion of the corporation’s ownership.    Alignment theory assumes that 
shareholders will reward executives with some additional share ownership for each period 
covered by a performance bonus-type contract.  Over time this may accumulate to 
represent a large proportion of the shareholding of the corporation.   Even if these share 
bonuses may not be exercised until some time in the future, at that time there will be a 
significant loss in shareholder value. For example Disney Corporation CEO Michael Eisner 
accumulated millions of options for shares while CEO.  When these were exercised as a 
block in 1997 it had a significant impact on the share price, with over $500 million in 
shares gained by Eisner305. 
 
Executives may adopt strategies with perverse long term outcomes to meet performance 
targets that did not measure factors contributing to long term growth (eg corporate 
downsizing of 1990s).306  
 
Modern recruiting practices for hiring executives have tended to eliminate several of the 
potential counter-forces to the temptation for the executive to “defect” from acting in the 
corporation’s interests.  External recruiting of executives is now common.  External 
candidates have no past history in which to have developed any personal ties or loyalty to 
                                                
305 James B. Stewart, “Disney War.” (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005). 
306 Alexandros P. Prezas, Murat Taramicilar and Gopala K. Vasudevan, “Corporate Downsizing and 
CEO Compensation.” Advances in Financial Economics, 2007 Vol 12 pages 119-136. 
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the corporation or fellow staff.  This makes it less likely they will have any non-financial 
interest in them to counteract their own self-interest. 
 
Corporate executive salaries have grown very large in comparison to all other forms of 
income.  Current salary levels would appear to be self-defeating in terms of engendering 
loyalty.  They allow the executive to quickly achieve their personal financial objectives 
within a short tenure in an executive role.  They will thereafter be less concerned with 
further bonuses or the long term consequences for the corporation. 
 
The use of “Golden parachute” clauses (employment contracts with large termination 
payout clauses) is now common.  These were intended to minimise the risk to the 
executive from mergers but that is in itself an acknowledgement that executives do 
possess management power that they can exploit at the expense of shareholders.  They 
also minimise risk both from the corporation becoming insolvent and from dismissal for 
poor performance. 
 
The majority of corporate executive pay is now in the form of performance bonuses that, 
combined with the growth in absolute terms of executive salaries, makes the bonuses very 
large.  Large performance bonuses do not necessarily motivate the executive to act 
optimally in the corporations interests. They may motivate executives to take undue risks 
with the corporation’s assets in order to achieve performance targets to receive their 
bonus.   
 
As well as the direct objections to alignment theories and reward levels in implementing 
performance based contracts for executives, there is a further question to consider about 
them.  That is, what other indirect consequences might widespread use of such contracts 
have on the behaviour of executives and corporate culture more widely?  Alignment theory 
places financial incentives as the sole motivator of executive behaviour.  The effect of 
these incentives on behaviour for executives and those under their direction should be 
considered more widely. 
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The first behavioural consequence of alignment theory to consider is incentives towards 
risk taking behaviour. The possibility that executive bonuses may become perverse 
incentives was warned about several years before the global financial crisis307. 
 
Performance bonuses appear to be problematic regardless of the level set for the 
performance targets.  If the performance targets are set low then they will be achieved too 
easily and the executive is likely to be rewarded with a “bonus” for achieving average or 
below average performance.  In such circumstances the bonuses become a means of 
disguising the level of base salary for the executive.  If the performance targets are set 
high, and a large proportion of the executive’s rewards are dependant on their being met, 
then the executive will have a strong incentive to manipulate the corporation’s activities in 
whatever means is necessary to achieve the target. 
 
There is no corresponding financial penalty to the executive if high risk investment 
decisions are unsuccessful (assuming they do not already hold shares), and thus the 
bonus scheme has the form of a “one way” gamble.  If the risks are unsuccessful the only 
loss to the executive is of potential income (bonus) rather than an actual loss of personal 
possessed wealth.  From a game theoretic viewpoint a self-interested agent (executive) is 
likely to maximise such risks if it maximises their own bonuses, discounting the potential 
for negative outcomes.  The risk of loss is to the shareholders not the executive, and so 
the executive will not fairly weigh risks versus returns.  Thus performance bonuses 
increase moral hazard in the corporation, as defined by Arrow308.  The returns to each 
party may be considered in the outcomes matrix in Table 7.1 below: 
 
Table 7.1 Outcomes Matrix for Executive with Bonus 
High Risk Strategy Low Risk Strategy  
Success Failure Success Failure 
Return to 
Corporation 










Base Salary  
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The only way to counteract this risk is to have the executive already holding a significant 
proportion of their wealth in the shares of the company.  Unless the executive is forced to 
do this as a condition of employment, this is only possible if a large salary or bonus in the 
form of shares has already been paid out to the executive, diluting the degree of 
ownership of the original shareholders.  The risk may be reduced if any bonuses are paid 
in shares that are vested in the executive some time later, to ensure the executive 
considers risks in the long term.  However this practice appears to be rare309.  When done, 
executives will then tend to discount future earnings compared to current, and so it will still 
be less efficient for corporations to pay executives in this manner. 
 
The second behavioural consequence of alignment theory to consider is the effect of 
“golden parachute” clauses.  Executive bonuses, higher salary and “golden parachutes” 
were all separately identified as being associated with high corporate performance in the 
1980s310. The potential adverse consequences of these measures in combination were not 
considered.  One consequence is that if the executive makes a failed investment decision 
and is dismissed, they will still receive the “golden parachute” payment.  In this scenario 
the executive appears to be better off financially adopting a high-risk strategy whether the 
investment succeeds or fails.  This combination of outcomes is shown in the revised 
outcomes matrix in Table 7.2 below: 
 
Table 7.2 Outcomes Matrix for Executive with Bonus and Golden Parachute 
High Risk Strategy Low Risk Strategy  
Success Failure Success Failure 
Return to 
Corporation 














By further insulating executives from personal financial loss after failed investment 
decisions, golden parachutes would appear to skew even further the bias by executives 
                                                
309 Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, 2004. 
310 Michael C. Jensen and Jerold L. Zimmerman, “Managerial Compensation and the Managerial 
Labor Market.” Journal of Accounting and Economics,  Vol. 7 , No. 1-3 (1985), pages 3-9. 
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towards high risk investment decisions.  Moral hazard is increased further.  This is contrary 
to the long-term interest of shareholders. 
 
A final problem with alignment theories based on bonus payments is that the focus on 
positive additional rewards for executives seems skewed towards the interests of 
executives.  Executives can only gain additional rewards and do not face any 
corresponding additional penalties.  Jensen and Murphy intended that bonus payments 
occurred in place of some salary but the emphasis was still on higher reward for good 
performance. There is no corresponding consideration of penalties against executives for 
poor performance.  There is remarkably little discussion in the relevant literature about the 
use of any negative measures against executives, such as legal action to recover 
inappropriately awarded rewards, or seeking damages for instances of unethical conduct 
that may have damaged the firm.   
 
Despite their enormous incomes and influence, corporate executives face little risk of 
punishment for poor performance.  Some business theorists argue that such prosecutions 
should only be considered on a cost effectiveness basis and not on whether a person has 
acted in bad faith311.  That is penalties should only be imposed when it is cost effective in 
that instance to do so, and not as a matter of principle when the action warrants a penalty.  
This view completely ignores the moral hazard again likely from the perception that 
misbehaviour will not be punished.  That hazard is likely to create a high cost to 
shareholders. 
 
This approach is inconsistent with the degree of liability most professions are held to for 
their actions.  Penalties for poor performance are faced by all forms of professional 
employees, with doctors, engineers, and lawyers facing cost penalties and  sanctions for 
causing damages to their clients due to poor performance, even when no wrong-doing or 
unethical conduct is suggested.  The cost of prosecution is not a factor in the decision to 
prosecute.  In most cases professionals found guilty of mal-practice (as opposed to simply 
poor or erroneous performance of their duties) may be criminally prosecuted and 
prohibited from further practising their profession, losing any opportunity for further income 
from it.  Nor is professional liability a question of reward level alone, with modestly 
                                                
311 Howard H. Chang and David S. Evans, “The Optimal Prosecution of Corporate Fraud: An Error 
Cost Analysis.” (November 1, 2006). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=943035 
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rewarded professionals such as teachers and nurses also able to be held criminally 
accountable for the safety of persons in their care. 
 
The evidence of market failure within the executive labour market, and the adverse 
consequences identified for executive rewards based on alignment –theory bonuses 
suggest that regulation is desirable.  The two questions remaining before we consider 
regulating the market are: 
(1) can executive actions or employee actions generally be aligned with shareholder 
interests? 
(2) can some mechanism other than bonus schemes be designed to motivate 
executives to act more in accord with shareholder interests? 
 
7.5 Is a Market Solution Possible? 
We have already established that alignment of interests between agent and principal is not 
logically possible.  This still leaves the question: is alignment of the agents’ actions and the 
principal’s interests possible? 
 
Proponents of alignment theory could argue that the fact that past contracts have not been 
appropriately structured or negotiated, does not make effective incentive contacts 
impossible.  Egregious practices such as bonuses linked to absolute rather than relative 
performance, and bonuses granted immediately and not deferred to incorporate long term 
outcomes could all be eliminated from well structured executive contracts.  The question 
then arrises – supposing that executive bonuses can be structured to ideally match 
shareholder preferences in terms of long term rewards for improvements in corporate 
performance, do they then align the actions of the executive and the interests of corporate 
shareholders? 
 
In philosophical terms, the interests described by Jensen and Murphy are motivations or 
mental states that would guide behaviour.  Hence the intent to “align interests” represents 
an intent on the part of shareholders or their agents to alter the motivations of the 
executives towards the shareholders’ purpose, making them a common purpose.  The 
question depends on whether it is possible to alter the motivational states of executives to 
match those of shareholders in the company. 
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From the prior discussion designing bonus mechanisms that accurately allow for what will 
be in the corporation’s best interest in the future is complex and may be impossible.  
Shareholders would have to offer an ever-increasing share of equity in the corporation (as 
bonuses) to the executive, to maintain the executive’s interest over time. Even then all the 
reasons previously identified (personal gain, own welfare needs satisfied) may tempt the 
executive to defect from shareholders’ interests. 
 
If it were epistemologically possible to design such a bonus scheme to motivate the 
executive, it is still not the case that the executive’s interests have been aligned with those 
of the corporation.  The interest of the executive so motivated remains in obtaining the 
performance bonus, which is a form of self-interest.  Whether or not the executive’s 
underlying interests happened to align with those of the firm would be merely coincidental.  
Absent of the bonus the executive has no internal reason to act in the corporation’s 
interest. 
 
Therefore a more plausible construction of Jensen and Murphy’s theory is to ask whether 
alignment of executive actions and corporate interests is possible.  Whether this is 
possible will depend on the degree of market  information known to those setting the 
executive pay package and targets.  This in turn will also depend on the interests of those 
setting the executive pay contract and conditions.   Directors are also individuals with 
differing and possibly conflicting interests.  There is no guarantee that they will accurately 
reflect the shareholder’s interests in setting the executive pay contract.   
 
In several respects the bonus mechanism may act to lessen the likelihood that the 
executive will act in the corporations interest.  Making the primary focus in hiring, 
contracting and rewarding executives to be on performance bonuses will tend to pre-select 
executives primarily interested in obtaining performance bonuses for themselves.  That is, 
it will attract primarily individuals who are primarily self-interested in the materialist sense.  
There will be a corresponding diminution of alternative motivations in executive 
candidates.  The potential to attract executives who may be internally motivated to act in 
the shareholders’ interests because of other sympathetic, parallel or overlapping interests 
such as the desire to lead, loyalty to peers, personal professional pride (in the 




If such sympathetic parallel or overlapping motivations are absent from the executive when 
first appointed, the executive employment system focused on performance bonuses 
seems unlikely to encourage their development later.  The system focuses the interests of 
the executive on performance targets and the obtaining of their performance bonus.  Their 
performance is regularly reviewed and assessed on that basis.  Their employment may be 
terminated if performance targets are not met.  Such an environment seems unlikely to 
engender any underlying alignment or loyalty to the corporation itself and its objectives.  
The executive is never asked to become sympathetic to the corporation or its objectives – 
only to be focused on their performance targets and their bonuses. 
 
This gives rise to a further question: is there any other mechanism by which the 
executive’s interests may be aligned with the corporation?   Various motivational tools are 
used in current corporate management to motivate or encourage employees to think of the 
corporation’s interests and to ensure that there is “alignment” of values between 
individuals within a team.  These include team-building workshops, corporate training, 
reward schemes, recognition schemes and mentoring.  These are sometimes applied to 
executives.  “Value alignment” is recognised as one of the explicit aims of such programs. 
 
None of these methods could be described as an “alignment type” theory as proposed by 
Jensen and Murphy.  They attempt to actively create alignment by means other than 
incentives.  Hence none of these techniques, if effective, could be considered a validation 
of alignment theory and executive bonuses. 
 
These techniques suffer from a number of potential negatives.  Some may be perceived as 
coercive or condescending, and hence risk creating a negative outcome.  If the schemes 
are solely intended to align the interests of the employee (including executives) toward the 
corporation then they will be seen as manipulative.  Thus if they are aimed directly at the 
goal of alignment they are likely to fail, unless their intention is concealed. There is then 
the danger that the attempt at concealment itself will be recognised and create a more 
negative impression of the corporation.  If the individuals being manipulated realise this it 
may have a negative effect on their alignment to the corporation.  Conversely if they do not 
realise they are being manipulated it might be questioned whether they are sufficiently 
mature and independent in their thinking to make an effective decision maker in an 
executive role.  
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Dismissing mechanisms which are either manipulative, coercive or condescending, there 
are other mechanisms that may be effective. Management theorists consider the role of 
underlying values and objectives within organizations to influence performance.  Students 
of organisational behaviour and culture identify the alignment of values within teams as a 
key feature in effective organizations312.   Generally these theories do not consider the role 
of performance bonuses in the gradual process by which genuine alignment of values may 
be achieved.  Such alignment occurs over a period of time through osmosis, via immersion 
in the organisational culture, experiences of the individuals concerned, and their personal 
development.  A healthy organization will foster such alignment, but cannot create or force 
it on any individual including an executive. 
 
Working within an organization over a long period of time may give rise to an increased 
sense of identifying with it.  Relationships will be built up with other employees.  Personal 
time spent on corporate projects will create a sense of emotional investment that may at 
least partly align a person’s interests with the corporation.  The loyalty of Japanese 
employees to their corporation, built up over a working lifetime, whether factory worker, 
salary man, or CEO, is a good example of this process.  However these indirect 
mechanisms do not appear to be things that are capable of being built into the structure of 
an executive contract, or able to be accomplished within the timeframe of a tenure as an 
executive. 
 
Finally, there would appear to be some non-financial interests that executives are likely to 
hold that no amount of incentive pay would induce them to bargain away in order to align 
their actions and the corporation’s interests.  It seems unlikely that any performance based 
contract could be written in a way to induce persons to sacrifice personal values, 
relationships or projects that they valued more highly than their career.  The image of a 
careerist executive who sacrifices everyone and everything else in their life to pursue their 
career might seem to suggest otherwise.  Yet in practice it seems unlikely that close 
personal interests would be sacrificed.  Even then, for incentive theories to be valid in all 
cases, the executive would need to be willing to sacrifice personal interest not for their own 
career, but for the corporation.  For deeply held personal interests, this seems implausible. 
 
                                                
312 E. H. Schein, “Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd Edition.” (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass 1985). 
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Some recent examples of actual behaviour of executives facing such difficulties illustrate 
this point.  In the Unites States, there were a long series of investigations and court cases 
involving State Health Departments and tobacco companies.  At issue was the cost to 
health departments of treating persons who had contracted diseases from smoking.  Some 
of the documents discovered demonstrated that tobacco corporations knew their products 
were a health risk, and that the corporations’ executives, had knowingly made false 
statements to inquiries in the past.  Those individuals could have been subject to criminal 
prosecution for fraud or perjury.   
 
The Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement was reached between the four largest US 
tobacco companies and the Attorneys General of 46 States in 1998.  Under it the 
companies agreed to pay large damages (long term cost $365 billion US) to the States for 
as long as they continued to operate313.  One of the conditions of the settlement was that 
the companies, including executives, would not be liable to prosecution.  While it could be 
argued that the agreement protected the corporations in the long term, it was not in the 
shareholders’ interests to negotiate to ensure that the executives were not prosecuted.   It 
is possible that this risk to executives was removed in the settlement bargaining process, 
at the cost of a higher settlement value than would otherwise have been incurred by 
shareholders.  There was potential for executives to do this, as some critics concluded that 
maximising the amount of the settlement was the principle objective of the State 
agencies314. 
 
In Australia, a similar situation involved the executives of the James Hardie Group, over 
the settlement of damages claims for disease caused by asbestos products made by the 
company.  The James Hardie Group had established a trust fund to pay the damages, and 
in 2001 moved the corporation’s headquarters to the Netherlands to escape the possibility 
of any further liability to the fund.  It subsequently became apparent that the fund was 
insufficient, and that James Hardie executives had mislead the government when it was 
established. An inquiry found that the company could not be legally obliged to refund the 
                                                
313 Milo Geyelin, "Forty-Six States Agree to Accept $206 Billion Tobacco Settlement." Wall Street 
Journal, November 23, 1998. 
314 Steven A. Schroeder, M.D., “Tobacco Control in the Wake of the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement.” New England Journal of Medicine, January 15, 2004. 
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pay the balance of funds required for damages315.  Whilst unethical, this outcome was in 
the financial interests of shareholders. 
 
Despite this in February 2007 the company voluntarily agreed to return sufficient funds 
from the Netherlands to pay the damages.  Criminal prosecutions of the executives were 
dropped in December 2008316.  Subsequent civil action launched by the Australian 
Securities Investment Commission found that the company board including executive 
directors had broken the law in their actions317.   
 
The cases are complex and it is not suggested that the prosecutions were dropped 
because of the voluntary decision of the company to return funds to pay damages.  
However there was obviously a strong potential conflict of interest for executives in 
considering shareholders’ interests (presumably to minimise payouts) and their personal 
interest to avoid prosecution.  It seems unlikely that a financial bonus would be sufficient 
for executives to increase their risk of prosecution, regardless of the loss to shareholders. 
 
7.6 Is Attempting to Align Interests Self Defeating? 
 
The question of executive motivation may be considered philosophically in the context of 
work by Jon Elster on states that are essentially by-products, and by Derek Parfit on 
objectives that may be self-defeating. 
 
Elster318 describes private mental states that may only be obtained as by-products or 
indirectly, and not through deliberate intent and action.  For example, one cannot 
intentionally try to forget something, as the act of concentrating on what is to be forgotten, 
keeps it in the consciousness.  Other examples of such private mental states cited by 
Elster include wisdom, hunger, humility, virtue, courage, love, sympathy, admiration, faith 
and understanding.  In each case, deliberately attempting to obtain that mental state is 
unlikely to result in its being obtained.   
                                                
315 D. Jackson, “Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Medical Research Fund and 
Compensation Foundation.” New South Wales Government, (2004). Available from: 
http://www.dpc.nsw.gov.au/publications/publications/publication_list_-_new#11330 
316 E. Sexton, “Dust to Dust.” The Sydney Morning Herald, 14 March 2009. 
317 E. Sexton, “Hardie Board Broke the Law.” The Sydney Morning Herald, 24 April 2009. 
318 Jon Elster, “Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality.” (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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Elster acknowledges that the state may be obtained by luck (fluke) and may be 
foreseeable.  However they will generally not be obtained by any form of 
technology/technique or command (one cannot force someone to believe/feel something).  
They cannot usually be faked, unless in a self-defeating way.  For example, qualities such 
as respect or love cannot be faked, since the act of faking them is contradictory to the 
relationship implied with the object of respect or love.  Elster also considers that searches 
for meaning and some political theories may be self-defeating, such as that the purpose of 
the political system is to educate the participants.  There appear to be several aspects of 
Elster’s theory applicable to the attempt to align the executive’s interests with the 
shareholders via executive bonuses.    
 
Following Elster, genuine alignment of the objectives of the corporation and executive 
would seem to be in the category of objectives that cannot be achieved directly.  For the 
reasons previously stated, if the corporation attempted it deliberately the attempt may be 
perceived by the subject and regarded as manipulative and cause a negative response, 
contrary to the intention of the action.  If the attempt is not noticed the manipulated 
executive may have better aligned interests but a person so compliant that they can be 
manipulated in such a way may be unsuitable for an executive role making independent 
decisions. 
 
It would seem to be inadequate for the executive to merely “fake” having interests aligned 
with those of the corporation.  If the alignment is faked and not genuine, there are likely to 
be a myriad of circumstances where the executive will have the opportunity to either 
overtly depart from acting in the shareholders interests, or appear to act in their interests 
while not actually doing so. 
 
Parfit in Reasons and Persons considers a further position, that some theories or 
objectives are indirectly self-defeating319.  The deliberate attempt to obtain such objectives 
will not only be unsuccessful, but will achieve an opposite or counter-productive outcome.   
 
Application of Parfit’s concept leads to the conclusion that self-interested individuals will 
regard an attempt to manipulate their motivations and interests, whether overtly or 
                                                
319 Derek Parfit, “Actions that May be Self-Defeating.” in “Reasons and Persons”, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986). 
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covertly, as against their interests.  Being self-interested, they will then be hostile to those 
making the attempt.  Even if not self-interested in a materialist sense, they may still regard 
the attempt as condescending and disrespectful of their personal autonomy, and again 
evoke hostility instead of “alignment”. 
 
In the case of corporate executives’ interests, aspects of Parfit’s theory appear to fit the 
situation of alignment of executives and corporations.  Using bonuses and rewards to align 
executives may serve to attract executive candidates who are solely interested in the 
rewards and have no interest in aligning with the corporation or its objectives.  Such 
persons will be almost certain to “defect” from the corporate investment strategy that is 
optimal for shareholders at any time their personal rewards are greater for some other set 
of actions. 
 
Note that both Elster and Parfit cite examples of attempting to alter or influence the values 
or motivations of other individuals as being in the category of actions or objectives likely to 
only be obtained as a by-product, or to be self-defeating.  While neither considered the 
example of aligning executive motivations specifically, aspects of it would appear to 
conform to their theories.  This suggest that, regardless of the method used, alignment of 
corporate and executive interests may be an impossible task, at least by direct means. 
That is, regardless of the structure of executive contracts and bonuses, they cannot 
achieve genuine alignment.  Consequently some form of external oversight or regulation of 
such agents will always be required. 
 
7.7 The Case for Government Intervention 
 
Government intervention in the executive labour market (or any market) is likely to have an 
associated cost, both to the market being regulated and to the government in providing the 
regulatory agency.  If the government recoups the cost of the regulatory cost of the agency 
from the market the cost to the community is unchanged.  Therefore in terms of economic 
outcomes, government intervention would only be desirable when market or other non-
government mechanisms will not be sufficient to eliminate current undesirable practices. 
 
This assumes that the regulation will require the imposition of some body or system for 
monitoring, investigation, prosecution and enforcement of the regulations where 
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necessary.  Some of these tasks may be able to be performed by existing agencies, but 
this will require the allocation of additional resources, unless other regulatory functions are 
to be reduced in its place.  For the executive labour market there are existing reporting 
requirements for executive salary and monitoring by market media organisations.  
Prosecution and enforcement of limits would require action by a government agency.   
 
The case for government intervention is strong given the structural causes of the over 
payment identified in earlier chapters.  Once the cause of executive overpayment is 
recognised as management power rather than a market mechanism at work, there is no 
logical reason to believe that the market will eliminate the problem without the power of 
management somehow being limited.  This limitation of management power would not be 
in the rational self interest of executives holding the power, and is therefore unlikely to be 
achieved voluntarily. 
 
Neo-classical economists could argue that government intervention in executive labour 
markets is not required because markets should correct themselves over time.  This claim 
seems implausible in the case of the executive labour market given the history of the 
problem.  The rising trend for executive rewards first started in the late 1970s, and has 
been continuous for the thirty years from then till the time of writing.  If the market were to 
be self correcting, this would have occurred by now. 
 
A second potential argument against government intervention is that it is likely to be more 
expensive than the alternative of a free market operating.  This counter-argument fails for 
two reasons.  Firstly, it assumes that the corporate executive labour market acts as a free 
market, when we have already established that it has the characteristics of an exploitative 
market.  Secondly, the case for government intervention on public interest grounds only 
fails if the cost of the regulation exceeds the costs of the current problem for the 
community as a whole, not only the corporation.  If the cost of the regulation is less than 
the cost to the community of the current market failure, then it is justified. 
 
It seems very unlikely that the cost of regulation could be more than the excess direct cost 
of current executive rewards.  Bebchuck and Fried320 established that by the end of the 
1990s executive rewards had exceeded an average of 10% of gross profits for the largest 
1200 US firms.  At the start of the 1980s they had been less than 2% of gross profits.  By 
                                                
320 Lucien Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, 2004. 
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contrast it was estimated that the total business regulation compliance cost for United 
States Corporations under the existing Sarbanes Oxley Act was 0.036% of revenue or 
much less than 1% of profits321.  Sarbanes Oxley has been widely criticised as 
cumbersome and unnecessarily costly to comply with.  Thus the cost of regulation (<1% of 
profits) is currently very much less than the cost of the growth in executive salary that has 
already occurred (>8% of profits) in the United States.  
 
Further, it may be argued that the indirect cost of executive reward practices to the wider 
community is very much greater than the direct cost to shareholders.  Economics Nobel 
Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has cited executives achieving their bonuses as one of the 
motivating factors in Wall Street investment banks that led to the global financial crisis of 
2008-09322.  This event cost shareholders in OECD nations over US$32 trillion dollars in 
equity losses and has caused unemployment for over 30 million persons.  Governments 
have spent US$13 trillion dollars stabilising their markets and economies, creating debts 
that will have to be born by the citizens of each affected country for decades to come.  
Overall, the cost has been greater than the combined GDP of the G7 nations in 2008323.  A 
number of related developments in finance markets caused the crisis, yet executive 
rewards have been at least a motivating factor behind several of them.   Almost any form 
of business regulation would have been cheaper than the costs incurred from that crisis. 
 
Even if the cost of regulation were not lower than the cost of excessive payments to 
executives, that is not an absolute case for ignoring regulation.  When a practice is clearly 
unethical and causing harm to a society, it is regulated against whether that regulation 
adds costs or not.  The mere fact that there is a strong popular demand for action against 
current levels of executive salary is sufficient reason to consider imposing such regulation, 
as long as it can be done in an ethical fashion.  Government regulation should not be 
solely a question of cost. 
 
On balance then government intervention in the corporate executive labour market seems 
necessary, appropriate and likely to be far less costly than losses from current practices 
continuing.   
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We have now established that executive rewards cannot be justified in a normative sense.   
We have considered explanations for the causes of current executive reward levels, the 
type of reform needed in executive labour markets, the adverse consequences of the 
current situation continuing and a justification for government intervention in terms of likely 
costs versus benefits.   
 
The executive labour markets in Australia and the United States are clearly dysfunctional, 
and do not result in efficient or defensible reward levels for executives.  The primary cause 
for this market failure is evidently not market based, namely the management power held 
by executives.  Market based theories such as alignment theory, supply and demand and 
the economics of superstars cannot account for current market outcomes.  Given the non-
market based causes identified for excessive executive rewards, market regulation and 
reform by government appears necessary.  The costs of such regulation are likely to be 
very much lower than the costs of the current situation continuing. 
 
In the next chapter I will consider some of the means by which governments may act to 




8 Policy Solutions 
8.1 The Objectives of Executive Reward Reform 
 
We have now established an explanation for current executive reward levels, identified the 
need for reform of executive labour markets, the adverse consequences of the current 
situation continuing and a justification for government intervention in terms of likely costs 
versus benefits.  I will next outline some of the types of reforms that I consider necessary 
to solve the problem.  I do not propose to nominate specific legislative or regulatory 
reforms in Australia or the Unites States.  The relevant legislation is voluminous, and the 
task would be far beyond the scope of this thesis.  The intent of this chapter is to identify 
the areas of reform and types of measures required to achieve a more efficient executive 
labour market and justifiable executive salary levels. 
 
Before discussing specific reforms, I will first identify what objectives should be set for 
such reforms.  It is important to ensure that there are definable criteria against which 
reforms may be tested.  This is to ensure that they are both sufficient to end the current 
problem, and not so excessive that they represent an undue burden to business and 
society 
 
The first objective should be to ensure that the executive labour market functions as a 
transparent, genuinely competitive market that is likely to achieve an economically efficient 
outcome.  It is still desirable that an executive labour market exists, so that better 
performing executives are rewarded, poor performers removed, suitable quality applicants 
are attracted to the field, and resources allocated efficiently between corporations.  
However it needs to be structured and regulated so as to avoid exploitation in that market. 
 
As a general principle, it would be desirable to ensure that reforms to the executive labour 
market make it more consistent with other existing labour markets and their regulations in 
Australia and the United States.  It should only vary from these regulations where it is 
necessary to prevent exploitation by virtue of the nature of the executive market.  I do not 
consider this requirement problematic.  We have seen that many of the current problems 




The second objective should be to undertake more broad reforms of corporate governance 
arrangements to remove some of the structural causes of current market failures in the 
executive labour market.  We saw in Chapter Four that the current combination of 
structures and ownership acts as a causal agent of executive labour market failure.  This is 
likely to be a long term project but is no less necessary for that fact.  Without removal of 
these causes, in the long term it is likely that the executive reward problem  - exploitation 
of corporate power for executives’ personal gain - will merely return in a different guise.  
This will require reforms to both the ownership and control mechanisms of corporations.  I 
will next discuss some reforms that might reduce these structural causes of failure in the 
executive labour market. 
 
8.2 Reforming Corporate Governance 
 
Ultimately the excessive reward levels currently paid to corporate executives must be seen 
as a failure of corporate governance.  Changes to share ownership and the structure of 
rewards may have caused the current problems with excessive executive rewards and 
perverse incentives, but corporate governance regimes still allowed them to happen, with 
considerable losses to shareholders.  It is therefore appropriate to reform corporate 
governance as part of a solution to the problem.   
 
Past changes to corporate governance, such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the United 
States and the Australian Clerp 9 amendments discussed in earlier Chapters, focused on 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, and were largely unsuccessful.  In this 
thesis I am advocating fundamental structural reform of the corporate governance regimes 
for firms.  Such reforms are likely to take a significant amount of time to define, legislate, 
implement and then take effect on salary levels.  Therefore in the short term caps or limits 
on executive salary will also be necessary.  Reforms to corporate governance should be 
seen as a long term and more permanent solution. 
 
8.2.1 The Executive Labour Market 
The executive labour market needs to be regulated to avoid what David Miller defined as 
exploitation. Miller did not define specific conditions to avoid exploitation.  The aim of any 
such measures should be to prevent either of the following situations that Miller described: 
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1. A transfer should not be more advantageous to the exploiting party and less 
advantageous to the exploited party than some bench mark or equilibrium price. 
2. A transfer should not occur through some special advantage the exploiter has through 
asymmetry of information and/or asymmetry in bargaining power,  
 
To achieve this, regulation needs to ensure symmetry of information, and symmetry of 
bargaining positions.  There are several means by which this may be achieved for 
executive labour markets.  Most of these would be achieved by making practices in 
executive labour markets more consistent with practices in other labour markets.   
 
Details of available executive positions, their duties, required skills and experience, and 
salary packages should be advertised for persons to apply, rather than using “head-
hunter” firms.  This would in itself reduce corporate costs.  The past employment history 
and performance of applicants should be available for scrutiny.  Employment decisions 
should be made by panels that are balanced in terms of gender, experience, and 
qualifications, and include internal and external (independent) board members.  Clear 
rules should guide the declaration of any conflicts of interest by selection panel members, 
and where necessary disqualify conflicted individuals from decisions on that basis. 
 
Note that Miller’s conditions are bi-directional.  Although at present the concern is with 
executives exploiting their corporation, it should be ensured that the reverse is not possible 
in the future.  Principles of justice should be universalisable following Kant’s dictum “Act 
only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should 
become a universal law."324.  Thus conditions such as minimum hourly wages, maximum 
working hours and reasonable conditions should also be applied to executives as they are 
to other classes of employees. 
 
The executive labour market needs to be regulated by an externally answerable body, as 
with other labour markets.  This would mean bringing it within the province of existing 
wage arbitration and industrial relations processes in Australia and the United States.  The 
aim would be to increase transparency and accountability in decision-making.  Likewise 
legal accountability for executive reward decisions should rest with directors just as with 
any other corporate investment or hiring decision. 
                                                
324 Immanuel Kant, “Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 3rd ed.” translated by James W. 
Ellington (London: Hackett [1785] 1993). Page 30. 
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In the case of the United States, this would require a significantly stronger system of 
government control of working conditions.  While this would be politically controversial, I 
see it as a necessary reform.  Market advocates are fond of arguing for “unfettered” 
markets but it is clear that labour markets are subject to the abuse of unequal bargaining 
power by market participants.  Low paid US workers suffer from exploitation by employers 
holding a stronger bargaining position.  Likewise executives with compliant boards exploit 
corporations and shareholders due to their weaker bargaining position.  In both cases the 
party with greatest bargaining power exploits it to their advantage.  Neither situation is 
ethically defensible, or economically efficient325.  The executive labour market illustrates 
the economic dangers of too weak market regulation. 
 
Although some will argue this is an unwarranted interference in the market, government 
intervention has been shown to be necessary in this case.  Moreover, government 
oversight of labour markets is normal for almost every occupation.  There is no 
philosophical reason why the executive labour market should be exempt.  Consistency 
with labour market laws would ensure that there would not be significant increased costs 
for government regulators in policing the executive labour market. 
 
8.2.2 Structural reform of Corporate Governance 
Current corporate governance mechanisms have proven so deficient in protecting share 
investors from excessive executive salary demands that there is good reason to believe 
that, over time, directors and executives working collusively will find new means to 
circumvent caps or limits and once again transfer excessive rewards to executives.  The 
perverse incentives that performance bonuses for executives create have caused far 
greater losses to shareholders than the cost of the rewards.  Therefore some reform to the 
structural mechanisms of corporate governance remains necessary. 
 
Excessive levels of corporate executive salary may be seen as a symptom of a wider 
problem in corporate structures.  That is, the corporate structures that have evolved over 
the past two centuries are weak mechanisms for translating the preferences of 
shareholders and investors into the actions of the corporation. The evidence of actual 
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corporate behaviour is that corporations are mechanisms that tend in practice to be guided 
by the preferences of executives, not shareholders or directors.   
 
Corporate structures have been developed to increase productivity, but do not guarantee 
that the power resulting from that structure is used for its originally intended purpose, or to 
benefit those they were intended to benefit.  In terms of political theory, they do not ensure 
decision-making by those in control of the corporation is in the interests of those with a 
legitimate stake in the corporation.  Most corporate regulation focuses on regulation of 
reporting, rather than regulation of practices.  Kym Sheehan reviewed Australian 
regulation relevant to executive remuneration and summarised as follows: 
“remuneration practice is largely regulated by statements of good practice, while legislative 
intervention is most prevalant for remuneration disclosure and voting on remuneration.  
Shareholder engagement is subject to the least amount of regulation, with most regulation 
being self-regulation by institutional investors.”326 
 
Previous discussion of corporate governance has focused on improving existing 
mechanisms for corporate reporting. These reforms implicitly assume that current 
corporate structures are appropriate.  They also assume that corporations act towards 
their shareholders interests and require refinement to ensure that their powers are not 
misused in this process.  The question of whether corporations do act in the interests of 
shareholders is seen as a separate question of the need to align shareholder and 
executive interests.  In this regard the comments of Sheehan noted above were made on 
the Australian situation after the CLERP9 financial reforms of 2004327. 
 
Previous reforms have failed to include share investment funds328 which, as we have seen 
in Australia and the United States, are now the predominant category of share ownership.  
Any effective reform of corporate governance needs to extend a similar governance 
regime for the management of share investment funds as exists for corporations.  In 
particular, this must include means by which share fund investors may have some say 
over the reward and appointment of managers of the fund they are investors in.  Inclusion 
                                                
326 Kym Sheehan, “Regulatory Framework for Executive Compensation”, Sydney Law Review, Vol. 
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of such institutions within the overall scope of corporate governance reform will be 
assumed in all following discussion of corporate governance reforms. 
 
Given the conclusions already reached on the incoherence of the notions of corporate 
interests and alignment of interests, previous approaches to corporate reform are grossly 
inadequate.  They have not addressed the fundamental questions of how the interests of 
different groups within the corporation are translated into corporate actions.  This problem 
is widespread, and not confined to Australia and the United States.  La Porta et al 
considered legal protection of shareholders in many OECD countries and concluded:  “For 
most countries, the improvement of investor protection requires radical changes to the 
legal system.  Securities, company and bankruptcy laws generally need to be amended”329 
 
Therefore it seems appropriate to look towards solutions from the viewpoint of political 
philosophy, to consider how corporations might be reformed to better represent multiple 
interests.  Towards this end, two approaches to increasing the degree of democracy within 
corporations should be considered.  The first approach is “bottom up” (democracy within 
the workplace) and the second is “top down” (democracy within the corporate ownership 
and control mechanisms). 
 
8.2.3 Corporate Democracy in the Workplace 
The first “bottom up” approach is to replace “command and control” type mechanisms 
which proliferate in current corporate culture with more democratic operational 
mechanisms whereby employees have a defined role in corporate management.  As we 
saw in Chapter Five, this could include employee involvement in the setting of salary and 
reward levels for both other employees and executives.  I will define corporate 
management approaches where employees are involved in such decisions as workplace 
democracy. 
 
At first glance workplace democracy might seem a radical change in corporate philosophy 
that rejects the current dominant form of business practice in Australia and the United 
States.  Yet there is no intrinsic reason why the current allocation of powers within 
corporate structures must be a feature of corporations owned by shareholders.   Other 
                                                
329 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “Investor 
Protection and Corporate Governance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 58 (2000) 3-27, page 20. 
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models exist both in theory and practice.  Shareholders should be supportive of changes in 
the balance of power between executives and other employees, if those changes improve 
returns to shareholders. 
 
There are examples of employees successfully taking over the running of corporations.  
Semco (Brazil) and the John Lewis Partnership (UK) have already been cited. Among non-
English speaking countries in the developed world alternative corporate models are more 
common.  In Germany corporate boards in most cases are legally required to include 
delegates elected by workers330.   
 
Additional business models exist that have not yet been implemented.  Weitzman in The 
Share Economy331, proposed a model whereby employees would be paid an agreed share 
(proportion) of corporate profits rather than a nominal wage.  This theory was aimed at 
avoiding stagflation and lowering unemployment rather than corporate governance reform.  
Although offering theoretical advantages, it was considered that this model would not be 
adopted because employees preferred to minimise risk rather than maximise outcomes.  
Nevertheless it highlighted that other income models than the traditional one may not only 
be viable but might have advantages. 
 
It should be clarified that workplace democracy is not intended to supplant or overrule the 
rights or interests of corporate shareholders.  Rather, it is an attempt to redistribute 
decision-making powers within the corporation in a more equitable way between 
employees and executives.  This would make executives accountable to employees in a 
way that should act as a brake on executive salaries where they are greatly disparate from 
those of other workers. 
 
Employee influence might also have other tangible benefits.  It would act as a 
countervailing force to deter executives from taking unjustifiably risky corporate strategies 
to the detriment of shareholders (and employees).  It would bring employee information on 
corporate operations directly to the board in a less filtered manner, enabling better 
informed decision-making.  Evidence from Germany, where co-determination laws require 
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employee representatives on boards of most large companies, suggests that this is to the 
benefit of shareholders.  Fauver and Fuerst (2004)332 found that firms with employee 
representation under co-determination had increased efficiency and firm value was 
increased. 
 
Philosophically there are many other benefits to adopting structurally required employee 
participation in corporate decision making.  Such systems give greater recognition to the 
knowledge and interest of workers in their corporation.  They ensure employees have a 
greater sense of autonomy over the work sphere of their lives, which for most will occupy 
the majority of their adult lives.  A role in decision making will create a greater degree of 
engagement between employees and their corporations, increasing their own work 
satisfaction, and possibly their performance. 
 
This is not to suggest that employee involvement is a panacea for corporate governance 
problems.  Gorton and Schmidt333 found that of German corporations under 
codetermination, those with one third employee representatives on the board performed 
better than those with one half employee representatives on the board.  There was 
evidence that employee dominated corporate boards became too reluctant to reduce 
payroll costs when economic conditions were difficult.   This conclusion suggests that 
employee representatives should provide an input, but not dominate corporate decision 
making. 
 
The trend in corporate governance in the United States in the past decade has been in the 
opposite direction from structural reform – towards increased executive power.  This may 
seem an odd statement, given the increased corporate regulations introduced in Australia 
and the United States in the wake of the collapse of dot-com firms in the late 1990s.  Yet 
since then the most dramatic change in corporate structure has been the rise of private 
equity firms and hedge funds.  Private equity firms and hedge funds were designed to 
(successfully) circumvent normal corporate governance and reporting rules.  In them the 
power of executives is greatly increased compared to public corporations.  By 2007 these 
accounted for an unknown but large and growing share of US private assets334.  Thus 
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while executive powers were being subjected to greater regulation in corporations, a larger 
share of business was moving outside the scope of these regulations entirely. 
 
The growth of private equity and hedge funds further demonstrates the powerlessness of 
shareholders to control how their investments are used.  The growth trend in this market 
was first claimed to be to the benefit of investors, thanks to the reduced costs from 
regulation and oversight.  Precisely because of the weaker reporting rules it is difficult to 
obtain reliable data on private equity and hedge fund performance.  Returns at first 
seemed better than average corporate returns, though not consistently335.   
 
However this advantage was spectacularly reversed during the global financial crisis of 
2007-2009, with hedge funds recording average losses of 30% and many becoming 
insolvent336.  They had been amongst the largest investors in Collatoralised Debt 
Obligations (CDOs), and could be regarded as one of the causes of the Global Financial 
Crisis337.  Private equity firms have on the whole performed even worse, with consistently 
below market returns for investors, but above market returns for sponsors (executive 
managers)338.  In both cases, removing controls designed to protect shareholders’ 
interests has not proved to be in the shareholders’ interests for very long.  This then leads 
to the second recommended area of reform: the relationship between shareholders and 
corporate organisation and boards. 
 
8.2.4 Corporate Democracy in the Boardroom 
Australia339, the United States340 and all other OECD countries have legislation governing 
the reporting, structure, principal office bearers, and requirements for directors’ elections 
within a corporation.  Beyond that, few have any particular restrictions on how a 
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corporation may be organised, managed, or governed by directors.  In theory corporations 
are democratic at the level of executive leadership, with shareholders voting to decide who 
will be directors, and directors voting on important issues of corporate direction (and the 
executives’ salary). 
 
In practice I contend that corporations are ineffective as structures in ensuring democratic 
outcomes from these processes.  This is because of the separation of ownership and 
control embedded in their structure.  Historically this was first identified by Berle and 
Means in The Modern Corporation and Private Property341 (1932).  Berle and Means 
clearly stated the mechanisms, typically proxie voting rules, by which executives 
dominated voting in corporations.  They called for changes to increase shareholder ability 
to influence voting.  Much of the subsequent literature on corporate governance was in 
response to the issues they identified.  Yet it remains a sobering testament to the enduring 
power of corporations to resist legal reform that, almost eighty years later, most of the 
problems Berle and Means identified remain in both Australia and the United States 
corporations. 
 
In this context I will define democratic as meaning that a decision is reflective of the 
preferences of a majority of the stakeholders in the group making it or affected by it.  
Shareholder democracy then, is defined as a corporation having governance rules, 
structures and methods of election for office holders, such that the decision making 
process (and body) of the corporation is fairly representative of the interests of 
shareholders.  Fair in this context means that the influence is in proportion to the legitimate 
interest. 
 
Based on this definition of corporate democracy, current methods to elect directors in 
Australia and the United States rate very poorly.  Rules for directors elections are such 
that any individual who owns 51% of shares can control 100% of directorships and thus 
every vote.  In practice share holdings of over 30% are generally considered to be 
controlling interests in corporations, as it is rare that all shareholders vote.  In the absence 
of a dominant shareholder, executives are likely to have a higher degree of control using 
                                                
341 Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, “The Modern Corporation and Private Property.” (New York: 
Harcourt Brace and World 1932). 
 210 
the mechanisms Berle and Means identified342.  Some economists have argued that 
concentrated share ownership leads to benefits in efficient decision making343 whereas 
dispersed shareholding has benefits in share liquidity.  I question this as, even if true, it 
does not ensure a fair distribution of the benefits of efficiency among shareholders. 
 
Shareholders generally have no ability to influence the management of their corporation 
directly.  Once directors are elected, there is little more shareholders can do to control the 
corporation other than sell their shares if they are dissatisfied.  Most codes of corporate 
law require directors to inform shareholders of decisions after the fact.  Only a small range 
of prescribed decisions, such as accepting hostile mergers, require a prior vote from 
shareholders. 
 
Stakeholders other than shareholders and executives have no formal say in corporate 
decision making in Australia and the United States. This situation is typical of English-
speaking countries, but contrasts sharply with Germany where we have seen employee 
representatives are required on boards, and Japan where banks or the government 
(Ministry of Trade and Industry, MITI) are often represented. 
 
There is evidence that broader board membership has had the effect that abuses of 
corporate power for the benefit of executives have not occurred to the same extent.  
Executive salaries are lower in Germany compared to the United States and comparable 
to Australia despite being a much larger market.  This is even more true of Japan where 
external parties including banks and government agencies are represented on corporate 
boards344.  Union or government directors have no personal incentive to conceal wrong-
doing by executives that might harm their employees or community.  Neither are banks 
with an equity stake in the corporation.  This should reduce such abuses, or at least make 
them more difficult to perpetrate undetected. 
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Reforms that may increase the degree of shareholder democracy in corporations include 
changes to the decision making process, the process by which shareholders vote345, and 
the process by which representatives (directors) are nominated and elected.  Changes to 
the decision making process would primarily focus on ensuring that shareholder views are 
obliged to be acted upon by directors and executives.  Making the results of shareholder 
votes on executive remuneration binding would be one example of this type of reform.   
 
Changes to the selection process for shareholder representatives (i.e. directors) would be 
aimed at ensuring that the composition of corporate boards of directors was representative 
of shareholders, similar to concepts of proportional representation in political philosophy.  
The most obvious required reform to achieve this would be to enable shareholders to 
nominate for ballots for director positions, as argued by Bebchuk346.  At present ballot 
nominations are controlled by the corporation’s executives.  A proposal to introduce this 
reform in the United States was rejected by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
2007347.  Philosophically, regardless of whether or not other changes to corporate decision 
making are made, restrictions to the nomination process for directors are indefensible, 
since they ensure that the existing status quo may be maintained indefinitely, even if it 
harms shareholders.  That is, shareholders cannot attempt to gain control of their own 
asset. 
 
Other reforms required to achieve a measure of shareholder democracy should include 
simultaneous election of directors with proportional voting methods.  A majority 
shareholder would elect a majority of directors, but not all as at present.  Directors terms 
should be fixed to legislated limits, with maximum term limits for the chairman.  Board 
positions should be elected one half at a time, to ensure continuity.  This would be similar 
to the half Senate elections held in the Australian and United States upper houses of 
federal government. 
 
Opponents of corporate reforms to achieve increased shareholder democracy typically 
argue two key objections.  Firstly corporate regulations and legislation are already 
numerous and cumbersome, and such reforms are unnecessary and will increase the 
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compliance cost, harming profits and shareholders interests. Proponents of shareholder 
democracy cannot simply appeal to emotive arguments about rights, as we are not dealing 
with a fundamental question of individual liberty, only the management of (corporate) 
assets.  They need to demonstrate that the benefits of such reforms will outweigh their 
costs.  Karpoffa, Malatesta and Walkling have shown that, where measured, shareholder 
initiated proxy proposals have generally not improved the performance of corporations348 
to date.  
 
Reforms of the types proposed should not increase corporate costs.  The intention is not 
for shareholders to interfere in day to day running of corporations.  The intent is to prevent 
abuse of position by executives and directors, which should reduce overall costs. 
 
A second objection is that any regulation that impacts on corporate decision making may 
reduce the responsiveness and flexibility of a corporation, harming its ability to create 
returns for shareholders.  That is, there is no guarantee that corporate decision making 
under shareholder democracy would be any better than under current arrangements. Stout 
has argued that there is no evidence that reforms such as those proposed by Bebchuk will 
benefit shareholders349.  This is true, but is also a straw-man argument since, until the 
reforms are introduced there is no evidence either way.  I do not consider this a valid 
criticism.  It would preclude any organisational change to say that it could not proceed until 
proven effective, when it had not been tested. 
 
On balance it would, as a minimum, be desirable to reform existing corporate director 
election processes and shareholder voting mechanisms to prevent abuses of power by 
executives.  Both of these mechanisms already exist, and so this should not result in any 
additional costs to the corporate governance of the corporation.  The resulting 
improvement in oversight should reduce agency costs in the long term. 
 
The following reforms would seem essential, if the degree of shareholder democracy is to 
be increased from its present low level: 
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1. Election of corporate directors should be periodic, regular, and based on some form of 
proportional representation, with all directors subject to re-election at the same or 
alternating times. 
2. Maximum term limits would be recommended for critical posts such as chairman of the 
board or CEO.  (It should be a compulsory function of any good executive to identify 
and develop successors). 
3. Processes for selection of corporate executives should mirror processes for other 
employees, including transparency of advertising, position descriptions and offered 
rewards. 
4. Parallel reforms to governance of share investment funds are required to ensure that 
fund managers are answerable to investors. 
 
The following would also be highly desirable, if costs are not increased: 
1. Shareholder votes on topics such as executive compensation should be binding on 
corporate boards. 
2. Employee and community representatives with observer status (at least) should be 
required on boards of publicly listed companies. 
 
8.3 Introducing New Motivational Incentives 
 
I identified in Chapter Five that the motivational assumptions in agency theory were 
simplistic and needed revision.  Although a replacement theory is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, this highlights the potential to motivate executive behaviour by non-financial 
incentives.  This merits further investigation as a possible means to reduce current 
executive reward costs.  In (limited) defence of executives, it could be argued that at 
present in Australia and the United States financial reward is the only prize they have to 
strive for. 
 
We can see the significance of non-financial motivations in executive behaviour when we 
consider the evidence on executive rewards from countries with different corporate 
cultures to Australia and the United States.  In Japanese society membership of the 
workplace group as a community is very important.  Esteem within the workplace is highly 
valued by individuals, leading them to display a much higher degree of loyalty to the 
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corporation than is normal in western countries350.  Japanese executive rewards are 
noticeably lower than in Australia and the United States (see graphs in Chapter Two).  
While I do not suggest that Japanese business culture is without its negatives, it shows 
that cultural practices can influence behaviour in the workplace independent of rewards. 
 
If behavioural economic theories are correct, then there would appear to be potential to 
motivate executives through non-financial rewards.  One method could be to establish 
formal external recognition for achievement by executives.  This would take the form of 
independently awarded prizes or rewards for superior executive leadership as markers of 
status or recognition for high performance.  These would aim to satisfy the desire for 
esteem and comparative recognition identified in executives by Haigh351, without creating 
a cost burden for shareholders. 
 
Ideally such an award would be nominated by a credible independent body.  This could be 
done in a similar manner to the Nobel Prize for Economics created by the Bank of Sweden 
to raise the status of financial analysis, and the technology prize sponsored by Nokia.  An 
incentive for executives to be praised for their contribution to society, rather than criticised 
for their greed in accepting current reward levels, could be highly beneficial for both. 
 
As well as a carrot, use of a stick may be appropriate.  I mentioned previously, there has 
been a notable focus on positive incentives for executives in finance literature on executive 
rewards and very little discussion of negative incentives.  This raises the obvious question: 
why has there been so little discussion of the use of negative incentives (i.e. punishments 
for poor performance or misconduct) for executives?  Proponents of alignment theories 
might argue that not receiving a bonus is already a negative incentive.  However, when 
base salaries for executives are already multiples of the average wage, this defence rings 
hollow. 
 
Given the prevalence of “golden parachute” clauses in executive contracts (and their 
endorsement by proponents of alignment theory), this assumption must be questioned.  
Many persons lose their jobs through no fault of their own when the demand for labour or a 
company’s profit falls.   That risk is not described as a penalty for poor performance but as 
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the labour market at work.  The dismissal for poor performance approach inherent in 
alignment theory assumes that, given adequate performance, executive employment will 
continue at the same reward levels.  It becomes an entitlement that cannot be removed 
except for wrongdoing, similar to the concept of tenure for some public servants and 
academics.  
 
In an economic sense, if incentive payments are to be persisted with, then “clawback” 
provisions for bonuses from misreported profits must be added352.  Financial penalty 
clauses should be considered for cases of grievous failures of corporate management.  
These should apply to directors as well as executives.  There is now a movement towards 
greater accountability of directors for financial decisions over shareholder funds353.  I have 
not found any discussion of such a possibility in alignment theory literature, where it is 
presumed that dismissal is sufficient penalty for an executive, and no penalty appropriate 
for a director.  This has slanted the development of executive reward models sharply in 
executives’ favour. Roberts, McNulty and Stiles have shown that in respect of 
accountability, agency theory alone is inadequate to describe the full range of required 
functions of directors354. 
 
For cases of unethical behaviour by executives, mechanisms for disbarment from future 
executive employment should exist.  This is normal practice for other professions, where 
professional bodies assess complaints of unethical behaviour and deregister members for 
unethical conduct.  There are no equivalent bodies for corporate executives, other than 
recourse to the courts.  Codes of conduct have been introduced, but they are generally 
corporation specific and voluntary. 
 
Regulators may prohibit persons acting as company directors in the event of convictions 
for breaches of corporate law355.  Yet this is by an external body, and for criminal conduct, 
not merely unethical behaviour.  There is no internal policing of ethical standards by 
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executives or directors as groups in Australia or the United States.  In this sense neither 
executives nor directors can be defined as professionals, since there is no internal attempt 
to hold individuals accountable to any particular standard of professional behaviour. 
 
Given the lack of internal policing, an obvious means of adding negative incentives to 
reduce executive misbehaviour is to increase the degree of external surveillance and 
prosecution of unethical executive behaviour by government.  This would require 
investigative and prosecuting resources as well as legal frameworks.  Discussion of reform 
frequently focuses on change to corporate laws.  While not disputing the importance of 
such regulation, without adequate surveillance of corporate activity by regulators and 
prosecution of misbehaviour, the deterrence effect of such regulation remains negligible. 
 
The role of the financial press is valuable in regard to surveillance.  In an Australian 
context the highest profile corporate prosecutions over the past two decades – Alan 
Bond356, Chris Skase, Ray Williams and the directors of James Hardie – all followed initial 
exposure of the alleged wrongdoing in the financial press. It is an open question how many 
would have been charged without this initial media investigation and exposure.  
Prosecution of executives other than following a corporate collapse remains very rare.  It 
would be naive to pretend that breaches of corporate law only occur in the case of 
corporate collapses. 
 
In Australia this was demonstrated in the inquiry into the collapse of HIH insurance, where 
the inability of the regulator, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) to 
comprehend the industry, much less police it, was noted357.  Thereafter Australian 
corporate regulator resources were strengthened.  The subsequent strength of financial 
regulators in Australia has been identified as one of the prime reasons why the global 
financial crisis had less severe consequences there than in the rest of the OECD358.  This 
stands in sharp contrast to the United States, where regulation was weakened in the 
decade prior to the financial crisis, with disastrous consequences. 
 
                                                
356 Paul Barry, “The Rise And Fall Of Alan Bond.” (Sydney :Bantam Books, 1991). 
357 Richard Grant, “Australia’s Corporate Regulators – the ACCC, ASIC and APRA.” 
Parliamentary Library Research Brief, Parliament of Australia, Canberra (2004). 
358 OECD, “OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform - Australia: Towards a Seamless National 
Economy.” OECD Directorate for Public Governance and Territorial Development, 15 February 
2010.  Accessed online at www.oecd.org 22 July 2010. 
 217 
8.4 Capping Executive Salary 
 
In the aftermath of the major financial collapses in 2008 experienced first in the United 
States and then worldwide, caps on the quantum of executive salary have been proposed 
in many OECD countries, including Australia and the United States.  In Australia in 2008 
the Prime Minister proposed limits on executive salary to the G20 when it met to discuss 
the need for regulatory reform.  At the time several countries actually imposed limits on 
executive salaries for companies in receipt of financial assistance, including France, 
Germany, Holland and Sweden359.  However by mid 2009 Australia had seemingly 
deferred this course of action, preferring to await the outcome of the Productivity 
Commission Inquiry360.   
 
In March 2009 the Australian Productivity Commission was charged with carrying out an 
inquiry into the regulatory framework around remuneration of directors and executives of 
companies regulated under the Corporations Act.  The initial discussion paper of this 
focused on eliminating the most questionable executive pay practices, such as “golden 
parachute” clauses, and making shareholder vote on executive pay contracts binding361.  
The question of executive pay caps was not pursued. 
 
In the United States efforts to reduce or limit corporate executive rewards started with the 
attempted bailout of financial organisations under the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) in 2008.  It had been intended that (insolvent) financial institutions in receipt of 
direct government assistance would be conditional on paying executive salaries of no 
more than $1 million each per annum (23 times average salary) and not paying bonuses.  
Even these limits were not in practice enforced after both Republican and Democrat Party 
Senators opposed them362.  
 
In the first instance most of these proposals appear to have been driven by widespread 
anger at the greed displayed by individual executives in the most egregious cases.  There 
is resentment at the social inequity caused by executives receiving rewards hundreds of 
                                                
359 Joann S. Lublin and Mike Esterl, “Executive pay curbs go global.” Wall Street Journal, October 
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360 Australian Government Productivity Commission, “Regulation of Director and Executive 
Remuneration in Australia.” Productivity Commission Issues Paper, April 2009.  
361 Australian Government Productivity Commission, April 2009, Ibid. 
362 United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, “Summary of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.” (Retrieved October 2, 2008) 
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times those of other workers.  A second rational is that very high executive salaries linked 
to performance bonuses had been a major incentive to adopt high risk investment 
strategies and thus acted as one of the motivational causes of the financial collapse.  
Therefore it would be in the public interest to limit executive rewards and end the perverse 
incentives to take excessive risks with corporate investment strategies. 
 
8.4.1 The Ethics of Salary Caps 
While market intervention in general is justified in cases of executive labour markets, we 
need to consider the ethics of salary caps.  The first question that should be considered is 
whether it is ethical to intervene to limit the incomes of private individuals in general, or of 
specific occupational groups such as corporate executives.  That is, is it reasonable for 
government to single out a particular occupational group and intervene to reduce or cap 
their income to a pre-determined level.  This assumes that the current income they receive 
is from a distorted market where economic rents may be extracted. 
 
In general terms governments already intervene to control market outcomes for incomes 
where the public interest is served.  Restrictions are variously applied to the number of 
hours allowed to be worked, number of clients permitted, fee that may be charged per 
service and/or fees per hour.  For example in Australia the fees that doctors charge are 
limited in ways that limit the maximum gross income able to be earned363.   
 
Governments have also intervened to control or reduce incomes for workers more 
generally, and not only for particular occupations.  In Australia in the 1980s the Hawke 
Labor government had a policy of wage restraint, whereby increases in wages were limited 
to those justified by increases in worker productivity.  After allowing for the effects of 
inflation, real average incomes for most workers declined significantly during this period.  
 
Historically maximum wages were set in the past in both England and the United States.  
In renaissance England the Statute of Artificers (1563) allowed magistrates to limit the 
wages of labourers, apprentices and tradesmen in a county.  At the time certificates 
required to live and work in some counties had the effect of artificially creating shortages of 
labour and higher wages.  Similar limits to wages for free tradesmen were imposed in 17th 
                                                
363 Bob Birrell, “Implications of controls on access to Medicare billing for GPs.” People and Place 
Vol. 5 No.1 1997.  
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century American colonies to prevent exploitation of labour shortages364.  Both of these 
cases were upper limits to wages for workers, not on the income of managers or the 
owners of capital.  In the modern era several professional sports have salary caps on 
individuals or teams, such as in football and basketball in the United States and football in 
Australia.  Many public service positions also have limits on the earning of income from 
outside (i.e. non-public service) sources. 
 
Salary caps may also be implemented through indirect means, such as via progressive 
income tax scales.  In western countries after World War Two progressive tax regimes 
incorporated very high marginal tax rates, up to 90%, for very high incomes.  These had 
the effect of setting de-facto maximum wages, with most income above the maximum rate 
threshold lost.  There was a corresponding fall in maximum wages in real terms365.   
 
The fact that salary caps have been successfully implemented in the past, and in other 
fields, does not necessarily make them ethical.  Salary caps may face economic counter 
arguments, as well as the criticism that they are an infringement of individual liberty.  
Monetarist economists such as Milton Friedman argued that high tax rates were a 
disincentive to creativity and innovation that would ultimately leave the society worse off366.  
This criticism is purely empirical and depends on the net effect on society of the tax rate 
for its force.  Friedman does not argue against high tax rates in principle.   
 
Austrian school economists such as Friedrich von Hayek and libertarians such as Robert 
Nozick had more fundamental criticisms of interference in the market.  They saw large 
governments and high taxation rates as underpinning the welfare state and an 
infringement on individual liberty. Hayek argued that they could ultimately lead to 
totalitarian states367.  He opposed the idea of “social justice” saying for markets “there is 
no point calling the outcome just or unjust”368. It could be argued that this conflation of 
ideas is unfair – punitive taxation rates on very high incomes need not be associated with 
large government or a welfare state.  However it does seem intuitively correct that punitive 
taxation rates are an infringement of a person’s liberty as conceived in the Lockean sense. 
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Locke argued that the fruits of a person’s labours belong to that person.   From this it could 
be said that an earned income in a capitalist society belongs to the individual and should 
not be taxed more than is necessary to maintain the society.  If this logic is extended to 
corporate executives, their salaries are earned from their own labours, and should no more 
be taxed than any other individual should be.  The fact that their income might be larger 
than other workers’ incomes may reflect greater intellect, effort or good fortune, but is not 
in itself a reason to tax them more. 
 
I consider that applying the Lockean argument to corporate executive incomes takes it 
much too far.  Locke was referring to individuals’ incomes from things created by their own 
physical labours.  It has already been shown in past chapters that corporate executives 
are not solely responsible for the production of their corporation.  Hence the Lockean 
argument cannot be used as a justification for executive income by linking their labour to 
corporate outputs.  It only justifies their income if it is the case that the effort or skill applied 
by the executive has resulted in the corporation’s social product.  As we have seen the 
reality is far more complex for a large corporation, with the efforts of other workers and the 
capital of the corporation both contributing to the output. 
 
The quantum of corporate executive rewards is now so great compared to other workers 
that it is implausible for it to be explained by differences in effort or skill.  Executives are 
undoubtedly skilled, but there is no evidence that they are more skilled than other 
professions such as doctors, lawyers and engineers.  Their requirements for formal 
training and education are generally less than these professions.  Professional positions 
are typically paid more than average wages, but not greatly, with average incomes in the 
listed professions typically no more than twice or three times the workforce average, 
though higher for doctors in the United States.  Differences in skill level are not sufficient to 
justify current executive rewards in comparison to other skilled occupations. 
 
Differences in effort also do not explain executive rewards. Their working hours are long, 
but again not more so than many other occupations.  Even if a person chose to do nothing 
but work and sleep in their life, compared to a “normal” forty hour week an individual 
working 100 hours per week, would justify a difference in income of up to 2.5 times on the 
basis of difference in labour exerted.  Again, the difference in effort exerted is not sufficient 
to justify current executive rewards.  Paying an executive dozens of times the average 
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wage (in Australia) or hundreds of times the average wage (in the United States) cannot 
be justified by differences in skill and effort.  Hence the Lockean argument fails as a 
justification of current levels of executive rewards. 
 
There is nothing about a transaction being a market transaction that makes it inherently 
just.  Nor is there any moral principle that says the government may not intervene in 
markets to influence transactions or outcomes.  Rather, the question is whether the public 
interest is served by restricting the market or not369.  If salary caps achieve the best overall 
social outcome, then they are ethically justified in the same way that the market is justified, 
by creating a social benefit.    
 
There are particular reasons in the case of executive salary why caps on rewards may be 
more appropriate than usual.  These are in addition to the weaknesses already identified in 
the executive labour market.  In the case of public companies in Australia and the United 
States, government intervention has already affected the market for executive labour. 
Federal legislation requires all workers to have part of their pay invested into 
superannuation or retirement benefit funds.  These in turn must invest some of the funds in 
private corporations through share markets.  Thus government regulation intervenes in the 
share market in a manner that increases the flow of capital into it.  This raises share prices 
and assists executives in achieving bonuses based on their company’s share price.  If 
executive “performance” is defined by changes in share price, then a large proportion of 
the “performance” executives claim in their desert base over the past three decades has 
been due to government regulation rather than their own efforts. 
 
A counter-argument to salary caps on particular occupational groups such as corporate 
executives is that they represent discrimination against those individuals.  Such a salary 
cap, in the absence of caps on incomes of other groups, would represent an arbitrary 
judgement that their work was less valuable to society than occupations with uncapped 
incomes. This would be valid if the salary cap is targeted solely at corporate executives. 
However this objection can be circumvented in the design of the cap.  A salary cap placed 
on all employees earning more than, say ten times the average income, including 
executives of any publicly listed corporation (presumably on other public institutions as 
well) would not be discriminatory but would still be highly effective.  The quantum of 
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corporate executive salaries is now so high that a targeted ban is not necessary.  A salary 
cap could be set at a level so that it was highly effective on executives (eg. ten times 
average wages) without affecting the prospects of other occupational groups.   
 
The acceptance of a range of different salary cap levels within the professional sports 
previously identified undermines any arguments about discrimination.  Dietl et al have 
shown that professional sports demonstrate differential salary caps can benefit a practice 
and be acceptable to society given that there is a clear public benefit370.  The principle to 
consider when applying salary caps is not whether they are discriminatory, but whether the 
discrimination is justified, in terms of the public interest.  In this respect salary caps may 
have an advantage over punitive tax rates on all high income earners.  They can 
discriminate between cases where very high incomes are justified, and those that are not. 
We have already seen that high levels of reward for executives do not appear to be 
justified.  A salary cap on them would prevent this occurrence, while not affecting 
occupations where high rewards were individually earned, such as “superstars” in the 
fields of entertainment, sports, and enterpreneurs who owned their own business, and 
deserved to keep their income as the fruits of their own labour.  
 
8.4.2 The Form of Executive Salary Caps 
The first executive salary caps proposed have consisted typically of two components:  
1. capping the total rewards (salary and bonuses) of executives to a multiple of average 
earnings either of all employees within the corporation or within the community as a 
whole; and 
2. elimination of dubious payouts such as “golden parachute” termination payments 
received by executives upon dismissal. 
 
Examples of such caps were proposed in Australia and the United States.  In Australia the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) proposed limiting the total rewards to 
executives at an upper limit of ten times the average wage of workers in the enterprise 
concerned.  Performance bonuses were to be strictly regulated and limited to cases where 
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companies outperformed their industry peers over a five year period371.  These limits were 
intended both to reduce absolute reward levels and the discrepancy between executive 
rewards and other workers.  The five year period would act as a device to limit perverse 
incentives towards taking excessive short term risks. 
 
The ACTU proposal tried to link executive salary to the average wage in the firm rather 
than the community.  This approach is questioned.  It has the benefit to unions of providing 
an incentive to raise workers wages within the firm and should reduce inequity.  However 
that does not make it inherently just. Evaluation of most occupational incomes is by 
comparison to overall average wages, not averages within an industry.  If the task of 
executive leadership is essentially the same in different industries, there seems no reason 
why the leader of a corporation with highly paid workers should earn more than the leader 
of a corporation with lower paid workers.  In industries where pay rates are unusually high 
throughout the industry, such as investment banking, such an approach would have acted 
as a significant brake on some of the most contentious executive salary cases in recent 
years.  On balance a cap on executive salary linked to average worker rewards would be 
preferable to a cap linked to average wages within a firm or industry. 
 
8.4.3 Criticisms of Executive Salary Caps 
Opponents of executive salary caps argue that they are “creeping socialism” or an 
interference in the market that will lead to a “brain drain” of the best executive talent from 
the country372.  Others claim they are the “politics of envy”373 or will create unintended 
consequences.  None of these counter claims are persuasive or proven, and some may be 
dis-proven.  I will deal with each in turn. 
 
References to socialism are ad-hominem type arguments (at least in the minds of 
libertarian critics) without philosophical force.  Whether a policy represents “socialism” or 
not is a political question but is not an ethical criticism.  As for the claim itself, socialism is 
normally taken to refer to systems where the means of production, such as corporations, 
are owned by the State, not simply regulated.  We have already identified many forms of 
government intervention and regulation, including limits on income for private agents that 
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are present in market economies.   Regardless of the intervention, the market agents still 
remain private, not State owned, entities.  Thus an executive salary cap does not 
represent socialism by definition.  The criticism is false and, even if it were true, not 
persuasive.  Complaints of interference in markets are not a counter-argument either; 
there is nothing sacred about a market that prohibits such interference.   
 
Claims of a “brain drain” are at best unproven and at worst false.  There is little known 
evidence that the skills and knowledge that creates a successful executive in one market 
is transferable internationally, or that such brain drains ever occur.  Nor is there evidence 
that the level of executive pay will cause executives to leave a given corporation, much 
less a nation.  Hasenhuttl and Harrison found no relationship between relative CEO pay 
and the likelihood of leaving a corporation374.  OECD studies have shown that it is 
predominantly scientists, engineers and technicians that move internationally for higher 
pay.  Business executives move mostly due to mergers and acquisitions by their 
corporation375.  There is no evidence that a “brain drain” for executives exists, or wold be 
created by differences in levels of reward or any other reason. 
 
A refined version of the brain drain argument by Kaplan376 is that restrictions on executive 
salary will lead to a brain drain of executives from corporations to hedge funds and private 
equity groups, that already pay much higher rewards to executives than publicly listed 
corporations.  Kaplan is correct that private equity groups and hedge funds do pay 
executives more than public corporations.  The highest paid US hedge fund managers in 
2007 are listed in Table 8.1 below: 
 
Table 8.1 Highest Paid US Hedge Fund Managers in 2007377 
Rank CEO/Manager 2007 Salary Hedge Fund Fund Size 
1 John Paulson $3.7B US John Paulson & Co $35B US 
2 George Soros $2.9B US Quantum Fund $17B US 
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3 James Simons $2.8B US Renaissance Tech. $29B US 
4 Phil Falcone $1.7B US Harbinger Capital $26B US 
5 Ken Griffin $1.5B US Citadel Investment $17.5B US 
 
However Kaplan’s argument raises other problems.  Firstly it is only relevant to the 
executives of finance corporations since they are the persons likely to transfer to 
management of private equity and hedge funds.  Secondly private equity groups and 
hedge funds are not models of good practice.  Private equity groups and hedge funds 
formed a growing sector of the US economy in the decade up to 2007.  At their peak in 
2007 hedge funds contained 2.5 trillion US$ in assets, although this fell after the sub-prime 
market bubble burst, and during the global financial crisis of 2007-09.  Many of the 
practices associated with the causes of the global financial crisis were intimately related to 
the investment behaviour of hedge funds378.  Many funds became insolvent, or suffered 
massive losses during this period. 
 
Hedge funds are not (at the time of writing) subject to the same reporting rules and 
regulations as publicly listed corporations.  Many were deliberately structured to avoid 
such rules.  Hence it is difficult to establish their true level of performance or the 
justification for executive rewards.  Rewards for the highest paid and most successful 
managers are known, but industry averages are not.  Hedge funds typically charge clients 
management fees of 2% of funds invested and an additional performance fee of 20% of 
the profits made.  In many respects hedge funds are pure speculators rather than 
productive entities.  The number of staff employed is usually small.  Managing one is an 
analytical task of investment judgement, rather than a leadership task of a large 
organisation.   Their enormous rewards is as an indication of weak regulation rather than 
proof of superior management.   
 
On balance I consider that comparison of corporate executive pay with private equity and 
hedge fund managers’ incomes is a straw man argument that does not justify either.  If 
there is a risk of a brain drain from corporations to hedge funds, it only occurs in the 
finance industry.  In that case, the solution is to regulate hedge funds and their executives’ 
incomes, not raise corporate executive incomes to the same level.  A salary cap that 
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included hedge fund managers as well as corporate executives would eliminate the 
possibility of Kaplan’s brain drain. 
 
The politics of envy argument is that the demands for caps are based on jealousy and do 
not fairly assess the value of the executive.  Describing objections to high executive 
rewards as jealousy misrepresents the criticisms most often made of executive rewards.  It 
implies that the critics wish to do the same as the executives and would do so if they had 
the opportunity.  It also implies that the criticism is based on emotion and not rational 
argument.  While the motivation for popular commentators is unknown, amongst 
professional and academic critics this is clearly false.   
 
Academic critics of high salary objecting on principle, such as J.K. Galbraith, Jared Harris, 
and Paul Wilhelm379 argue that nobody should earn rewards either so high or so much 
higher than fellow workers.  Academic critics objecting on economic grounds, such as 
Lucien Bebchuck, Paul Krugman, Rakesh Kurana, Nell Minnow and John Shields argue 
that the rewards are not in the public interest and by implication would regard it as wrong 
for them to take such rewards themselves.  Neither group work as executives and have 
never expressed any desire to become executives and earn an executive salary.  
Professional business critics such as Warren Buffett and William Gates have had the 
means and opportunity to pay themselves such rewards as executives and declined to do 
so.   
 
The emotional aspect of the response to excessive executive rewards would be more 
accurately described as resentment rather than jealousy. The level of executive pay has 
been proven to fail all relevant tests of fairness in earlier chapters.  Resentment that is 
present as a result would seem justified.  All of the listed critics have cited rational reasons 
for their criticism.  Hence the implication of an emotional nature to the criticism of 
executive rewards is false both in terms of the emotions claimed to be at play, and false 
more generally. 
 
Another argument against executive salary caps is that they will be very difficult to define 
and enforce.  This may be true, as all previous attempts to force full disclosure of actual 
executive salary have proven at best partly successful.  Complex bonus options that may 
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be vested in future years make it difficult to determine what part of an executives’ reward 
was earned in the current year.  As long as the executives in question remain in control of 
the reporting mechanisms of their corporations, forcing disclosure will remain difficult.  This 
may in turn require tighter regulation, which will in turn add a compliance cost to the 
corporation, which is also a cost to shareholders.   
 
The argument about difficulty in enforcement of salary caps is a perverse argument in 
another sense.  Much of the complexity that does exist arises from the efforts of 
executives themselves to conceal the level of their rewards and bonus targets from 
scrutiny.  This is done through the continual invention of new jargon to describe rewards 
and through complicated reporting structures.  It would not encourage ethical behaviour in 
reward practices to abandon attempts at regulation due to the efforts of the rewarded 
parties to evade them.  Intelligently designed, new regulations may become a disincentive 
against opaque reporting structures.  This raises another argument that may affect the 
ability to impose salary caps – that there is a right to privacy of information regarding 
income for executives. 
 
A counter argument to the cost of implementation criticism is that it is not necessarily the 
case that regulations such as salary caps need be costly and inefficient.  It is possible to 
intelligently design such restrictions to minimise implementation cost.  It is often the case 
in practice that the more simply defined such restrictions are, the more difficult they are to 
evade and the less complex is their implementation380. 
 
None of these counter-argument justify the non-implementation of executive salary caps.  
The question should not be whether a reward cap is difficult, but whether a cap is needed.  
That need has already been established, as has the likelihood that the compliance cost of 
the regulation is less than the economic losses now arising from reward practices.  The 
argument about difficulty of regulation is therefore not sufficient to discount implementing 
such measures. 
 
                                                
380 For example, in Australia in 1986 the introduction of the Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT), 
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unpopular with business interests, this definition was highly effective in capturing such income. 
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8.4.4 The Right to Privacy over Income 
This argument assumes that there is a right to privacy over personal information such as 
income.  Philosophically, Aristotle first distinguished between the public or political, and the 
private or domestic spheres of interests in The Politics.  Legal rights to privacy exist over 
various aspects of life, such as voting intention and medical records.  These were implied 
in the Fourth amendment of the United States Constitution (1791), became a specific 
constitutional right to privacy after a US Supreme Court case (1965), and now exists in 
most western countries381.  However while these instances may be seen as instrumentally 
necessary to particular practices, there is still no general philosophically agreed definition 
of privacy, or agreement on a right to it.   
 
Warren and Brandeis382 raised the concept of “informational privacy” in the 1890s, but did 
so in the context of persons’ thoughts, sentiments and emotions, not finances.  William 
Prosser383 gave a more specific definition of four different interests in privacy.  These 
included intrusion into private affairs, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, 
damaging publicity, and appropriation of a person’s likeness (appearance).  It was not 
clear if these interests would apply to matters on the public record, and presumably could 
still be trumped by a public interest.  Prosser’s work was based on a review of legal cases 
and still did not amount to a general theory of privacy.  None of the interests he cited 
would justify non-disclosure of income for a corporate executive or anyone else. 
 
For there to be a “right” to privacy over information on personal income, such a right must 
be universalisable to all employed persons.  At present this is impossible in most western 
countries.  The incomes of employees in public service and on other fixed pay scale 
positions are able to be known accurately for anyone whose individual pay level is known.  
Hence a right to privacy over personal income is not universalisable and cannot be 
regarded as existing as a right at present.  Claims by business groups that disclosure of 
aspects of executive income are a breach of such a right to privacy are false384.  
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personal security from unreasonable seizure and searches.  The 1965 case Griswald v Connecticut 
(381 US 479) established a specific right to privacy. 
382 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy.” Harvard Law Review 4:193-
220 (1890). 
383 William Prosser, “Privacy.” 48 California Law Review 383 (1960). 
384 For example, see Business Council of Australia, “Submission to the Productivity Commission 
Discussion Draft on Executive remuneration in Australia.” Comments on Draft Recommendations 8 
and 12, November 2009. 
 229 
 
Supporters of a privacy right over personal income would also have to show how it would 
be in the public interest for such a right to exist for it to be adopted in future.  This is 
difficult to show for economic information such as personal income in a free-market 
economy because it will reduce the amount of information available to the market and 
hence reduce the efficiency of market outcomes.  Posner cited this reason in arguing that 
the kinds of interests protected by privacy are not distinctive385.  That is, they are for 
private economic gain, not public gain, and not justified. 
 
There seems no possibility to argue for a right to privacy of information on corporate 
executive income in opposing salary caps.  If the corporate executive labour market works 
competitively then the information on income is required for efficient working of that 
market.  If the corporate executive labour market does not work competitively then 
interventions in the market such as salary caps are warranted. 
 
There is no evidence that the opaqueness of current reporting structures is in the interests 
of shareholders, as the notorious Enron case demonstrated.  In the post 2007-08 financial 
collapses era, disclosure and independent auditing of executive rewards would appear to 
be desirable and in the shareholders’ interest.  Given the public cost of bailing out failed 
firms in this period, the same argument would apply to the public interest. 
 
Another solution to this problem is that governments could use the income taxation 
mechanism to both define executive income (taxable income) and check that the income 
did not exceed the relevant limit.  Public access to taxable incomes is a feature in several 
nations, including Japan for corporations, and Norway, Sweden and Finland for all 
individuals. 
 
8.4.5 Other Payment Restrictions 
Other proposed restrictions on executive rewards, such as bans on golden parachutes and 
other types of unearned bonus payments, do not face the same counter-arguments as 
salary caps.  The original justifications for these payments were purely empirical and failed 
to consider their negative consequences.  There seems no ethical difficulty in imposing a 
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ban on a particular form of payment such as these.  Such a ban does not limit an 
executive’s potential income, and protects the community from possible harm.  Given that 
these bonus payments are by definition unearned the executive does not have a moral 
claim to them via a Lockean argument.  Ethically, banning these forms of payments is not 
only justified, but desirable to protect the public interest. 
 
The comparative acceptance of regulations banning or limiting such payments also 
undermines in-principle arguments against salary caps generally.  If defenders of high 
executive pay believed that salary caps were in-principle wrong then they would 
presumably oppose caps on termination payments and golden parachutes as well, since 
these are a component of executive pay packages.  The lack of objections to such 
restrictions illustrates that opponents of salary caps do not have a principled argument 
against caps, and only seek to defend the status quo. 
 
Australia and the United States may soon find themselves overtaken in this area of 
regulation by international developments.  In several European countries shareholders of 
corporations have had the right to vote to reject executive pay agreements for some years.  
That is, unlike Australian legislation, the votes are binding on the boards386.  In Germany in 
2009 the Bundestag (Lower House) passed a law limiting executive salary387 in several 
ways: 
! share options may only be cashed out after four years 
! executives may be liable for damages up to 1.5 times their salary  
 
This trend does not in itself justify executive salary caps.  Nevertheless, it demonstrates 
that such limits are part of a movement for change.  In this context, similar restrictions 
being emplaced in Australia and the United States would seem reasonable. 
 
8.4.6 Appropriate Levels for Executive Salary Caps 
The level of salary caps requires careful consideration.  The cap limits actually proposed to 
date have all been very high – ten times average earnings in the firm in Australia (ACTU), 
$500,000 per annum in the United States (TARP limit on executives; 13 times average US 
earnings), and 500,000 Euro in Germany for finance executives (14 times average 
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earnings).  These caps all represent multiples of average incomes (10 to 14 times) that are 
higher than those established in Chapter One for any other field.  From that analysis, a 
salary limit of four to six times average incomes would be more consistent with community 
norms, and should be sufficient to accommodate appropriate levels of average executive 
reward, assuming acceptable performance.   
 
Any executive reward limits should allow for reasonable bonuses for executives performing 
exceptionally well and thus have some margin for above average rewards.  The potential 
for excessive bonuses to cause moral hazard must be curbed.  The difficulty with bonuses 
has been their excessive size and receipt even when performance was poor, not the 
concept of incentive payments itself.  If an allowance of up to an additional 20% were 
made for rewards to executives performing above average, then a maximum executive 
salary cap of six to eight times average incomes should be sufficient. This is based on an 
average executive reward of four to six times average incomes, with performance bonuses 
of up to an additional 20% of the base salary.  This should be sufficient to allow for 
reasonable incentives.  This would correspond to executive salary caps of up to $480,000 
AUS in Australia in 2009388, and up to $320,000 US in the United States in 2009389.  The 
US figure is based on a different definition of wages (including part time workers).  In 
reality the United States cap figures would be similar to the Australian cap figure.  There is 
no evidence that capping salary to a higher level than this is justified. 
 
There is preliminary evidence that salary caps of a similar level may be effective.  
Following the United States Troubled Assetts Relief Program (TARP) “bailout” of financial 
and automotive corporations in 2008, those firms’ executive salaries required administrator 
approval.  Most salary packages were limited to under $500,000 US in cash with higher 
amounts in stock to be held for three years or more.  For some executives this represented 
a reduction in income of over 60%.  Despite claims that executives would leave if caps 
were imposed390, in these firms 88 out of 104 executives (85%) still remained in their 
positions two years later391.  It remains to be seen whether this will remain the case as the 
United States economy improves. 
                                                
388 Eight times 2008 average full time income of $60,387 from OECD, Benefits and Wages, 
Australia, 2008, accessed online at www.oecd.org 21 July 2010. 
389 Eight times 2008 average wage of $39,481 from OECD, Benefits and Wages, United States, 
2008, accessed online at www.oecd.org 21 July 2010. 
390 Conor Clarke, “Six reasons to doubt executive compensation caps.” The Atlantic, Feb 3 2009.  
See also Robert Frank, (2009) “Should Congress Cap Executive Pay”. 
391 Eric Dash, “Few Fled Companies Constrained by Pay Limits.” New York Times March 22, 2010. 
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In more normal circumstances such caps may be difficult to implement.  In labour market 
economics wages are notorious for being difficult to adjust downwards, even when there is 
a compelling case to do so392.  The fact that many executives have base salaries in excess 
of these levels means that they would require large downward adjustments in existing 
contracts to comply.  This would make such salary caps politically difficult to implement 
due to the management power able to be exerted by incumbents over government.  For 
example when the Swiss government proposed executive salary caps in the wake of 
expensive bailouts of Swiss banks in 2009, Peter Brabeck the chairman of Nestle393 
threatened to relocate the corporation’s headquarters away from Switzerland.  There was 
no suggestion in the threat that this would be in the interests of Nestle shareholders. 
 
This does not mean that the proposed salary limits are not required or are too low.  It 
illustrates the magnitude of the problem due to management power and excessive 
executive salary.  However a weaker salary limit is not a desirable compromise.  If the 
salary limits were set at a level that required no downward adjustment of current executive 
rewards they would simply be an acknowledgement of the current status quo and would 
not represent any honest assessment of what level executive salaries should be.  Given 
that current salary levels are excessive by all means of analysis considered in this thesis, 
caps set to accommodate those salaries might have the undesirable effect of legitimising 
and thus perpetuating them.  Salary limits should be based on what level would 
encompass a fair reward for executives performing as expected, not on political 
expediency.  
 
8.5 Political Difficulties in Limiting Management Power 
 
At this point we have established that the current corporate executive labour market is 
exploitative, that executive rewards are excessive and that as a result the public interest is 
harmed, while existing regulation of executive labour markets is ineffectual.  High 
executive salaries are also highly unpopular in societies where they are observed, and 
benefit only a tiny number of individuals.  Politically it should be a simple and popular task 
                                                
392 Robert E. Hall, 'Stochastic implications of the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis.” Journal 
of Political Economy 86 (6), pp. 971-87 1978. 
393 AFP, “Salary cap – Nestle threatens to leave Switzerland.” Sydney Morning Herald, September 
14, 2009. 
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for governments to regulate to reform executive labour markets and reduce executive 
salary.   
 
Yet effective reforms have not occurred after three decades in Australia or the United 
States.  This raises the question of why politicians would not act on an issue that is both 
necessary and likely to be politically popular.  One obvious reason for not introducing limits 
to executive salary is a lack of political will (from politicians) to act to implement them.  I 
will now sketch a theory as to why this occurs. 
 
From economics, public choice theory394 explains how corporations use their financial 
power to lobby politicians to distort business regulations in favour of corporate 
(shareholder) interests at the expense of the public interest.  This enables market failures 
to remain in the long term395. From Agency theory we know that corporate executives use 
management power to further their private interests rather than shareholder interests.  
 
We have established in Chapter Four that corporate interests as such do not exist.  
Therefore not only should we expect that corporations will use their influence with 
government to distort regulations to benefit shareholders, but that they will do it to benefit 
executives’ private interests as well.  I will define this concept of corporate executives 
using the lobbying power of the corporation to induce governments to legislate for their 
private interests as “executive influence theory”.  This may be summarised as follows: 
 
Public Choice:  Corporations lobby governments for corporate ends 
+ Agency Theory: Executives use corporate powers for private ends 
 
= Executive Influence: Executives lobby governments for private ends 
 
Seen in the light of executive influence theory, the ongoing failure of Australian and United 
States governments to effectively regulate corporate executive salaries is easy to explain, 
though still difficult to defend.  This trend has worsened in recent decades, with the 
increasing tendency of executives to donate corporate (i.e. shareholder) funds towards 
political campaigns.  Corporate donations are now the dominant source of political funding 
                                                
394 James M. Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock, “The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy.” (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1958). 
395 R.S. Kroszner and T. Stratmann, “Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the 
Rewards to Legislators.” The Journal of law and Economics, 2005. 
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in Australia and the United States.  Farrell, Hirsch and Netter (2001) have highlighted the 
link between corporate political finance and executive remuneration396. 
 
This represents a serious political problem that will be difficult to repair.  The importance of 
corporate funding to politician’s prospects of election continues to grow as electronic 
media become more influential in society.  The proportion of western economies made up 
by large corporations also continues to grow over time.  It would seem that the ability of 
executives to use shareholder funds to buy influence from legislators, to ensure that 
legislation allows them to continue to extract an excessive amount of shareholder funds in 
their rewards, will only increase over time.  
 
One area where governments may have leverage to move towards reform is in the 
regulation of how retirement savings are invested.  Prudent risk management alone would 
recommend that these savings not be invested in companies that paid executives 
excessively or using risk encouraging bonus plans.  In Australia, governments could 
require that “approved” superannuation funds (eligible to receive tax deductible 
contributions) could only invest in private companies that followed a code of practice 
including salary caps, bonus caps and no “golden parachute” payments.  In the United 
States similar restrictions could be placed on any corporation receiving funds (shares or 
equity) from pension plans and retirement savings plans.  This would not impose such 
changes on all corporations, but would add a strong market incentive for them to reform.  If 
not they would be cut off from a large pool of investment capital.   
 
As a minium in both jurisdictions, governments should include all private equity, pension, 
and superannuation and funds in similar corporate governance regimes to public 
corporations.  This is to ensure that share investors may have some say on the rewards of 
fund managers and the use of invested funds.  Without such controls, it cannot be 
guaranteed that fund managers will exercise their position as institutional shareholders to 
benefit fund investors and not themselves.  At present the same agency problems exist in 
these institutions as between shareholders and corporate executives, but with even less 
transparency, and no ability to control the outcome.  This is not economically efficient, in 
addition to the impact on executive rewards. 
 
                                                
396 Kathleen A. Farrell, Philip L. Hersch, and Jeffry M., Netter, “Executive Compensation and 
Executive Contributions to Corporate PACs.” Advances in Financial Economics Vol.6 2001. 
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In the long term, this issue highlights a threat to the integrity of political systems in 
capitalist democracies.  Capitalist democracies based on representative governments 
enshrine the concept of equal rights between citizens.  Considerable power and a unique 
combination of legal rights, without some legal obligations that fall to citizens, have been 
accrued by corporations.  These entities are controlled by an individual CEO or a small 
number of executives who can use corporate powers to pursue their private interests. The 
existence of large corporations controlled by a few executives undermines the concept of 
political equality between individuals.  The individuals who control corporations wield 
considerably greater power and influence over government than other individuals in the 
society.   
 
There are numerous examples of this use of corporate power to pursue private agendas 
already occurring.  In Australia the politically active and often partisan behaviour of media 
barons Rupert Murdoch and formerly Kerry Packer has been notorious for its interference 
in government and the political process.  In the United States the historical actions of 
individuals such as Randolph Hearst, Henry Ford and John Rockefeller, and more recently 
Rupert Murdoch (now a US citizen) show the same pattern of behaviour.  Perhaps the 
most famous instance is the career of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who has on 
many occasions used his media company RAI, not only to pursue political agendas, but to 
promote his own political career. 
 
The most prominent examples of the political use of corporations are by individuals who 
were CEOs or executives of media companies, but they are by no means the only 
individuals who are politically active through their corporate powers.  Many corporations 
lobby government to pass laws that suit their business activities397.  The actions in office of 
former US Vice President and Halliburton CEO Richard Cheney illustrate a further related 
problem: conflicts of interest for politicians awarding government contracts to firms of 
which they were formerly executives398.  
 
This issue of corporate influence over political as well as economic policy is not new.  It 
was raised by J.K. Galbraith over forty years ago in, for example, identifying the role of US 
                                                
397 John M. De Figueiredo, and Emerson H. Tiller, “The Structure and Conduct of Corporate 
Lobbying.” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol.1 No.10, Spring 2001. 
398 Jane Corbin, “BBC uncovers lost Iraq billions.” BBC News, 10 June 2008. 
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oil corporations in US foreign policy to the Middle East399.  At the time such examples were 
tolerated by Galbraith as examples of corporations acting for their shareholders’ best 
interest through indirect means.  However some corporations now support political causes 
in a manner that does not generate any obvious benefit to the corporation or shareholder, 




There is a compelling case for governments to regulate corporations in a manner that 
effectively reduces corporate executive salaries over time.  Such action is necessary, 
morally justified and in the public interest. There is nothing in the current trend of corporate 
governance to indicate that the problem will solve itself without external regulation. 
 
In the short term there should be a direct cap on the level of total executive rewards, linked 
to average incomes.  There should be prohibitions on perverse and unearned rewards 
such as golden parachutes and performance bonuses not tied to defined comparative 
performance measures.  The proportion of salary that may be paid as a bonus should also 
be limited, to reduce the risk of perverse incentives.  Despite the claims of critics, it is 
difficult to see disadvantages for the society or shareholders in implementing executive 
salary caps in the short term.  The current level of executive salary is so much higher than 
that of other occupations that it could undergo massive reduction (by a factor of ten in 
Australia or fifty in the United States) and still represent a substantially above average 
income that would prove attractive to new business career aspirants. 
 
These measures are not described as “short term” because they are only assumed to be 
necessary in the short term.  Rather it is because in the long term executive salary caps 
are likely to be necessary but insufficient.  In the long term additional measures are likely 
to be needed, as it is assumed that incumbent executives will use their positional power 
and political influence to circumvent such restrictions as public memory of past abuses 
fades. 
 
In the long term reform of the nature of corporate governance is required. Such reforms 
need to be revolutionary not evolutionary.  Current systems consider market efficiency and 
                                                
399 J.K. Galbraith, “The New Industrial State.” (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin 1967). 
 237 
fair competition but not the public interest or in some cases shareholder interests.  
Corporate structures were never developed to achieve compliance with any overarching 
political or ethical theory but were developed to further commercial interests at the time. 
Corporate structures were developed by corporate executives for the efficient control of 
the corporation by the executives.  In that sense they remain highly efficient mechanisms, 
but this power is being used to benefit the interests of individual executives sometimes at 
the expense of shareholders. 
 
Now that corporations have grown to be the dominant economic force in most western 
democracies there is an urgent need to revisit their powers and the degree of 
accountability for decision makers within them.  In this light, excessive executive rewards 
may be seen as a symptom of a broad and growing problem.  This creates an imbalance 
of power and influence in the hands of corporate executives compared to other citizens.  
Unchecked, this threatens to harm democracy itself.   
 
The solution is to reform the processes by which corporate decisions are made, and to 
reform the process by which corporate decision makers (directors and executives) are 
selected.  The objectives are to make the selection processes: more representative, so 
that all shareholders interests are proportionally considered; more inclusive, so that groups 
such as employees and the community are represented (especially in publicly listed 
companies); and more transparent, so that executive positions are filled in the same 
manner as other employee positions, and with similar conditions. 
 
A large number of legal changes will be required to achieve these objectives.  Critical 
areas for regulatory reform include the nomination, election and terms of corporate 
directors, rules for handling of proxy votes of shareholders, and legally binding codes of 
ethical conduct for both directors and executives.  Parallel changes to bring the regulation 
of retirement and investment share funds into the same governance regime as 
corporations are equally important. 
 
These changes may be politically difficult to implement, but are essential if the causes of 
excessive executive rewards are to be eliminated.  As a starting point, it is recommended 
that governments introduce such rules on investment funds wishing to be eligible to 
receive government mandated retirement savings.  This will create an incentive for the 
market to move towards reform. 
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In the next and final chapter I will briefly summarise the findings of the thesis for executive 
rewards.  I will also develop some conclusions on the implications of the executive rewards 
problem for relevant branches of philosophy and economics.  In my view, this problem 
highlights the need for greater collaboration and change in the far too separate disciplines 






I will now summarise my findings, starting first with the most basic question of whether the 
current levels of executive salaries are justifiable.  I will then proceed on to conclusions 
firstly about the philosophical theories of distributive justice that might be used to examine 
executive rewards, and secondly about the economic theories used to justify them.  This 
leads to conclusions about the causes of current trends, and policy recommendations for 
changes in the structure of the executive labour market and its regulation.  These policy 
recommendations are based on the Australian and United States executive labour 
markets, however they would also be applicable to other democracies with large private 
corporations operating in similarly regulated markets. 
 
Beyond the findings relating to the executive labour market, this thesis also suggests 
broader conclusions about the macro-economic theories that have dominated the political-
economy discourse over the past thirty years.  The trends of the executive labour market 
over this time have implications for both the practice of corporate governance, and 
indirectly to political governance structures. 
 
Conclusions about what the nature of corporate and political governance structures should 
be depend on many factors, of which executive reward is only one.  Nevertheless I will 
show that the conclusion of this thesis is that in so far as executive rewards are 
problematic, they are already having an adverse effect on both the economic performance 
and political institutions of capitalist countries.  There is a need to rethink aspects of both 
corporate governance structures and political governance.  Finally, I will explain the need 
for greater integration of the relevant disciplines. 
 
9.1 Executive Salary Levels 
 
The public reaction against the current level of corporate executive salaries described in 
chapter one is understandable.  However it does not in itself mean that those reward levels 
are unreasonable.  The real question should be, whether the current salary levels can be 
justified, and what would constitute reasonable criteria for deciding levels of executive 
reward, and what those levels should be. 
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As we have seen in the subsequent chapter examining empirical evidence, the public 
criticism of reward levels is in fact correct.  There does not appear to be any justification 
for the current levels of executive rewards in Australia and particularly in the United States.  
They cannot be defended on the basis of equity or economic efficiency, either from the 
point of view of the individual corporation or for the nation as a whole.  There is a slight 
correlation between executive rewards and corporate performance in Australia, and no 
significant relationship between them in the United States.   
 
Significantly for economic efficiency, executive reward levels within a nation appear to 
have no relationship to share-market returns and a negative relationship to GDP growth, 
although this result may be influenced by the United States.  The United States executive 
labour market pays significantly more than in other countries, even for similar sized firms, 
and has had lower GDP growth in the period when executive rewards reached their 
highest levels. 
 
Even worse, there is some evidence to suggest that in the United States above average 
executive rewards may be a marker for risk of corporate collapse.  There is insufficient 
data to prove a relationship, although high executive reward and risk of collapse both 
appear to be linked to poor corporate governance.  A rational share-market investor would 
seek to avoid investing in United States corporations that pay their executives above the 
average market rate.  It has been suggested that this result may be due to large executive 
bonuses.  When combined with “golden parachute” clauses in contracts, they act as 
perverse incentives for executives to adopt high-risk strategies with corporate assets. 
 
As to what criteria should be appropriate for setting the level of executive rewards, in the 
absence of any evidence supporting a different approach, social norms for salary 
differences in groups should apply to executives.  There are consistent relationships in 
both Australia and the United States between the average and the highest paid members 
of occupational groups, whether due to holding leadership positions and/or exceptional 
skill.  Based on these relationships, executives should be paid a maximum of six to eight 
times the average reward for group members, or nine to thirteen times the lowest 
rewarded group member.  This would equate to an upper reward limit of $480,000AUS in 
Australia and a similar level in the United States in 2009 dollars.  This would suggest a 
huge reduction in executive reward levels is required for them to meet social norms.  
Current CEO reward levels exceed these norms by a factor of twelve in Australia (CEO 
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rewards 110 times average wages rather than 8 times) and by an extraordinary factor of 
thirty-four in the United States (CEO rewards 275 times average wages rather than 8 
times). 
 
The current level of executive rewards is partly an unfortunate (for shareholders) historical 
accident, with the introduction of executive contracts linked to share prices coinciding with 
the dramatic increase in share prices in Australia and the United States during the 1980s 
and 1990s.  This still does not explain why executive reward levels have risen in 
comparative terms for almost thirty years.  There was some evidence that the rate of 
increase in executive rewards halted briefly during the global financial crisis of 2008-09.  
However they still remain far higher than the average income for any other profession, and 
several times higher than executive rewards prior to the 1980s. 
 
9.2 Distributive Justice 
 
Turning next to the philosophical conclusions arising from this inquiry, the question of 
executive reward levels exposes a number of weaknesses in the contribution based desert 
theories within the field of distributive justice.  In considering rewards for executives as 
corporate leaders, we need to understand the general case of rewards for leaders of 
groups engaged in joint activities.  This case has not previously been considered in 
literature on desert theories.  These have tended to focus on the questions of sharing 
rewards between rich and poor individuals, and the actions of the state or institutions in 
dealing with individuals.  They do not deal with how groups or institutions should internally 
reward their members. 
 
This is a major omission from desert theories of distributive justice since in practice the 
majority of cases of deciding rewards will be dealing with individuals within groups.  
Whether rewarding members of private corporations, government departments, sporting 
teams, universities or churches, working within a group context is the predominant case for 
most human activities, rather than individuals in isolation.  Any desert theory of distributive 
justice that cannot be applied within groups has limited practical application. 
 
We have examined the question of rewards under contribution-based desert theories 
because they most closely resemble actual labour markets, and because they also equate 
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to the attitudes of the general public.  In considering contribution based rewards for 
leaders of groups we are immediately confronted with a problem in determining how to 
allocate a share of the group’s social product to the desert base of the group leader.  
There is no obvious way to define the marginal product of any group member, including 
the leader, for a group action.  Presumably the desert base of the leader is based upon the 
change in social product from the group in implementing their leadership action upon the 
group.  We cannot allocate the entire change in social product because that ignores any 
potential change in contribution from other group members.  Hence we have no absolute 
way of determining the group leader’s contribution to the social product. 
 
We might compare the group’s performance to that of another group to adjudge the 
leader’s impact.  However we then have two other problems.  First, we are assuming that 
the difference in the two groups’ performance is due to the actions of the leaders.  Second, 
we only have a comparative measure of performance, not absolute.  For example we can 
say that leader of productive group A should be 50% better rewarded than leader of 
unproductive group B.  But we still cannot say what that appropriate reward level for the 
leaders of A or B is in absolute terms.  We therefore also cannot say whether the reward 
level is economically efficient. 
 
Of contribution based desert theories, David Miller’s market rate theory400 seems 
preferable to determining marginal contributions for members of groups.  Miller’s theory 
also contains useful definitions of exploitative markets.  We may use these to judge the 
fairness of individual labour markets, including the executive labour market.  Ultimately 
though Miller’s theory too does not allow us to define what an acceptable level of reward 
for executives (or any other position) should be.  Rather, it defines market conditions in 
which we may be moderately confident that the reward offered is justified.  The current 
labour markets for corporate executives in Australia and the United States do not satisfy 
Miller’s conditions. 
 
This suggests that the use of compensation based desert theories would be preferable to 
contribution based desert theories in assessing rewards for members of groups, including 
leaders.  Compensation-based desert is defined upon conditions of employment and 
opportunity cost that may be assessed for any position.  There is no philosophical difficulty 
                                                
400 David Miller, “Market, State and Community.” (New York: Oxford University Press 1989), 
pages 157-174. 
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in applying compensation theories to the case of corporate executives.  Executive rewards 
would then depend on factors such as length and stress of working hours, difficulty of 
working conditions, years of study or experience required to qualify, and risk of dismissal.   
 
Compensation based rewards would represent a profound departure from current practice 
for executive rewards, and require a fundamental re-evaluation of the extent of executive 
rewards in most western countries.  No doubt corporate executive would still be found to 
be a challenging position deserving above average reward.  However it seems unlikely 
that the actual reward level justified would be any greater than that for other professions 
requiring skill and responsibility. 
 
9.3 Economic Theories for Executive Rewards 
 
The question of whether current reward levels for corporate executives are justifiable has 
been answered emphatically in the negative for Australia and especially the United States.  
This leads us to the question of what are the economic causes of such high executive 
reward levels, and the economic theories used to justify them.  In this we encounter a 
substantial conflict between protagonists of the rival market-based (alignment) theories 
and non market-based or market failure (management power) theories.  Both have been 
used to explain trends in executive rewards.  Both build on the understanding of agency 
theory, where the question of how to motivate and control executives to act in the interests 
of shareholders is an example of a principal – agent problem.  Shareholders represent the 
principals and executives the agents. 
 
The primary market-based theory of executive rewards, Jensen and Murphy’s alignment 
theory401, held that contracts with performance-based incentives could align the actions of 
executives with the interests of shareholders.  As the performance of the corporation 
improved the share price would rise in value, and so the executive’s share-based incentive 
would rise in value.  This would motivate the executive to improve the performance of the 
corporation.  Alignment theory also relied on Fama’s Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
(EMH)402, where it is assumed that markets are informationally efficient and thus are self-
                                                
401 Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy, “Performance Pay and Top-Management Executives.” 
Journal of Political Economy, April 1990. 
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regulating.  If valid, alignment theory would allow the setting of economically efficient 
executive rewards, without the cost of external regulation.  Alignment theory assumes that 
both share markets and the executive labour market are efficient, and that executive 
performance influences share price. 
 
If, as Jensen and Murphy argued, the executive labour market is an ideal laboratory to test 
the ability of incentive type contracts to align the interests of principals and agents, then 
the evidence suggests that incentive payments do not align those interests, or their 
actions.  The initial evidence cited by Jensen and Murphy in the 1980s was statistically 
weak.  Over the next two decades the correlation between US executive rewards and 
corporate performance became weaker, until it is debateable whether any relationship can 
be identified at all.  Jensen and Murphy’s dogmatic insistence on alignment theory in the 
face of this mounting contrary evidence cannot be defended. 
 
A number of theoretical weaknesses in alignment theory were identified that explain this 
lack of confirming evidence.  Firstly, unless the efforts of the executive can be proven to be 
the cause of corporate performance, it is circular reasoning, assuming cause and effect.  
Second, at best it can only determine whether the distribution of executive rewards 
matches performance in relative terms.  It cannot determine whether the level of executive 
rewards is appropriate, which is precisely the issue in question, and which Jensen and 
Murphy have attempted to defend.  For this reason, it is not possible to guarantee that 
alignment theory will lead to an economically efficient allocation of executive rewards. 
Finally, alignment theory uses simplistic assumptions about the motivation of executives, 
and fails to consider the adverse impact of income and substitution effects on the supply of 
executive labour.  Compared to modern behavioural economic theories, or standard labour 
market economics, alignment theory does not adequately explain the executive labour 
market. 
 
The alternative non-market theory of executive rewards is management power, which has 
been expounded by Bebchuck and Fried403 and others.  In this executives exploit the 
informational and bargaining asymmetries of their positions to increase their rewards. 
Various contract forms such as incentive contracts and share bonuses are simply means 
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of camouflaging this behaviour.  In my view Bebchuk and Fried’s theory is theoretically 
sound and better fits the evidence than alignment theory. 
 
The only aspect lacking from Bebchuk and Fried’s hypothesis is an explanation of how 
management power increased after the tightening of regulations on executive rewards that 
occurred from the 1990s onwards.  That should have reduced executive power.  My 
hypothesis is that increased management power can be explained by changes in the 
nature of share ownership.  During the period of rapidly growing executive rewards, share 
ownership in Australia and the United States was becoming less direct.  The majority of 
shares are now owned by institutional funds.  The ultimate owners of corporations, the 
investors, are now three steps removed from corporate executives.  This adds a layer of 
agency costs and raises the possibility of collusive games developing between fund 
managers, directors and executives.  Management power has increased greatly in this 
environment of more complex, more remote, and more diffuse share ownership. 
 
Proponents of market based explanations of executive rewards could argue that alignment 
theories have the advantage of being quantifiable, whereas management power is not 
quantifiable and could be subjective.  However this is not sufficient reason to prefer 
alignment theory to management power explanations.  A non-quantifiable theory that is 
logically sound and can explain the observed trend is still preferable to a quantifiable 
theory that is not logically sound and is not empirically valid. 
 
9.4 Corporate Reform 
 
The fact that actual rewards to corporate executives are higher than can be justified, and 
that this pattern has continued for three decades, suggests that there is a structural 
problem in the executive labour market.  Normal market fluctuations do not explain the 
persistent nature of the problem.  At no stage has the executive labour market appeared 
likely to correct itself.  Market regulation is therefore warranted, in the public interest, and 
since it is likely to be much less expensive than the current cost of market failure, 
economically justifiable as well.  Reform is required both to the executive labour market 
directly in the short term, and to corporate governance and structures to remove the 
causes of market failure in the long term. 
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In the short term direct limits such as salary caps on executive rewards are likely to be 
necessary.  This is due to the large quantum of reduction in reward levels needed to arrive 
at a defensible level.   Salary caps are ethically justifiable given the strong public interest.  
The salary cap limits proposed are at levels well above average incomes (six to eight 
times), and do not represent a hardship or injustice being imposed on executives. 
 
In the long term reform of the nature of corporate governance is required. Such reforms 
need to be revolutionary not evolutionary.  Current regulations consider market efficiency 
and fair competition but not the interests of stakeholders or the community.  Corporate 
structures were not developed to achieve compliance with any overarching political or 
ethical theory but were developed to further commercial interests at the time. They were 
developed by corporate executives for the efficient control of the corporation by the 
executives.  In that sense they remain highly efficient mechanisms, but their power is 
being used to benefit the interests of executives rather than shareholders.  Regulation of 
corporate structures also requires change because the nature of share ownership has 
altered to make previous assumptions about the motivations of internal corporate 
stakeholders obsolete. 
 
The solution is to reform the processes by which corporate decisions are made, and to 
reform the process by which corporate decision makers (directors and executives) are 
selected.  The objectives are to make the selection processes more representative so that 
all shareholders interests are proportionally considered; more inclusive, so that groups 
such as employees and the community are represented (especially in publicly listed 
companies); and more transparent, so that executive positions are filled in the same 
manner as other employee positions, and with similar conditions. 
 
The difficulty is not in identifying the changes that are needed, but in gaining political 
approval for them.  Economists already recognise in public choice theory that corporations 
use their lobbying power to influence government to benefit corporate ends.  Agency 
theory tells us that corporate executives will use corporate powers to benefit their private 
ends.  Putting the two together, a theory of executive influence tells us that corporate 
executives are likely to use their corporation’s lobbying power to benefit their private ends.  
This presumably would include lobbying to block efforts to reduce corporate executive 
power and cap executive rewards. 
 
 247 
9.5 Broader Implications for Capitalist Democracies 
 
The excesses in executive salary seen in recent years have reached the point where the 
credibility of free-market capitalism itself is now under question.  This was demonstrated in 
a 2009 article by journalist Matt Taibbi published in Rolling Stone Magazine entitled “The 
Great American Bubble Machine”404.  The article was about the role of investment bank 
Goldman Sachs in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/08, and previous financial crises.  
Taibbi described Goldman Sachs as follows:  
“The world’s most powerful investment bank is a great vampire-squid wrapped around the 
face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells of money.” 
 
Taibbi’s article is polemic and does not explain the technical causes of the crisis.  Yet it 
clearly struck a popular chord, and was widely quoted405.  The article was not a criticism of 
Goldman Sachs’ shareholders, but rather the behaviour of its executives, and in particular 
former executives with roles in government who had acted where they held clear conflicts 
of interest.  It ends with a pessimistic view of the nature of current capital markets and the 
damage they have done not only to America and the world’s economy but to democracy 
as well. 
 
We cannot entirely blame recent events only on corporate executives and the weaknesses 
of the governance systems and ownership structures they exploit.  There is also a social 
dimension to the responsibility.  While the majority of shares are now owned by 
institutional funds, some 30% of shares in Australia and the United States are still owned 
by private individuals. I do not suggest that small investors are able to significantly 
influence share markets or corporate behaviour.  Yet clearly in the past decade, most 
individual investors were happy to accept the status quo while markets were rising.  Most 
invested in corporations focused on short-term profits regardless of risk, and accepted the 
dividends that resulted.  At the time the markets were rising few criticised the executives 
undertaking these strategies.  Ironically, this would prove to be against those private 
investors own long term interests.  Thus while the primary causes of excessive executive 
rewards are structural, they were reinforced by this self-serving yet self-defeating attitude 
to markets held by many individuals. 
 
                                                
404 Matt Taibbi, “The Great American Bubble Machine.” Rolling Stone Magazine, July 9-23, 2009. 
405 At the end of 2010 a Google search for this title produced over one million matches. 
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Taibbi’s deeply negative view of the nature of the individuals who comprise corporate 
executives is not isolated.  Less colourful but equally damning criticisms were made of 
many other financial executives prominent during the decade since 2000.  Examples 
included Fred “the Shred” Goodwin of the Royal Bank of Scotland, Charles Prince and 
Vikram Pandit of Citigroup, and Icelanders Bjorgolfur Gudmunsson of Landsbanki and 
Hreidar Mar Sigurdsson of Kaupthing, who effectively bankrupted their entire country as 
well as their own banks406.  The widespread perception that executives have enriched 
themselves through irresponsible behaviour has greatly damaged the standing of business 
leaders generally.  I agree with Taibbi’s general view of them, and consider that the current 
system of rewarding executives has had the effect of attracting many individuals who are 
inappropriate to be leaders. 
 
Loss of trust in business leaders is more than simply a question of reputation.  Capitalism 
relies on the voluntarily exchange of goods and services, with agents having confidence 
that they will either be paid for a service or that the goods will be received.  Some degree 
of trust is thus foundational to capitalism.  If business leaders cannot be trusted, the 
institution of capitalism is damaged as a result.  This loss of trust leads to a reluctance to 
loan money, which was one of the direct underlying causes of the “freezing” of credit 
markets during the GFC407.  It would seem that corporate executives did not trust each 
other any more than the general public now trust them. 
 
The importance of trust in the functioning of economic systems has been understood since 
the days of Adam Smith, who described the nature of “civil society” in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments408 that was the predecessor work to The Wealth of Nations409.  Yet the period 
during which corporate executive salaries rose so dramatically was characterised by 
laissez fair capitalism where issues such as trust were sidelined to research in behavioural 
economics.  In the wake of the GFC the importance of trust has begun to be reintroduced 
into economic theory, with works such as Animal Spirits by Ackerloff and Shiller410.  In this 
                                                
406 Robert Peston, "Markets call time on Iceland." BBC News, 4 October 2008. 
407 Paul Krugman, “The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008.” (New York: 
W.W. Norton Company Limited, 2009). 
408 Adam Smith, “The Theory of Moral Sentiments.” (first published 1759; Clarendon Press edition: 
Oxford, 1976). 
409 Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.” (London: W. 
Strahan and T. Cadell 1776; Penguin edition: London, 1986). 
410 George A. Ackerlof and Robert J. Shiller, “Animal Spirits.” Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 2009. 
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book not only is the necessity of trust for voluntary exchange to flourish acknowledged, but 
its opposites, bad faith and corruption, are identified as historic causes of market collapse. 
 
The political leadership in western countries has also suffered a parallel loss in reputation.  
The massive financial losses suffered during the GFC led to large amounts of public funds 
being used to “bail-out” (rescue) insolvent banks and other entities deemed “to big to fail” 
in several countries.  The consequent debts falling to taxpayers have created considerable 
public resentment. Although such actions may have been necessary in the public interest, 
they have been marked by sharp protests, and even riots in countries such as Greece.  In 
many cases the public reaction to bail-outs has been so hostile that it has limited the ability 
of governments to respond to financial crises, notably in the United States in 2008411 and 
Germany in 2010412. 
 
The public reaction is understandable in that governments were seen to assist rather than 
punish business leaders who caused considerable social harm.  This is a classic example 
of moral hazard as defined by Arrow413, where a failure to make individuals accountable 
for the risks they incur might lead to a recurrence of such crises in future.  Since the GFC 
incumbent governments have been defeated in most elections in OECD nations.  Among 
G7 nations the USA, UK, Canada, Italy and Japan all elected new leaders in the election 
following the GFC in 2007/08 (France and Germany have not had national elections since 
2007).  The institution of government is now less trusted in western countries than it was 
before. 
 
There is also a counter danger to the business community that needs to be considered.  
The resentment that follows any period of excess and inadequate regulation often leads to 
a desire to find scapegoats and reactionary over-regulation.  There is now considerable 
popular sentiment in western countries for regulation of executive salaries.  There is a 
danger that demonising the role of executives too greatly will deter capable individuals 
from entering the field.  If corporate executives are also the entrepreneurs and creators of 
new wealth in our society, then it is not in the interests of society that their contribution is 
discouraged.   
 
                                                
411 Ben Rooney, "Bailout foes hold day of protests." CNN Money Online, 25 September 2008. 
412 Nicholas Kulish, “Opposition Grows in Germany to Bailout for Greece.” New York Times, 15 
February 2010. 
413 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Essays in the Theory of Risk- Bearing.” (Chicago: Markham 1971). 
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Now that corporations have grown to be the dominant force in the private sphere of most 
western democracies there is an urgent need to revisit their powers and the degree of 
accountability for decision makers within them.  In this light, excessive executive rewards 
may be seen as a symptom of this broader and still growing problem.  This creates an 
imbalance of power and influence in the hands of corporate executives compared to other 
citizens.  Unchecked, this threatens to harm democracy itself in the long term.   
 
Most theories of political philosophy for western democracies were developed in the 
eighteenth century before the advent of large corporations.  They considered relationships 
between individuals and the State, but not between large private institutions and the State, 
or other individuals.  Corporations have been granted unique forms of legal status, with 
legal rights to own property and defend property rights like a citizen, usually far greater 
financial resources to pursue them with, but without many of the individual responsibilities 
that fall to citizens within the same society.  This obvious imbalance, combined with the 
ability of corporations to accumulate assets over more than a single lifetime, leads to the 
inevitable long term outcome that the size and financial power of corporations will greatly 
exceed that of even the wealthiest individuals.  The power and influence accruing to the 
individuals gaining controlling positions within corporations will be correspondingly greater 
than the power and influence accruing to other citizens.   
 
The powers held by corporate executives appear to have far fewer checks and balances 
on their abuse compared to comparable restraints on executive positions in the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches of government.  Those individuals are usually subject to 
strict rules on their behaviour, financial interests and conflicts of interest, and use of 
information.  Breaches of such rules are often criminal offences, subject to sanctions well 
beyond loss of employment or financial penalties.  This is not to say that such powers are 
never abused, but the risk of abuse is a recognised problem and safeguards are added to 
minimise it.  
 
Corporate executives are rarely subject to such constraints beyond those designed to 
protect the narrow financial interests of the corporation.  This may include contractual 
conditions, and the need to comply with business regulations that ensure fair and efficient 
competition.  Yet forms of abuse that might result in harm to individuals, or social or 
political harm, are rarely regulated.  The global financial crisis has proven that corporations 
are now so large that abuse of their power has the capacity to do harm at the national and 
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even international level.  The need to construct a new approach to corporate accountability 
is pressing.   
 
In this regard economic theories that only consider the effect of executive roles on 
efficiency and returns to shareholders are wholly inadequate.  The broader social and 
political consequences of these power imbalances has not been considered adequately in 
economic theory, or at all in the financial accounting literature that usually deals with 
executive rewards.  Ackerloff and Shiller414 have made an encouraging start on developing 
a broader theory of motivations for corporate agents.  The need for such a theory is now 
pressing, as a thirty-year trend of failing to halt the growth in executive rewards has 
demonstrated. 
 
This leads to a final and more general conclusion about the nature of academic inquiries 
into executive rewards.  The topic is complex, requiring an understanding of disciplines 
such as economics, financial accounting, corporate governance, and political theory.  Most 
of these fields have developed separately and have shown comparatively little inclination 
to pay serious heed to philosophical literature on ethics.  Yet the need for input from 
applied philosophical ethics fields such as distributive justice is great.  Without it, we have 
seen economists and financial accountants make technical analyses, then extrapolate 
them to reach normative conclusions, without an adequate normative framework on which 
to base them.  Meanwhile the question of overwhelming interest to the community – the 
level of executive salary – has sometimes been ignored. 
 
In closing, economists such as Friedman have argued that consideration of ethics is 
outside the scope of analysis of business behaviour, including the question of executive 
rewards.  However as I have demonstrated, the opposite is true.  Corporations have 
enormous ability to influence societies both socially and politically, as well as 
economically.  With this power comes a moral responsibility to consider the consequences 
of their actions.  In this context the ethics of executive salaries is important, and merits 
further philosophical investigation.  The impact of economics on society has become far 
too important to leave to the economists. 
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